International suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear activities was first aroused in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it was not until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched an intensive investigation into the Iranian nuclear program in 2002, that it was revealed that Iran had enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards. In January 2006, Iran began to ignore limitations on nuclear fuel cycle activities yet again, in defiance of the broad opinion of the international community and despite both offers of assistance and the threat of sanctions. To discuss the issue of Iran's nuclear program and its possible future repercussions on regional and global security, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) hosted a symposium entitled Iran's Nuclear Program: Realities and Repercussions, in Abu Dhabi on February 26, 2006. Visiting experts were invited to share their views on the Iranian nuclear program, its likely development and the extent to which the potential threat of nuclear weapons could destabilize the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East region. This volume represents a valuable collection of these expert views, covering Iran's current nuclear capability and its potential to develop atomic weapons; the changes and developments in Iran's nuclear program since the 2005 Iranian presidential elections; Israeli foreign policy in relation to Iran; the possible impact that an Iranian nuclear program could have on the security of the GCC; and the prospect of military action against Iran.

This monograph reexamines the strategic implications for the United States in the event Iran moves ahead to acquire nuclear weapons capability. This study draws on expert workshops held in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in January and February 2005, as well as meetings, interviews, and research conducted at NDU and elsewhere over the past several years. Chapters are as follows: "Iran's Perspective: National Rights and Nuclear Weapons," "Neighbors, Negotiators, and Nonproliferators," and "U.S. Policy Options." Appendixes include "Timeline of Iran's Path to Nuclear Weapons," "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects," and "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments."

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’: Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the ‘crisis’ surrounding Iran’s nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’ presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

As Iran?'s nuclear program evolves, U.S. decisionmakers will confront a series of critical policy choices involving complex considerations and policy trade-offs. These policy choices could involve dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons; deterring Iran from using its nuclear weapons, if it were to acquire them; and reassuring U.S. regional partners. The U.S. Air Force will need to prepare to carry out whatever policies are chosen.

Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that "[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper's February 2016 testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.