The aim of this research is to ascertain whether Pakistan’s financial system is conducive to market discipline. We measure the potential of depositors to induce market discipline in the commercial banking sector. A comprehensive survey of over six thousand respondents was used to gauge their propensity to discipline bank management in response to deteriorating financial conditions. Our results portray that depositors are likely to withdraw funds in response to a reduction in profitability, an increase in non-performing loans, and a reduction in total assets. We identify that banks with better service quality are less sensitive to deposit withdrawals in the event of a reduction in their financial performance. Among other findings, the presence of contractual guarantees by the government desensitizes depositors to market information, making them less likely to be involved in imposing market discipline.

Over a decade has passed since the collapse of the U.S. investment bank, Lehman Brothers, marked the onset of the largest global economic crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis revealed major shortcomings in market discipline, regulation and supervision, and reopened important policy debates on financial regulation. Since the onset of the crisis, emphasis has been placed on better regulation of banking systems and on enhancing the tools available to supervisory agencies to oversee banks and intervene speedily in case of distress. Drawing on ten years of data and analysis, Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 provides evidence on the regulatory remedies adopted to prevent future financial troubles, and sheds light on important policy concerns. To what extent are regulatory reforms designed with high-income countries in mind appropriate for developing countries? What has been the impact of reforms on market discipline and bank capital? How should countries balance the political and social demands for a safety net for users of the financial system with potentially severe moral hazard consequences? Are higher capital requirements damaging to the flow of credit? How should capital regulation be designed to improve stability and access? The report provides a synthesis of what we know, as well as areas where more evidence is still needed. Global Financial Development Report 2019/2020 is the fifth in a World Bank series. The accompanying website tracks financial systems in more than 200 economies before, during, and after the global financial crisis (http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr) and provides information on how banking systems are regulated and supervised around the world (http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS).

This book covers financial sector stability issues in the following areas: risk management and governance in financial institutions; financial crises and contagion; domestic monetary and financial policies; and international cooperation. The papers were presented at the IMF’s eighth Central Banking Seminar by authors from academia, investment banks, government, and international institutions. The papers discuss such subjects as bank soundness, systemic bank restructuring, and the safety and efficiency of systemically important payment systems and their interaction with the macroeconomic environment.

This book provides a comprehensive reassessment of the development of the economy of Pakistan since independence to the present. It employs a rigorous statistical methodology, which has applicability to other developing economies, to define and measure episodes of growth and stagnation, and to examine how the state has contributed to each. Contesting the orthodox view that liberalisation has been an important driver of growth in Pakistan, the book places the state at the centre of economic development, rather than the market. It examines the state in relation to its economic roles in mobilising resources and promoting a productive allocation of those resources, and its political roles in managing the conflict inherent in economic development. The big conclusions for economic growth in Pakistan are that liberalisation, the market and the external world economy in fact have less influence than that of the state and conflict. Overall, the book offers analyses of the different successive approaches to promoting economic growth and development in Pakistan, relates these to medium-term economic outcomes - periods of growth and stagnation - and thereby explains how the mechanisms by which the state can better promote growth and development.

Corporate Governance Failures in Emerging Economies – Evidence from Pakistan provides detailed insights regarding corporate governance practices, legal and regulatory frameworks, drivers of corporate governance codes, levels of compliance and various corporate governance mechanisms in an emerging market context. The material outlines and discusses potential challenges to corporate governance development in these settings, emphasizing the wide array of formal and informal institutional factors that have both permitted and fostered corporate governance failures and scandals in Pakistan. This book will be of interest to anyone who is concerned with exploring issues relating to corporate governance outcomes in emerging market contexts and the relevance of institutional theory in offering explanations for the observed behaviour.

This book provides a comprehensive summary of the latest academic research on the important topic of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) in banking. It explains TBTF from various perspectives including the range of regulatory measures proposed to counter TBTF, most notably the globally accepted regulation of global-systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and its main tool of capital surcharges. The empirical analysis quantifies the shareholder value of the G-SIB attribution by using quarterly observations from more than 750 global banks between Q2 2008 and Q3 2015. The main finding is that G-SIBs are confronted with a substantial relative valuation discount compared to non-G-SIBs. From the end of 2011 until the end of 2015, a stable discount of 0.6x–0.8x price-to-tangible common equity (P/TCE) is statistically highly significant. The results suggest that the G-SIB designation effect, which positively impacts G-SIBs’ share prices because of funding benefits from IGGs, is dominated by the regulatory G-SIB burden effect, which negatively impacts G-SIBs’ share prices because of lower profitability due to capital surcharges and other regulatory requirements placed on G-SIBs. The findings re-open the debate about whether breaking up G-SIBs would unlock shareholder value and whether G-SIBs are regulated efficiently.