On May 1, 2003, before a live television audience onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared victory for the United States and the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Preceding the president's speech was perhaps the most stunning display of technological superiority and joint conventional fire power in military history. In just 26 days, the United States and coalition forces had invaded Iraq, defeated Iraqi conventional forces, ousted President Saddam Hussein from power, and terminated the Ba'ath party's 35-year hold on Iraq. Even the harshest critics of the war were claiming that there had never been a combat operation as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Omitted from the President's jubilant speech, however, was that the United States' campaign in Iraq was far from over. The defeat of Iraqi conventional forces and subsequent regime change were trigger points for the coalition's transition to the final phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom -- post-conflict operations. Post-conflict or post-hostility operations are activities taken to stabilize, secure, and reconstruct an area of operations (AO) to transition the AO back to peace and civilian government control. Almost 3 years after President Bush's declaration of the end of major combat operations, the United States is still heavily engaged in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in Iraq. This thesis states that U.S. Combatant Commanders struggled to transition to and execute post-conflict operations in Iraq for three main reasons. To support his thesis, the author examines shortfalls in the formulation of the plan for post-conflict operations; analyzes the lack of interagency coordination and communication and how it affected the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and its subsequent successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and examines how lack of operational intelligence and cultural awareness contributed to the problem.

It would be an understatement to say events in Iraq, post-combat operations, did not go as envisioned. The obvious question is why? Many of the difficulties experienced by the U.S. military in Iraq were clearly foreshadowed, even predicted. Almost every analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlights flaws in the planning for post-war Iraq. The pitfalls can be sorted into several all-too-familiar categories, including timeliness, unity of effort, prioritization, and completeness and coherence. Military planners significantly underestimated the magnitude of the difficulties they would encounter in Iraq. Lessons emanating from OIF also confirmed several emerging truths about modern military operations. Operations in Iraq firmly substantiated the criticality of successfully executing post-conflict operations to the achievement of strategic aims. The realities of modern military operations combined with the lessons of OIF strongly argue for a further evolution in the combatant commander's ability to conduct post-conflict operations. The U.S. military can no longer approach post-conflict operations as a second-tier event, something that can be done in an ad hoc fashion. The combatant commander needs to have a distinct post-conflict planning and executing capability. The combatant commander can best achieve this capability by integrating a dedicated post-conflict planning element into his Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Doing so will better ensure he has the needed capabilities and staff integration to effectively plan and orchestrate post-conflict missions.

A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

Summarizes a report on the planning and execution of operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM through June 2004. Recommends changes to Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and Title 10 functions.

A colloquium on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation" was held November 2, 2005, and was co-sponsored by SSI and Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Three years beyond the start of that transition, the debate continues about the adequacy of planning for and proficiency of execution of Phase IV operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The debate most often surrounds three issues concerning this final operational phase: the relationship to preceding operational phases; responsibility for planning; and responsibility for execution. Much of the debate to this point has been an unproductive effort to assign blame for shortcomings in the planning for and execution of stability and reconstruction operations; participants in the colloquium moved beyond finding fault, began analyzing the central issues, and addressed solutions.

"In April of 2003, a stunned world looked on as the armed forces of the United States and Britain conducted a lightning-fast military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Anglo-American victory brought down not just the Iraqi regime, but also much of the conventional wisdom about modern war. But even as U.S. and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and new military and security challenges emerged." "In this book, respected military analyst Anthony Cordesman provides the first in-depth examination of the key issues swirling around the most significant U.S. war since Vietnam. Finding answers is essential if we are to understand the United States' awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Finding answers is also essential if we are to draw the proper lessons and understand the new challenges of conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building."--BOOK JACKET.

On Point is a study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) as soon after the fact as feasible. The Army leadership chartered this effort in a message to the major commands on 30 April 2003. In his guidance, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki directed "a quick, thorough review that looks at the US Army's performance, assesses the role it played in the joint and coalition team, and captures the strategic, operational, and tactical lessons that should be disseminated and applied in future fights." For those of us in the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group (OIF-SG), this translated into three separate products. A "quick look" lessons-learned briefing produced in July, less than 30 days after returning from the theater. On Point-this work-is the second product and was largely completed by mid-August 2003. Finally, the most significant product is the archive of 119,000 documents, some 2,300 interviews and 69,000 photos archived with the support and assistance of the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. We had straightforward guidance and a short time horizon. Simply put, On Point tells the Army's story in the only context possible-a combined-arms ground force operating in a joint environment. There is no other way for the Army to tell its story-the Army cannot get to a theater of war, let alone fight, in any context but that of a joint operation. Accordingly, the OIF-SG relied heavily on the cooperation and support of units in the field and from our colleagues on the other services' collection teams. We also drew on the more deliberate efforts of the Center of Military History and unit historians. We encountered only helpful attitudes, with the exception of one or two Iraqi combatants who fired on or threw grenades at members of the team. The joint lessons learned team from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) assigned a liaison offi cer to the OIF-SG who proved helpful in working with our joint counterparts. The Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC ) historian, the V Corps historian, the Army Materiel Command historian, and various branch historians all were abundantly helpful. Like the soldiers bound for the theater, we trained at two different replacement centers, and most of us deployed via military or Civilian Reserve Air Fleet aircraft. Once in theater, we traveled freely throughout area of operations. Members of the team visited Europe, Turkey, and nearly a dozen sites in the US, ranging from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, to Fort Bliss, Texas. To do this in the time allowed, we depended on others for help. We found eager and enthusiastic support at every stop. Interpreting history is difficult; interpreting ongoing events is even more difficult. On Point is not the seminal history of the OIF or even of the Army in OIF. We understand the risks of a rapidly produced history and believe they are worth taking to glean initial insights, or what General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. described after DESERT STORM as "glimmerings" of change.