Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal fought a war to retain its African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Collectively known as the Campaigns for Africa, the origin of the conflict stems from the post-World War II atmosphere of nationalism and anti-colonial fervor. The Angolan insurgency began in 1961, followed by unrest in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Portugal’s initial actions in Angola were based on foot-slogging by infantry, considered the best method of addressing an insurgency, not only to hunt the enemy but also to keep contact with the population. But in the vast areas of Angola – the majority of which was unsuited to wheeled vehicles – this tactical approach was too painful, and for Portugal the number of troops available was limited. The helicopter was a possible solution, but it was beyond Portugal’s finance resources and it had a tendency to fly over those areas where it was vital to communicate with the population and secure its loyalty. When in 1966 the enemy guerrillas sought a new front in eastern Angola, Portugal needed a force that could combine mobility over rough terrain with the ability to engage insurgents, while maintaining strong links with the population. One of the adaptive solutions to this challenge was found in the past: create horse cavalry units in the form of dragoons that were equally trained for cavalry or infantry service, just as their historical predecessors fought. In this particular case, adaptive tactics involved adjusting existing military methods and means from the traditional and available inventory to craft a solution that would deny eastern Angola to insurgents and support the population there. This story is about imaginative thinking that, instead of a ‘forced abandonment of the old’, led to a ‘resurrection of the old.'

In 1966 Portugal needed a force that could combine mobility with the ability to engage insurgents; one solution was to create horse cavalry units.

Portuguese paratroopers or “paras” began as a stepchild of the army and found a home in the Portuguese Air Force in 1955. Initially, the post-World War Two Portuguese Army seemed to have had mixed emotions about the need for elite, special-purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility and elevated lethality. Shock troops have been traditionally controversial, and even the vaunted military theorist Baron Karl von Clausewitz saw little point in them. The history of the paras in the Portuguese Army is illustrative of this ambivalent view. Nevertheless, in a “war of the weak” in which insurgents avoid government strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities using agility, deception, and imagination, such small, crack government units are particularly well suited to counterinsurgency operations. This appreciation emerged with the threat of a new kind of war in Portuguese Africa, an insurgency, and the new and visionary Air Force well understood the potential of paras when combined with the mobility of the helicopter. The Air Force saw an urgent need for troops who could fight an unconventional war, who could not only defeat an enemy but separate him from the population in which he sought concealment and support and on which he depended for funding, recruits, and intelligence. These were specialised warfighters who in one minute were physically destroying an insidious enemy and in the next administering aid and support and protecting a vulnerable population. These were just the troops that Portugal would require for military success in its approaching battle fought between 1961 and 1974 to retain its African possessions, and this vision would be realized on the African battlefield with devastating consequences. This book tells the paras’ story as researched from Portuguese sources. It details how they were formed and trained and how they developed their imaginative, effective, and feared tactics and applied them in operations to protect the population from insurgent predations and destroy a vicious enemy.

During the 13-year insurgency (1961-74) in Portuguese Africa, more than 800,000 men and women served in the Portuguese armed forces. Of this number, about 9,000 served as commandos (or about 1 percent). Yet their combat losses ― 357 dead, 28 missing in action and 771 wounded ― represented 11.5 percent of the total casualties (a percentage 10 times that of normal troops). It is well established that these warriors were responsible for the elimination of more insurgents and capturing more of their weapons than any other force during the war. Great pains were taken to stay abreast of the latest enemy operational methods and maintain the 'warrior edge' in the force. This edge, in essence, was an approach to fighting that pushed the commandos always to think of themselves as the hunter rather than the hunted. Officers returning from contact with the enemy were rigorously debriefed, and commando instructors regularly participated in operations to learn of the latest enemy developments. This information was integrated with intelligence from other sources gathered by the military and national intelligence services, and from this current knowledge, training was constantly revised to remain attuned to the enemy and his behavior. The commandos became a breed apart - and their reputation was such that when insurgents discovered a unit deployed into their area, they would generally withdraw until the killers left. This commando training - and its sympathy with the fighting environment - made the commandos the most effective ground force in the Portuguese Army. The commandos were expert practitioners in the art of counterinsurgency, and their practice of destroying the enemy in great numbers quickly and quietly served as inspiration not only to South Africa and Rhodesia, but to the enemy himself. This is the story of the Portuguese commandos: their beginnings, their unique operations and their legacy and influence in subsequent sister units such as the Buffalo Battalion of South Africa.

The 1974 Carnation Revolution came as a blessing for independence movements in Portugal's African colonies: Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. As had been the case in a number of sub-Saharan countries suddenly finding themselves free of the colonial yoke, the political vacuum left behind by a previously omnipresent power gave different factions the opportunity to impose their own form of rule. Angola was no different: civil war broke out in 1975 and was to last until 2002. In some ways the Angolan civil war bore similarities to the one which had taken place in neighboring DRC. Too much was at stake for the West not to intervene in some shape or form and in July 1975 President Ford authorized the CIA to provide covert assistance to the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). With South Africa providing military support against a Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), another southwestern African nation became the battleground for a war of ideologies. In 1975-1976, no fewer than nine different armed forces were involved in the fighting. In addition, a large group of British mercenaries were recruited to train FNLA soldiers. The role of these soldiers of fortune would end in ignominy, death and legislative changes intended to rid mercenaries from conflict forever. From Operation IA/FEATURE to Massacre at Maquela examines the dynamics of the Angolan civil war and takes the reader into the inner workings of geopolitical interests, of CIA covert operations and mercenary recruitment. It examines clandestine arms and money laundering networks; takes us from the heart of the Vietnam War to Australian banks, and takes us into dealings between the US and British governments in operations far removed from, but connected to, the Angolan Civil War.

The battle for the town of Cuito Cuanavale is a myth. The conduct of Operations Modular, Hooper, Packer and Displace by South African and UNITA forces in the 6th Military Region of southeastern Angola initially prevented FAPLA and its allies from occupying the UNITA town of Mavinga. The success achieved in this endeavor then led to the conduct of offensive military operations to force FAPLA and its allies to relinquish their bridgehead over the Cuito River and to redeploy to the western bank at Cuito Cuanavale. The FAPLA deployment and occupation of Cuito Cuanavale, on the western bank of the Cuito River, was never contested militarily by opposing forces during 1987 and 1988.

Focusing on the Chiricahua Apache, led by such famous warriors as Cochise Mangas Coloradas, Victorio, Nana and Geronimo, this book strips away the myths behind the history of some of the feared opponents of the US Army in the southwest United States. It explains how their upbringing, training and culture equipped them uniquely for survival in the harsh environment of New Mexico and Arizona and enabled them to fight off their Mexican and American enemies for so long. For decades legendary Apaches like Victorio and Geronimo led resistance in the desert Southwest that defied the firepower of the post Civil War US Army. The Apache warrior evokes a number of images; endurance, elusive cunning, ferocity, and cruelty. These are images prevalent both during the Apache Wars of the 1860s to the 1880s and are, to some extent, still believed today. General George Crook described them as "Human Tigers."