This groundbreaking book is about Karl Popper's early writings before he began his career as a philosopher. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate that Popper's philosophy of science, with its emphasis on the method of trial and error, is largely based on the psychology of Otto Selz, whose theory of problem solving and scientific discovery laid the foundation for much of contemporary cognitive psychology.

Since Karl Popper‘s fallibilist portrayal of scientific methodology in the 1940s, critical rationalism has developed in many ways, and in many fields. However, some of these developments still leave deep and important possibilities open. One of these is the portrayal of all rational actions as social. This book elucidates the significance of this perspective in regard to psychology, political and social philosophy, the understanding of how scientists can better communicate, and strategies for better living. The importance of the social theory of rationality for psychology arises above all due to the numerous assumptions made in psychological research that rationality is strictly individualist. This is at hand, for example, in its historical portrayal and in important aspects of cognitive psychology. As shown here, these assumptions have damaging consequences for the relationship of rationality with cognitive and social psychology.

This is one of the most comprehensive collections of critical essays to be published on the philosophy of Karl Popper.

In September 2007, more than 100 philosophers came to Prague with the determination to approach Karl Popper’s philosophy as a source of inspiration in many areas of our intellectual endeavor. This volume is a result of that effort. Topics cover Popper’s views on rationality, scientific methodology, the evolution of knowledge and democracy; and since Popper’s philosophy has always had a strong interdisciplinary influence, part of the volume discusses the impact of his ideas in such areas as education, economics, psychology, biology, or ethics. The concept of falsification, the problem of demarcation, the ban on induction, or the role of the empirical basis, along with the provocative parallels between historicism, holism and totalitarianism, have always caused controversies. The aim of this volume is not to smooth them but show them as a challenge. In this time when the traditional role of reason in the Western thought is being undermined, Popper’s non-foundationist model of reason brings the Enlightenment message into a new perspective. Popper believed that the open society was vulnerable, due precisely to its tolerance of otherness. This is a matter of great urgency in the modern world, as cultures based on different values gain prominence. The processes related to the extending of the EU, or the increasing economic globalization also raise questions about openness and democracy. The volume’s aim is to show the vitality of critical rationalism in addressing and responding to the problems of this time and this world.

John H. Sceski argues that Karl Popper's philosophy offers a radical treatment of objectivity that can reconcile freedom and progress in a manner that preserves the best elements of the Enlightenment tradition. His book traces the development of Popper's account of objectivity by examining his original contributions to key issues in the philosophy of science. Popper's early confrontation with logical positivism, his rarely discussed four-fold treatment of the problem of induction, and his theory of propensities and evolutionary epistemology are linked in a novel way to produce a coherent and philosophically relevant picture of objectivity. Sceski also explores and clarifies many central issues in the philosophy of science such as probabilistic support, verisimilitude, and the relationship between special relativity and indeterminism. He concludes that Popper's account of objectivity can best bridge the gap between Enlightenment aims for science and freedom and post-modern misgivings about 'truth', by developing a philosophy that is non-foundationalist yet able to account for the growth of knowledge.

This book focuses on what other volumes have only touched on, that is the factors that contribute to the rise of certain persons and ideas in the field of psychology. Bringing together noted experts in the field, it describes the process of intellectual reconstructions that determines how we view historical events, and why some ideas die only to be reborn again, as well as why new ideas can quickly topple traditional views.