Politicians, bureaucrats and leadership in organizations is the first book-length study of the French regional agency DATAR-DIACT. At one level, it is a story of the interactions and infighting of political leaders and the bureaucrats as they develop an ambitious regional development policy from the Vichy wartime period to the present day. At another level, it sheds new light on a topic of importance to theoreticians and practitioners alike: political leadership in a bureaucracy. It shows how French political leaders exercise or not their constitutional and political powers, to control government organisation, appointments and funds, and to modify public policies, such as road-building or regionalisation, according to their own interests. Innovative and transferable methodological techniques demonstrate convincingly, chapter by chapter, the impact of political leaders on institutions. It is a study of France that can be applied to other political and administrative systems.

This is the first book in English on the French agency DATAR-DIACT that has been the envy of regional planners worldwide. It sheds new light on political leadership in a bureaucracy and demonstrates convincingly the impact of political leaders on institutions. It is a study of France with lessons for other political and administrative systems.

In Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions: The Politics of Controlling the U.S. Bureaucracy, the author argues that political control of the bureaucracy from the president and the Congress is largely contingent on an agency’s internal characteristics of workforce composition, workforce responsibilities, and workforce organization. Through a revised principal-agent framework, the author explores an agent-principal model to use the agent as the starting-point of analysis. The author tests the agent-principal model across 14 years and 132 bureaus and finds that both the president and the House of Representatives exert influence over the bureaucracy, but agency characteristics such as the degree of politization among the workforce, the type of work the agency is engaged in, and the hierarchical nature of the agency affects how agencies are controlled by their political masters. In a detailed case study of one agency, the U.S. Department of Education, the author finds that education policy over a 65-year period is elite-led, and that that hierarchical nature of the department conditions political principals’ influence. This book works to overcome three hurdles that have plagued bureaucratic studies: the difficulty of uniform sampling across the bureaucracy, the overuse of case studies, and the overreliance on the principal-agent theoretical approach.

The first edition of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy is one of the most successful Brookings titles of all time. This thoroughly revised version updates that classic analysis of the role played by the federal bureaucracy—civilian career officials, political appointees, and military officers—and Congress in formulating U.S. national security policy, illustrating how policy decisions are actually made. Government agencies, departments, and individuals all have certain interests to preserve and promote. Those priorities, and the conflicts they sometimes spark, heavily influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. A decision that looks like an orchestrated attempt to influence another country may in fact represent a shaky compromise between rival elements within the U.S. government. The authors provide numerous examples of bureaucratic maneuvering and reveal how they have influenced our international relations. The revised edition includes new examples of bureaucratic politics from the past three decades, from Jimmy Carter's view of the State Department to conflicts between George W. Bush and the bureaucracy regarding Iraq. The second edition also includes a new analysis of Congress's role in the politics of foreign policymaking.

What is the relationship between the composition of the public sector workforce and the nature of the society it serves? Taking a comparative and analytical perspective, the authoritative and accessible chapters illustrate the salience of representativ

In twelve essays, influential scholars in political science explore the meaning of political leadership from the kaleidoscopic perspectives of the leaders, institutions, goals, procedures, problems, and traditions involved. The approaches, as varied as the subject itself, coalesce around the central question of how leaders interact with, transform, or are controlled by the organizations they lead.

How to better coordinate policies and public services across public sector organizations has been a major topic of public administration research for decades. However, few attempts have been made to connect these concerns with the growing body of research on biases and blind spots in decision-making. This book attempts to make that connection. It explores how day-to-day decision-making in public sector organizations is subject to different types of organizational attention biases that may lead to a variety of coordination problems in and between organizations, and sometimes also to major blunders and disasters. The contributions address those biases and their effects for various types of public organizations in different policy sectors and national contexts. In particular, it elaborates on blind spots, or ‘not seeing the not seeing’, and different forms of bureaucratic politics as theoretical explanations for seemingly irrational organizational behaviour. The book’s theoretical tools and empirical insights address conditions for effective coordination and problem-solving by public bureaucracies using an organizational perspective.