Arab leaderships have been remarkably stable since the 1970s, particularly given the frequency of military coups in preceding years. Nonetheless, the military remains a key force in most Arab states and political leaders must maintain its loyalty if they are to retain office. Regimes have used a range of methods to ensure the military’s backing: In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak has maintained political control largely through providing the military with private and corporate benefits; selective appointments and institutional checks, are also useful instruments. Tribal relations underpin King Hussein’s political control in Jordan. Transjordanians have not only been the main beneficiaries of political power, but have also occupied the key positions in the armed forces. In Syria, President Hafez al-Assad has built his regime on the Alawi minority, while the vast security apparatus limits the spread of sectarian, class or ideological grievances in the military. President Saddam Hussein has established multiple security agencies in Iraq designed to prevent conspiracies against his regime. Regular rotations and purges ensure that few officers are in place long enough to contemplate, let alone organise, a coup, while the severe punishments meted out to suspected plotters are a further disincentive to rebellion. In this paper, Risa Brooks argues that the need for Arab regimes to maintain political control can undermine the combat potential of their armed forces. Centralising command, creating overlapping commands, politicising selection criteria and authorising involvement in economic activities all potentially compromise military effectiveness. The fact that regimes have successfully managed political–military relations in the past does not mean that they will automatically do so in the future. Changing social or economic conditions could upset the equilibrium in political–military relations. Regime stability cannot therefore be taken for granted Transition to new leadership is a looming issue for the key regimes in Egypt, Syria and Jordan; political–military relations will play a crucial role in how it is resolved. New leaders must gain and maintain social support if they are to consolidate power. The fact that so many Middle Eastern regimes face uncertain transitions raises the sobering prospect of profound instability and change in this strategically vital region. Maintaining political control is a continuous and evolving process. A breakdown in social support for the leadership, failure to detect a conspiracy within the military and economic or political change that threatens military prerogatives could all disrupt political–military relations. Current stability should not give rise to complacency.

Following the popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2010, armed forces remained pivotal actors in politics throughout the region. As demonstrators started to challenge entrenched autocratic rulers in Tunis, Cairo, Sana'a, and Manama, the militaries stormed back into the limelight and largely determined whether any given ruler survived the protests. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, senior officers pulled away from their presidents, while in Algeria, Bahrain, and Syria, they did not. More important, military officers took command in shaping the new order and conflict trajectories throughout that region. Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring explores the central problems surrounding the role of armed forces in the contemporary Arab world. How and why do military apparatuses actively intervene in politics? What explains the fact that in some countries, military officers and rank-and-file take steps to defend an incumbent, while in others they defect and refrain from suppressing popular protest? What are the institutional legacies of the military's engagement during, and in the immediate aftermath of, mass uprisings? Focusing on these questions, editors Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson have organized Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Spring into three sections. The first employs case studies to make comparisons within and between regions; the second examines military engagements in the Arab uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria; and the third looks at political developments following the cresting of the protest wave in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and the Gulf. The collection promotes better understanding not only of the particular history of military engagement in the Arab Spring but also of significant aspects of the transformation of political-military relations in other regions of the contemporary world. Contributors: Holger Albrecht, Risa A. Brooks, Cherine Chams El-Dine, Virginie Collombier, Aurel Croissant, Philippe Droz-Vincent, Kevin Koehler, Fred H. Lawson, Shana Marshall, Dorothy Ohl, David Pion-Berlin, Tobias Selge, Robert Springborg.

Militaries generally play a vital role in the survival of states, neutralizing both domestic and foreign threats. In addition, during moments of political crisis when political institutions and processes break down, militaries play an integral part of a particular regime's survival. Each chapter of this study analyzes a critical component of military decision-making and regime survival in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Jordan is the central case study for each chapter. Through the collection of data from interviews with security personnel in Jordan, this study offers an in-depth investigation of civil-military relations in the MENA region. There is a shortage of research on this topic, and this study seeks to fill the gaps in important places in the political science literature. In order to fill these gaps, this study begins by establishing a new and alternative approach to understanding security decision-making called the identity-rationalist model. This new model incorporates notions of identity into cost-benefit analysis. Then the study tests hypotheses on military loyalty, finding that integration of the military into the political economy of a country has the greatest explanatory power for military defection. Finally, this study gives a detailed exploration of Jordanian intelligence services to understand why the institutions are effective at maintaining state stability despite the volatility of the MENA region. Together the three core chapters each contribute to the literature on civil-military relations and understanding the complexity of security forces in the Arab world.

This report identifies several important trends that are shaping regional security. It examines traditional security concerns, such as energy security and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as newer challenges posed by political reform, economic reform, civil-military relations, leadership change, and the information revolution. The report concludes by identifying the implications of these trends for U.S. foreign policy.

Since late 2010, an unprecedented wave of protests has swept across much of the Arab world. The aim of this paper is to examine the role of the armed forces when confronted with anti-regime uprisings that demand greater political freedoms or even regime change. Drawing on the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, it argues that the degree of institutionalization of the armed forces and their relationship to society at large can account for different responses to pro-reform uprisings.

Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation examines the escalatory patterns of Israel's relations with Arab countries, paying particular attention to the preconditions, conditions, and ultimate precipitants of wars that have broken out with some repetitiveness in the Middle East. The impact of the October 1973 War (known as the Yom Kippur War in the West and the Ramadan War in Arab countries) on the United States interests in the Middle East is also assessed. This book is comprised of seven chapters and opens with an overview of the October War; those Arab states actually involved in the war, especially Egypt and Syria; and those Arab states having geographical access to either the Mediterranean or Indian Oceans, including the oil-producing states. The wider political and military implications of the war are discussed, with specific reference to super power interests. The following chapters discuss the perceptual context of Arab politics; the wars of 1967 and 1973 and the impact of Arab conflict imagery on an inherently escalatory situation; the consequences and lessons of the June 1967 war, or Six-Day War; and Arab coalition politics between 1970 and 1973. The final two chapters focus on the combined Egyptian-Syrian battle plan, code-named Operation Badr, and the historical and political implications of the 1973 war. This monograph will be of interest to diplomats, policymakers, and government officials concerned with the politics of war and in international relations more generally.