This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government’s term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems.

This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government’s term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems.

The aim of this SDN is to examine whether fear of a political cost associated with economic reforms is justified by the available evidence, and whether there are lessons from how economic policies might be adjusted to mitigate any political cost. The paper will be based on a new comprehensive database on structural reforms developed by RES, which covers a broad sample of advanced and developing economies over four decades, and incorporates regulations related to the real sector (labor, product markets, trade and the current account), and the financial sector (banking, securities markets and the capital account). The paper will address three questions. First, do reforms reduce the probability of a government getting reelected? Second, for which reforms are political costs particularly high? And third, can fiscal stimulus or other policies “sweeten the pill,” and would favorable economic conditions or greater reform ownership raise the odds for reelection?

This paper investigates the short-term effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity in OECD economies. We examine the historical record, including Budget Speeches and IMFdocuments, to identify changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to reduce the budget deficit and not by responding to prospective economic conditions. Using this new dataset, our estimates suggest fiscal consolidation has contractionary effects on private domestic demand and GDP. By contrast, estimates based on conventional measures of the fiscal policy stance used in the literature support the expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis but appear to be biased toward overstating expansionary effects.

Offers a comprehensive, region-wide analysis of the politics of taxation in Latin America to make reforms politically palatable and sustainable.

This paper identifies policy tools that could be used for fiscal consolidation in advanced and emerging economies in the years ahead. The consolidation strategy, particularly in advanced countries, should aim to stabilize age-related spending in relation to GDP, reduce non-age-related expenditure ratios, and increase revenues. Bold reforms are needed to offset projected increases in age-related spending, particularly health care. On the revenue side, measures could include improving tax compliance, for example through better international cooperation, as well as increasing the yield from VAT by eliminating exemptions and reduced rates, further developing property taxes, and increasing excise rates within the range of rates already applicable in comparable countries.

This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of tax changes during fiscal consolidations. We build a new narrative dataset of tax changes during fiscal consolidation years, containing detailed information on the expected yield, motivation, and announcement and implementation dates of more than 2,000 tax measures across 10 OECD countries. Using this data, we then analyze the macroeconomic impact of tax changes, distinguishing between tax rate and tax base changes, and further differentiating between changes in personal income, corporate income, and value added taxes. Our results suggest that base broadening during fiscal consolidations leads to smaller output and employment declines compared to rate hikes, even when distinguishing between tax types.