This volume confronts an important historical hypothesis with empirical evidence from selected periods of history. The hypothesis in question states that competition among political and legal organisations in developing rules has been a crucial condition for liberty, innovation and growth in the history of mankind. It is due to Immanuel Kant, Edward Gibbon and Max Weber and has been revived and further developed by Nobel-Laureate Douglass C. North who contributes the first chapter. The volume brings together political economists, historians and legal scholars to discuss the role of political competition in the rise and decline of nations - both in theory and in a large number of case studies.

Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the process of economic growth? How can the incentives of policy makers be influenced in order to achieve such a dynamic? These are the questions this study seeks to address by examining the transition process in post-communist countries. The author argues that political competition within an accepted and respected institutional environment has been a driving force in shaping the direction and success of transition reforms. Evidence shows that in countries with a sufficient degree of political competition, citizens responded to economic crises by calling for economic liberalization. Economic liberalization removed existing distortions, increased economic efficiency and raised public welfare. This activated a dynamic, self-enforcing reform process that also strengthened the political and economic power of the poor. In the absence of political competition, such a process failed to emerge, thereby contributing to the persistence of poverty. Based on these findings, there is good reason to postulate that some level of political competition is essential for transition reforms to improve economic efficiency and public welfare in a sustainable manner.

One strand of research argues that polarized societies find it difficult to reach political consensus on appropriate responses to crises. Another strand focuses on redistribution, asking whether income inequality stifles growth by increasing political incentives to redistribute. Which is right?Most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution. However, empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth.Keefer and Knack analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization. They argue that social polarization, whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension, makes large changes in current policies (including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights) more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements. The resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth.They find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument.The policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution.If redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality, governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth.If, on the other hand, the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies, governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth. Fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty.This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the interplay of institutions and economic development. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].

In the late 1980s, the field of comparative economics and NATO faced a similar problem: the threat of obsolescence. A predictable reaction of those who had made major investments in both comparative economics and NATO was to look for a new job. It was time to say: comparative economic systems are dead, long live comparative economic systems. The purpose of this book is to redirect study of what we called comparative economic systems toward analysis of the development of institutions and the effects of alternative institutional arrangements on economic performance. To that end, the book internalizes into a theoretical framework (1) the effects of alternative property rights on the costs of transactions and incentives structures, (2) the effects of the costs of transactions and incentives on economic behavior, and (3) the evidence for refutable implications of those effects. Analysis here focuses on the issues, propositions and conclusions that lend themselves to the only known scientific test: empirical verification. Thus, this book is not about what socialism or capitalism could have been, should have been, or should be. Nor is it an ode to capitalism. Its purpose is not to assert that capitalism is a better economic system than socialism. The history of this century and the market for institutions have done that. My purpose is to explain what is it that makes the institutions of capitalism better in terms of economic outcome than all other alternatives that have been tried since the beginning of recorded history.

This book provides a fresh perspective on the debate over the role of the state in East Asia’s development history. Comparing the post-war development policies of Singapore and Hong Kong, it argues that their strong economic performances preceded and persisted despite, not because of, developmental state policies. While both nations are not pure free markets, the Hong Kong economy comes closer to that ideal and exhibited clear advantages over state-driven Singapore, in terms of greater levels of indigenous entrepreneurship, productivity and innovation. The book highlights the complex ways in which states penetrate markets, which are often neglected in liberal accounts of Hong Kong and Singapore as ‘free-market success stories’. At the same time, it also stands as a cautionary tale on the use of non-comprehensive development planning in the twenty-first century, where an unprecedented degree of complexity complicates economic policy and industrial upgrading. The book renews the case for economic liberalism in development policy through a unique Asian cultural lens.