Political competition between European countries has often been viewed as being a stimulus to the innovation process and part of the reason why Europe was the first region of the world to experience sustained growth. Countries that fell behind their rivals technologically and economically became more vulnerable to exploitation by their neighbors. In this way the presence of rival states provided added incentive to innovate. This paper uses a simple model of conflict between countries to study the role of political competition in economic growth. The governments of each country are threatened politically by innovation and hence face a trade-off between the stability of their regime and keeping up with their rivals. The model shows that "institutional spillovers", such as a decrease in the level of rent-seeking in one country, can affect growth in a competing country. Thus political fragmentation can be growth enhancing as it can result in more political competition.

Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the process of economic growth? How can the incentives of policy makers be influenced in order to achieve such a dynamic? These are the questions this study seeks to address by examining the transition process in post-communist countries. The author argues that political competition within an accepted and respected institutional environment has been a driving force in shaping the direction and success of transition reforms. Evidence shows that in countries with a sufficient degree of political competition, citizens responded to economic crises by calling for economic liberalization. Economic liberalization removed existing distortions, increased economic efficiency and raised public welfare. This activated a dynamic, self-enforcing reform process that also strengthened the political and economic power of the poor. In the absence of political competition, such a process failed to emerge, thereby contributing to the persistence of poverty. Based on these findings, there is good reason to postulate that some level of political competition is essential for transition reforms to improve economic efficiency and public welfare in a sustainable manner.

Abstract: Which political and institutional factors trigger reforms that enable the poor to benefit from the process of economic growth? How can the incentives of policy makers be influenced in order to achieve such a dynamic? These are the questions this study seeks to address by examining the transition process in post-communist countries. The author argues that political competition within an accepted and respected institutional environment has been a driving force in shaping the direction and success of transition reforms. Evidence shows that in countries with a sufficient degree of political competition, citizens responded to economic crises by calling for economic liberalization. Economic liberalization removed existing distortions, increased economic efficiency and raised public welfare. This activated a dynamic, self-enforcing reform process that also strengthened the political and economic power of the poor. In the absence of political competition, such a process failed to emerge, t

This volume confronts an important historical hypothesis with empirical evidence from selected periods of history. The hypothesis in question states that competition among political and legal organisations in developing rules has been a crucial condition for liberty, innovation and growth in the history of mankind. It is due to Immanuel Kant, Edward Gibbon and Max Weber and has been revived and further developed by Nobel-Laureate Douglass C. North who contributes the first chapter. The volume brings together political economists, historians and legal scholars to discuss the role of political competition in the rise and decline of nations - both in theory and in a large number of case studies.

This book has much to commend it, because of the richness and diversity of the issues addressed. Indira Rajaraman, Tax Justice Focus The volume offers substantial insights into the nature of institutional competition, focusing mostly on governmental institutions, and shows the many subtleties in understanding and analyzing the role of institutions. Institutional competition is a small subset of institutional analysis, but an important one, and while the volume does cover the more familiar tax and expenditure topics, it also delves more deeply into the subject. Randall G. Holcombe, Public Choice While economists typically praise the merits of competition among market-based enterprises, they are not so sure when it comes to competition among institutions, especially governments. I am aware of no better source for thoughtful reflection on competition among institutions than the ten essays presented in this book. Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University, US Why is competition between institutions usually viewed in a negative light, when competition is considered positive in most other economic contexts? The contributors to this volume introduce new perspectives on this issue, analytically and empirically exploring reasons for this perception. Negative assessments of institutional competition emphasize that such competition may lead to a race to the bottom in terms of eroding government revenues, redistributing wealth from workers to capitalists, and limiting democracy by forcing politicians to prioritize international investment capital rather than working for their voters. In this volume, however, many of the essays draw attention to the positive learning and information effects. The contributors conclude that competition may actually lead to institutions becoming more efficient in allocating resources. Students and scholars of economics, political economy, international relations and political science will find the book s non-traditional take on institutional competition a must-read, as will policy analysts and those with an interest in taxation and welfare states.

Richard Vietor shows how governments set direction and create the climate for a nation's economic development and profitable private enterprise. Drawing on history, economic analysis, and interviews with executives and officials around the globe, he provides examinations of different government approaches to growth and development.