The concluding volume of this work provides a fresh description of the climatic battle of Waterloo placed in the context of the whole campaign. It discusses several vexed questions: Blucher's intentions for the battle, Wellington's choice of site, his reasons for placing substantial forces at Hal, the placement of Napoleon's artillery, who authorized the French cavalry attacks, Grouchy's role on 18 and 19 June, Napoleon's own statements on the Garde's formation in the final attack, and the climactic moment when the Prussians reached Wellington's troops near la Belle Alliance. Close attention is paid to the negotiations that led to the capitulation of Paris, and subsequent French claims. The allegations of Las Cases and later historians that Napoleon's surrender to Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon amounted to entrapment are also examined. After a survey of the peace settlement of 1815, the book concludes with a masterly chapter reviewing the whole story of the 1815 campaign.

This, the fourth volume in Andrew Field's highly praised study of the Waterloo campaign from the French perspective, depicts in vivid detail the often neglected final phase the rout and retreat of Napoleon's army. The text is based exclusively on French eyewitness accounts which give an inside view of the immediate aftermath of the battle and carry the story through to the army's disbandment in late 1815. Many French officers and soldiers wrote more about the retreat than they did about the catastrophe of Waterloo itself. Their recollections give a fascinating insight to the psyche of the French soldier. They also provide a firsthand record of their experiences and the range of their reactions, from those who deserted the colors and made their way home, to those who continued to serve faithfully when all was lost. Napoleons own flight from Waterloo is an essential part of the narrative, but the main emphasis is on the fate of the beaten French army as it was experienced by eyewitnesses who lived through the last days of the campaign.

In this compelling book, Richard Holmes tells the exhilarating story of the Duke of Wellington, Britain's greatest ever soldier.

A dual biography of the greatest opposing generals of their age who ultimately became fixated on one another, by a bestselling historian. 'Thoroughly enjoyable, beautifully written and meticulously researched' Observer On the morning of the battle of Waterloo, the Emperor Napoleon declared that the Duke of Wellington was a bad general, the British were bad soldiers and that France could not fail to win an easy victory. Forever afterwards historians have accused him of gross overconfidence, and massively underestimating the calibre of the British commander opposed to him. Andrew Roberts presents an original, highly revisionist view of the relationship between the two greatest captains of their age. Napoleon, who was born in the same year as Wellington - 1769 - fought Wellington by proxy years earlier in the Peninsula War, praising his ruthlessness in private while publicly deriding him as a mere 'sepoy general'. In contrast, Wellington publicly lauded Napoleon, saying that his presence on a battlefield was worth forty thousand men, but privately wrote long memoranda lambasting Napoleon's campaigning techniques. Although Wellington saved Napoleon from execution after Waterloo, Napoleon left money in his will to the man who had tried to assassinate Wellington. Wellington in turn amassed a series of Napoleonic trophies of his great victory, even sleeping with two of the Emperor's mistresses.

In 2013, Germany celebrated the bicentennial of the so-called Wars of Liberation (1813-15). These wars were the culmination of the Prussian struggle against Napoleon between 1806 and 1815, which occupied a key position in German national historiography and memory. Although these conflicts have been analyzed in thousands of books and articles, much of the focus has been on the military campaigns and alliances. Karen Hagemann argues that we cannot achieve a comprehensive understanding of these wars and their importance in collective memory without recognizing how the interaction of politics, culture, and gender influenced these historical events and continue to shape later recollections of them. She thus explores the highly contested discourses and symbolic practices by which individuals and groups interpreted these wars and made political claims, beginning with the period itself and ending with the centenary in 1913.

The Battle of Waterloo has been studied and dissected so extensively that one might assume little more on the subject could be discovered. Now historian Peter Hofschröer brings forward a long-repressed commentary written by Carl von Clausewitz, the author of On War. Clausewitz, the Western world’s most renowned military theorist, participated in the Waterloo campaign as a senior staff officer in the Prussian army. His appraisal, offered here in an up-to-date and readable translation, criticized the Duke of Wellington’s actions. Lord Liverpool sent his translation of the manuscript to Wellington, who pronounced it a “lying work.” The translated commentary was quickly buried in Wellington’s private papers, where it languished for a century and a half. Now published for the first time in English, Hofschröer brings Clausewitz’s critique back into view with thorough annotation and contextual explanation. Peter Hofschröer, long recognized as a leading scholar of the Napoleonic Wars, shows how the Duke prevented the account’s publication during his lifetime—a manipulation of history so successful that almost two centuries passed before Clausewitz’s work reemerged, finally permitting a reappraisal of key events in the campaign. In addition to translating and annotating Clausewitz’s critique, Hofschröer also includes an order of battle and an extensive bibliography.