In global financial centers, short-term market rates are effectively determined in the pledged collateral market, where banks and other financial institutions exchange collateral (such as bonds and equities) for money. Furthermore, the use of long-dated securities as collateral for short tenors—or example, in securities-lending and repo markets, and prime brokerage funding—impacts the risk premia (or moneyness) along the yield curve. In this paper, we deploy a methodology to show that transactions using long dated collateral also affect short-term market rates. Our results suggest that the unwind of central bank balance sheets will likely strengthen the monetary policy transmission, as dealer balance-sheet space is now relatively less constrained, with a rebound in collateral reuse.

In global financial centers, short-term market rates are effectively determined in the pledged collateral market, where banks and other financial institutions exchange collateral (such as bonds and equities) for money. Furthermore, the use of long-dated securities as collateral for short tenors—or example, in securities-lending and repo markets, and prime brokerage funding—impacts the risk premia (or moneyness) along the yield curve. In this paper, we deploy a methodology to show that transactions using long dated collateral also affect short-term market rates. Our results suggest that the unwind of central bank balance sheets will likely strengthen the monetary policy transmission, as dealer balance-sheet space is now relatively less constrained, with a rebound in collateral reuse.

Large banks and dealers use and reuse collateral pledged by nonbanks, which helps lubricate the global financial system. The supply of collateral arises from specific investment strategies in the asset management complex, with the primary providers being hedge funds, pension funds, insurers, official sector accounts, money markets and others. Post-Lehman, there has been a significant decline in the source collateral for the large dealers that specialize in intermediating pledgeable collateral. Since collateral can be reused, the overall effect (i.e., reduced ?source' of collateral times the velocity of collateral) may have been a $4-5 trillion reduction in collateral. This decline in financial lubrication likely has impact on the conduct of global monetary policy. And recent regulations aimed at financial stability, focusing on building equity and reducing leverage at large banks/dealers, may also reduce financial lubrication in the nonbank/bank nexus.

Most short-term interest rates in the Euro area are below the European Central Bank deposit facility rate, the rate at which the central bank remunerates banks’ excess reserves. This unexpected development coincided with the start of the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP). In this paper, we explore empirically the interactions between the PSPP and repo rates. We document different channels through which asset purchases may affect them. Using proprietary data from PSPP purchases and repo transactions for specific (“special") securities, we assess the scarcity channel of PSPP and its impact on repo rates. We estimate that purchasing 1 percent of a bond outstanding is associated with a decline of its repo rate of 0.78 bps. Using an instrumental variable, we find that the full effect may be up to six times higher.

This paper considers the central bank mandate with respect to financial stability and identifies the links to the functioning of securities markets. It argues that while emergency support to securities markets is an important part of the crisis management response, a high bar should be set for its use. Importantly, it should be used only as part of a comprehensive policy package. The paper considers what types of securities markets may be important for financial stability, what market conditions could trigger emergency support measures, and how programs can be designed to restore market functioning while minimizing moral hazard.

Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.

Traditional measures of leverage in the financial system tend to reflect bank balance sheet data. The paper argues that these traditional, bank-centric measures should be augmented by considering pledged collateral in the financial system since pledged collateral provides a measure of an important part of nonbank funding to banks. From a policy perspective, the paper suggests that a broader view on leverage will enhance our understanding of global systemic risk, and complement the theoretical work in this field by providing a link from micro-level leverage data to macro aggregates such as credit to the economy.