Plea Bargaining -- the only comprehensive, fully up-to-date reference on the subject -- teaches you how to negotiate the best deal. It discusses the nature, types and goals of plea bargaining, and treats in detail a wide variety of styles and strategies. Attorneys on both sides of the aisle know that effective plea bargaining is both an art and a science. You'll find extensive analysis of plea bargaining in the federal courts, the process of negotiating with the U.S. Attorney under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the plea policies of the Department of Justice contained in the United States Attorney’s Manual and the Principles of Federal Prosecution. Other pertinent standards and rules such as the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, National District Attorneys Association Prosecution Standards and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are also discussed.

"That relatively few criminal cases in this country are resolved by full Perry Mason-style strials is fairly common knowledge. Most cases are settled by a guilty plea after some form of negotiation over the charge or sentence. But why? The standard explanation is case pressure: the enormous volume of criminal cases, to be processed with limited staff, time and resources. . . . But a large body of new empirical research now demands that we re-examine plea negotiation. Milton Heumann's book, Plea Bargaining, strongly and explicitly attacks the case-pressure argument and suggests an alternative explanation for plea bargaining based on the adaptation of attorneys and judges to the local criminal court. The book is a significant and welcome addition to the literature. Heumann's investigation of case pressure and plea negotiation demonstrates solid research and careful analysis."—Michigan Law Review

Traditions of plea bargaining : the United States -- Informal bargaining : Germany -- Introducing plea bargaining as part of comprehensive legal reform : Russia and Bulgaria -- Alternatives to plea bargaining : China and Japan -- Plea bargaining at international criminal courts

The practice of plea bargaining plays a hugely significant role in the adjudication of criminal charges and has provoked intense debate about its legitimacy. This book offers the first full-length philosophical analysis of the ethics of plea bargaining. It develops a sustained argument for restrained forms of the practice and against the free-wheeling versions that predominate in the United States. In countries that have endorsed plea bargains, such as the United States, upwards of ninety percent of criminal defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial. Yet trials, which grant a presumption of innocence to defendants and place a substantial burden of proof on the state to establish guilt, are widely regarded as the most appropriate mechanisms for fairly and accurately assigning criminal sanctions. How is it that many countries have abandoned the formal rules and rigorous standards of public trials in favor of informal and veiled negotiations between state officials and criminal defendants concerning the punishment to which the latter will be subjected? More importantly, how persuasive are the myriad justifications that have been provided for plea bargaining? These are the questions addressed in this book. Examining the legal processes by which individuals are moved through the criminal justice system, the fairness of those processes, and the ways in which they reproduce social inequality, this book offers an ethical argument for restrained forms of plea bargaining. It also provides a comparison between the different plea bargaining regimes that exist within the US, where it is well-established, England and Wales, where the practice is coming under considerable critique, and the European Union, where debate continues on whether it coheres with inquisitorial legal regimes. It suggests that rewards for admitting guilt are distinguished from penalties for exercising the right to trial, and argues for modest, fixed sentence reductions for defendants who admit their guilt. These suggestions for reform include discouraging the current practice of deliberate over-charging by prosecutors and charge bargaining, and require judges to scrutinize more closely the evidence against those accused of crimes before any guilty pleas are entered by them. Arguing that the negotiation of charges and sentences should remain the exception, not the rule, it nevertheless puts forward a normative defense for the reform and retention of the plea bargaining system.

This volume investigates the skills, procedures, & routines involved in plea bargaining. It delineates specific practitioner skills, ways in which such procedures as character assessments are accomplished, & the mechanics of caseload management. Model sentencing decisions & a discourse system for negotiations are also included.