cians concerned with using logical tools in philosophy have been keenly aware of the limitations that arise from the original con centration of symbolic logic on the idiom of mathematics, and many of them have worked to create extensions of the received logical theories that would make them more generally applicable in philosophy. Carnap's Testability and Meaning, published in 1936 and 1937, was a good early example of this sort of research, motivated by the inadequacy of first-order formalizations of dis 'This sugar cube is soluble in water'. positional sentences like And in fact there is a continuous history of work on this topic, extending from Carnap's paper to Shoham's contribution to the present volume . . Much of the work in philosophical logic, and much of what has appeared in The Journal of Philosophical Logic, was mo tivated by similar considerations: work in modal logic (includ ing tense, deontic, and epistemic logic), intensional logics, non declaratives, presuppositions, and many other topics. In this sort of research, sin.ce the main point is to devise new formalisms, the technical development tends to be rather shallow in comparison with mathematical logic, though it is sel dom absent: theorems need to be proved in order to justify the formalisms, and sometimes these are nontrivial. On the other hand, much effort has to go into motivating a logical innovation.

Is `artificial intelligence' a contradiction in terms? Could computers (in principle) model every aspect of the mind, including logic, language, and emotion? What of the more brain-like, connectionist computers: could they really understand, even if digital computers cannot? This collection of classic and contemporary readings (which includes an editor's introduction and an up-to-date reading list) provides a clearly signposted pathway into hotly disputed philosophical issues at the heart of artificial intelligence.

Extending over a period of 30 years, this is a collection of papers written by John McCarthy on artificial intelligence. They range from informal surveys written for a general audience to technical discussions of challenging research problems that should be of interest to specialists.

"Machines who think—how utterly preposterous," huff beleaguered humanists, defending their dwindling turf. "Artificial Intelligence—it's here and about to surpass our own," crow techno-visionaries, proclaiming dominion. It's so simple and obvious, each side maintains, only a fanatic could disagree. Deciding where the truth lies between these two extremes is the main purpose of John Haugeland's marvelously lucid and witty book on what artificial intelligence is all about. Although presented entirely in non-technical terms, it neither oversimplifies the science nor evades the fundamental philosophical issues. Far from ducking the really hard questions, it takes them on, one by one. Artificial intelligence, Haugeland notes, is based on a very good idea, which might well be right, and just as well might not. That idea, the idea that human thinking and machine computing are "radically the same," provides the central theme for his illuminating and provocative book about this exciting new field. After a brief but revealing digression in intellectual history, Haugeland systematically tackles such basic questions as: What is a computer really? How can a physical object "mean" anything? What are the options for computational organization? and What structures have been proposed and tried as actual scientific models for intelligence? In a concluding chapter he takes up several outstanding problems and puzzles—including intelligence in action, imagery, feelings and personality—and their enigmatic prospects for solution.

cians concerned with using logical tools in philosophy have been keenly aware of the limitations that arise from the original con centration of symbolic logic on the idiom of mathematics, and many of them have worked to create extensions of the received logical theories that would make them more generally applicable in philosophy. Carnap's Testability and Meaning, published in 1936 and 1937, was a good early example of this sort of research, motivated by the inadequacy of first-order formalizations of dis 'This sugar cube is soluble in water'. positional sentences like And in fact there is a continuous history of work on this topic, extending from Carnap's paper to Shoham's contribution to the present volume . . Much of the work in philosophical logic, and much of what has appeared in The Journal of Philosophical Logic, was mo tivated by similar considerations: work in modal logic (includ ing tense, deontic, and epistemic logic), intensional logics, non declaratives, presuppositions, and many other topics. In this sort of research, sin.ce the main point is to devise new formalisms, the technical development tends to be rather shallow in comparison with mathematical logic, though it is sel dom absent: theorems need to be proved in order to justify the formalisms, and sometimes these are nontrivial. On the other hand, much effort has to go into motivating a logical innovation.

"Philosophical Logic is a clear and concise critical survey of nonclassical logic, written by one of the world's leading authorities on the subject. After giving an overview of classical logic, John Burgess introduces five central branches of nonclassical logic (temporal, modal, conditional, relevantistic, and intuitionistic), focusing on the sometimes problematic relationship between formal apparatus and intuitive motivation. The book provides a thorough treatment of conditional logic, unifying probabilistic and model-theoretic approaches. It underscores the variety of approaches that have been taken to relevantistic and related logics, and stresses the problem of connecting formal systems to the motivating ideas behind intuitionistic mathematics. Requiring minimal background and arranged to make the more technical material optional, Philosophical Logic offers a choice between an overview and in-depth study, and it balances the philosophical and technical aspects of the subject."--Page 4 de la couverture.

A broad introduction to the subject; many exercises with full solutions are provided.