This multidisciplinary collection explores three key concepts underpinning psychiatry—explanation, phenomenology, and nosology—and their continuing relevance in an age of neuroimaging and genetic analysis. This book opens with Dr. Kenneth S. Kendler’s introduction to the philosophical grounding of psychiatric practice. Chapters in the first section of the book then address the concept of explanation, from the difficulties in describing complex behavior to the categorization of psychological and biological causality. In the second section, contributors discuss experience, including the complex and vexing issue of how self-agency and free will affect mental health. The third and final section examines the organizational difficulties in psychiatric nosology and the instability of the existing diagnostic system. Each chapter includes both an introduction by the editors and a concluding comment by another of the book’s contributors. Contributors: John Campbell, PhD; Thomas Fuchs, MD, PhD; Shaun Gallagher, PhD; Kenneth S. Kendler, MD; Sandra D. Mitchell, PhD; Dominic P. Murphy, PhD; Josef Parnas, MD, DrMedSci; Louis A. Sass, PhD; Kenneth F. Schaffner, MD, PhD; James F. Woodward, PhD; Peter Zachar, PhD "This is a serious and important book . . . it is certainly one that researchers, scholars and anyone involved in trying to explain the nature of psychiatric disorders to a skeptical audience ought to read."—British Journal of Psychiatry Kenneth S. Kendler, MD, is the Rachel Brown Banks Distinguished Professor of Psychiatry at the Medical College of Virginia, where he is also a professor of human genetics and the director of the Virginia Institute for Psychiatric and Behavioral Genetics. He is the author of Genes, Environment, and Psychopathology. Josef Parnas, MD, DrMedSci, is a professor of psychiatry and the consultant medical director for the Department of Psychiatry at Copenhagen University. He is the codirector of the National Danish Research Foundation's Center for Subjectivity Research.

Psychiatry has long struggled with the nature of its diagnoses. The problems raised by questions about the nature of psychiatric illness are particularly fascinating because they sit at the intersection of philosophy, empirical psychiatric/psychological research, measurement theory, historical tradition and policy. In being the only medical specialty that diagnoses and treats mental illness, psychiatry has been subject to major changes in the last 150 years. This book explores the forces that have shaped these changes and especially how substantial "internal" advances in our knowledge of the nature and causes of psychiatric illness have interacted with a plethora of external forces that have impacted on the psychiatric profession. It includes contributions from philosophers of science with an interest in psychiatry, psychiatrists and psychologists with expertise in the history of their field and historians of psychiatry. Each chapter is accompanied by an introduction and a commentary. The result is a dynamic discussion about the nature of psychiatric disorders, and a book that is compelling reading for those in the field of mental health, history of science and medicine, and philosophy.

This groundbreaking volume of original essays presents fresh avenues of inquiry at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry. Contributors draw from a variety of fields, including evolutionary psychiatry, phenomenology, biopsychosocial models, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, neuroethics, behavioral economics, and virtue theory. Philosophy and Psychiatry’s unique structure consists of two parts: in the first, philosophers write five lead essays with replies from psychiatrists. In the second part, this arrangement is reversed. The result is an interdisciplinary exchange that allows for direct discourse, and a volume at the forefront of defining an emerging discipline. Philosophy and Psychiatry will be of interest to professionals in philosophy and psychiatry, as well as mental health researchers and clinicians.

This is a comprehensive resource of original essays by leading thinkers exploring the newly emerging inter-disciplinary field of the philosophy of psychiatry. The contributors aim to define this exciting field and to highlight the philosophical assumptions and issues that underlie psychiatric theory and practice, the category of mental disorder, and rationales for its social, clinical and legal treatment. As a branch of medicine and a healing practice, psychiatry relies on presuppositions that are deeply and unavoidably philosophical. Conceptions of rationality, personhood and autonomy frame our understanding and treatment of mental disorder. Philosophical questions of evidence, reality, truth, science, and values give meaning to each of the social institutions and practices concerned with mental health care. The psyche, the mind and its relation to the body, subjectivity and consciousness, personal identity and character, thought, will, memory, and emotions are equally the stuff of traditional philosophical inquiry and of the psychiatric enterprise. A new research field--the philosophy of psychiatry--began to form during the last two decades of the twentieth century. Prompted by a growing recognition that philosophical ideas underlie many aspects of clinical practice, psychiatric theorizing and research, mental health policy, and the economics and politics of mental health care, academic philosophers, practitioners, and philosophically trained psychiatrists have begun a series of vital, cross-disciplinary exchanges. This volume provides a sampling of the research yield of those exchanges. Leading thinkers in this area, including clinicians, philosophers, psychologists, and interdisciplinary teams, provide original discussions that are not only expository and critical, but also a reflection of their authors' distinctive and often powerful and imaginative viewpoints and theories. All the discussions break new theoretical ground. As befits such an interdisciplinary effort, they are methodologically eclectic, and varied and divergent in their assumptions and conclusions; together, they comprise a significant new exploration, definition, and mapping of the philosophical aspects of psychiatric theory and practice.

Psychiatry has long struggled with the nature of its diagnoses. The problems raised by questions about the nature of psychiatric illness are particularly fascinating because they sit at the intersection of philosophy, empirical psychiatric/psychological research, measurement theory, historical tradition and policy. In being the only medical specialty that diagnoses and treats mental illness, psychiatry has been subject to major changes in the last 150 years. This book explores the forces that have shaped these changes and especially how substantial ""internal"" advances in our knowledge of the.

Psychiatric and psychological practice and research is critically dependent on diagnosis. Yet the nature of psychiatric diagnosis and the rules by which disorders should be created and organized have been highly controversial for over 100 years. Unlike simple medical disorders (like infectious diseases), psychiatric disorders cannot be traced to one simple etiologic agent. The last two generations have seen major conceptual shifts in the approach to diagnosis with the rise of operationalized criteria and an emphasis on a descriptive rather than etiological approach to diagnosis. The interest in psychiatric diagnoses is particularly heightened now because both of the major psychiatric classifications in the world - DSM and ICD - are now undergoing major revisions. What makes psychiatric nosology so interesting is that it sits at the intersection of philosophy, empirical psychiatric/psychological research, measurement theory, historical tradition and policy. This makes the field fertile for a conceptual analysis. This book brings together established experts in the wide range of disciplines that have an interest in psychiatric nosology. The contributors include philosophers, psychologists, psychiatrists, historians and representatives of the efforts of DSM-III, DSM-IV and DSM-V. Some of the questions addressed include i) what is the nature of psychiatric illness? Can it be clearly defined and if so how? ii) What is the impact of facts versus values in psychiatric classification? iii) How have concepts of psychiatric diagnosis changed over time? iv) How can we best conceptualize the central idea of diagnostic validity? And v) Can psychiatric classification be a cumulative enterprise seeking improvements at each iteration of the diagnostic manual? Each individual chapter is introduced by the editors and is followed by a commentary, resulting in a dynamic discussion about the nature of psychiatric disorders. This book will be valuable for psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health trainees and professionals with an interest in the questions and problems of psychiatric diagnosis, as well as philosophers and philosophy students interested in the problems posed by psychiatry, particularly those working in the philosophy of science.

The revisions of both DSM-IV and ICD-10 have again focused the interest of the field of psychiatry and clinical psychology on the questions of nosology. This work reviews issues within psychiatric nosology from clinical, historical and particularly philosophical perspectives. It brings together an interdisciplinary group of distinguished authors