When I was Dickinson Miller's assistant from 1940 to 1942, I soon realized that I had encountered an unusually powerful, acute, and original mind and a writer whose clear but vivid style matched the high quality of his intelligence. These traits were apparent in his comments about eminent philosophers with whom he had associated - particularly William James but also Santayana, Dewey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein - and in the mutual criticism he demanded of his writing and my first efforts. I was pleased and felt immensely privileged to share in his planning of a book devoted to "analysis, the method of philosophy at work" as in his articles on the knowledge-problem, induction, and free will. In view of the penetration of his articles, such a book seemed long overdue as James had insisted even in 1905. When Miller's projected book on "analysis at work" did not appear by 1956, I consulted him about putting together a collection of his published essays. Such a collection seemed but slight homage to one who had made such a striking contribution to American philosophy in rela tion to James and one from whom I had learned so much. He felt, however, that such a collection would be inappropriate and preferred to concentrate on a book, never finished, on "the principles of practical intelligence", the application of intelligence in a "morality of results" for human welfare.

Volume II of the exclusive behind-the-scenes diaries of one of Ireland's most hard-working politicians ... Another hilarious account of local politics from Pat Shortt's legendary creation, the esteemed Councillor Maurice Hickey. The sequel to the popular I will in me Politics which was a runaway success - features a host of hilarious and recognisable characters.

vii 1 ~OOUCTIONANOOVERVlliW 1 2 SEITING THE STAGE: PERSONAL IDENTITY ANO THE MErAPHYSICS OFMIND 1. Introduction 6 2. The Problem of Personal Identity over Time 7 3. The Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity over Time 12 4. The Neo-Lockean Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity 16 5. The Circularity Objection 19 6. Problems of Logical Form 21 7. The Lack of a Third-Person Criterion for Reidentification 23 8. The Unity of the Mental Bundle 25 9. The Individuation ofPersons 26 10. The Neo-Lockean Criterion and Physicalism: a 'Natural' Alliance 28 11. One 'Solution' to Five Problems 35 3 PARFIT'S REDUcrIO OF A SUBSTRATUM-ORIENTEO CONCEPfION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUlTY 43 1. Introduction 2. Relation R 45 51 3. Relation R and the Neo-Lockian Paradigm 4. Psychological Atomism 56 61 5. The Central Place of Q-Memory in the Neo-Lockean Paradigm 64 6. The Trouble with Q-memory 74 7. Contents and Contexts. The Other Four Problems 79 8. Conclusions 4 A CON1ENT-ORIENTEO CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 82 1. Introduction 83 2. Two Kinds of Psychological Continuity 91 3. Levels of N-Continuity 93 4. The Unity of N-Continuous Sequences. The Role of the Body 105 5. N-Continuity and Psychological Connectedness 109 6. Summary vi 5 A PSYCHOLOGICAL CRI1ERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE AVE PROBLEMS REVISITED 1. Introduction 111 2. Circularity, Q-Memory, and N-Continuity 112 119 3. Narrativity and Logical Form 127 4. Third-Person Criteria of Reidentification: The Role of the Body 5.

This essay is the product of years of distaste for, and dissatisfaction with, the efforts of moral philosophers. It can be tiresome to attend to details, to spell out the obvious, but moral philosophy is such an abysmally difficult subject that faster than a creeping slug is breakneck reckless speed. One simply must content oneself with a slow slimy trail painfully drawn and cautiously constrained. Generally speaking, philosophy, and, in particular, moral philosophy, is too hard fot philosophers. Even though publishing is spitting in the ocean, and even though my sour sweet spittle will not alter the ocean's salinity, I am somehow inclined to publish this essay. Acknowledgments: I began this essay in 1956. During the years, I have discussed many of the topics in this volume with a great many philosophers. I am indebted to all of them, especially those with whom I disagreed and those who disagreed with me. One learns nothing from agreement, whereas disagreement provokes one to look more closely and more carefully at what is at issue: if a philosopher is to profit from discussion, someone must be disagreeable.

One of the most basic themes in the philosophy of language is referential uptake, viz., the question of what counts as properly `understanding' a referring act in communication. In this inquiry, the particular line pursued goes back to Strawson's work on re-identification, but the immediate influence is that of Gareth Evans. It is argued that traditional and recent proposals fail to account for success in referential communication. A novel account is developed, resembling Evans' account in combining an external success condition with a Fregean one. But, in contrast to Evans, greater emphasis is placed on the action-enabling side of communication. Further topics discussed include the role of mental states in accounting for communication, the impact of re-identification on the understanding of referring acts, and Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction. Readership: Philosophers, cognitive scientists and semanticists.

Every two years since 1989, an international colloquium on cognitive science is held in Donostia - San Sebastian, attracting the most important researchers in that field. This volume is a collection of the invited papers to the Sixth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science (ICCS-99), written from a multidisciplinary, cognitive perspective, and addressing various essential topics such as self-knowledge, intention, consciousness, language use, learning and discourse. This collection reflects not only the various interdisciplinary origins and standpoints of the participating researchers, but also the richness, fruitfulness, and exciting state of research in the field of cognitive science today. A must-read for anyone interested in philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and computer science, and in the perception of these topics from the perspective of cognitive science.