Book 2 of the Physics is arguably the best introduction to Aristotle's work, both because it explains some of his central concepts, such as nature and the four causes, and because it asks some gripping questions that are still debated today: Is chance something real? If so, what? Can nature be explained by chance, necessity and natural selection, or is it purposive? Philoponus' commentary is not only a valuable guide, but also a work of Neoplatonism with its own views on causation, the Providence of Nature, the problem of evil and the immortality of the soul.

Originally published in 1991. Philoponus’ long commentary on Aristotle’s definition of light sets up the major concerns, both in optics and theory of light, that are discussed here. Light was of special interest in Neoplatonism because of its being something incorporeal in the world of natural bodies. Light therefore had a special role in the philosophical analysis of the interpenetration of bodies and was also a paradigm for the soul-body problem. The book contains much about the physiology of vision as well as the propagation of light. Several chapters investigate the philosophical theory behind what came to be known as ‘multiplication of species’ in medieval light theory. These issues in the history of science are placed within an analysis of Neoplatonic development of the distinction between Aristotle’s kinesis and energeia. The book treats Philoponus’ philosophy of mathematical science from the point of view of matter, quantity, and three-dimensionality.

This book considers the concepts that lay at the heart of natural philosophy and physics from the time of Aristotle until the fourteenth century. The first part presents Aristotelian ideas and the second part presents the interpretation of these ideas by Philoponus, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, John Buridan, and Duns Scotus. Across the eight chapters, the problems and texts from Aristotle that set the stage for European natural philosophy as it was practiced from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries are considered first as they appear in Aristotle and then as they are reconsidered in the context of later interests. The study concludes with an anticipation of Newton and the sense in which Aristotle's physics had been transformed.

Themistius' treatment of Books 1-3 of Aristotle's Physics presents central features of Aristotle's thought about principles, causation, change and infinity. The tradition of synthesising and epitomising exegesis is here raised to a new level by the innovative method of paraphrase pioneered by Themistius. Taking a selective, but telling, account of the earlier Peripatetic and Presocratic tradition, Themistius creates a framework that can still be profitably used in the study of Aristotle. This volume contains the first English translation of Themistius' commentary, accompanied by a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.

Supporting the twelve volumes of translation of Simplicius' great commentary on Aristotle's Physics, all published by Bloomsbury in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series, between 1992 and 2021, this volume presents a general introduction to the commentary. It covers the philosophical aims of Simplicius' commentaries on the Physics and the related text On the Heaven; Simplicius' methods and his use of earlier sources; and key themes and comparison with Philoponus' commentary on the same text. Simplicius treats the Physics as a universal study of the principles of all natural things underlying the account of the cosmos in On the Heaven. In both treatises, he responds at every stage to the now lost Peripatetic commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which set Aristotle in opposition to Plato and to earlier thinkers such as Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras. On each passage, Simplicius after going through Alexander's commentary raises difficulties for the text of Aristotle as interpreted by Alexander. Then, after making observations about details of the text, and often going back to a direct reading of the older philosophers (for whom he is now often our main source, as he is for Alexander's commentary), he proposes his own solution to the difficulties, introduced with a modest 'perhaps', which reads Aristotle as in harmony with Plato and earlier thinkers.

Physics in Neoplatonist thought, the subject which occupies the second volume of this sourcebook, was innovative: the world of space and time was causally ordered by a nonspatial, nontemporal world, and this view required original thinking

Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change. Change receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualisation of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine change. Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, we are told, and Simplicius himself, prefer to admit relational change. Chapter 3 introduces a general causal principle that the activity of the agent causing change is in the patient undergoing change, and that the causing and undergoing are to be counted as only one activity, however different in definition. Simplicius points out that this paves the way for Aristotle's God who moves the heavens, while admitting no motion in himself. It is also the basis of Aristotle's doctrine, central to Neoplatonism, that intellect is one with the objects it contemplates.In defending Aristotle's claim that the universe is spatially finite, Simplicius has to meet Archytas' question, "What happens at the edge?". He replies that, given Aristotle's definition of place, there is nothing, rather than an empty place, beyond the furthest stars, and one cannot stretch one's hand into nothing, nor be prevented by nothing. But why is Aristotle's beginningless universe not temporally infinite? Simplicius answers that the past years no longer exist, so one never has an infinite collection.