Demonstrates how phenomenology constructively addresses problems in philosophy of mind, moral psychology and philosophy of action.

Why should I be moral? Philosophers have long been concerned with the legitimacy of morality’s claim on us—especially its ostensible aim to motivate certain actions of all persons unconditionally. This problem of moral normativity has received extensive treatment in analytic moral theory, but little attention has been paid to the potential contribution that phenomenology might make to this central debate in metaethics. In The Phenomenology of Moral Normativity, William H. Smith takes up the question of morality’s legitimacy anew, drawing contemporary moral philosophers into conversation with the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Utilizing a two-part account of moral normativity, Smith contends that the ground of morality itself is second-personal—rooted in the ethical demand intrinsic to other persons —while the ground for particular moral-obligations is first-personal—rooted in the subject’s avowal or endorsement of certain moral norms within a concrete historical situation. Thus, Smith argues, phenomenological analysis allows us to make sense of an idea that has long held intuitive appeal, but that modern moral philosophy has been unable to render satisfactorily: namely, that the normative source of valid moral claims is simply other persons and what we owe to them.

Against the widespread, mainstream take on the philosophy of law, this collected volume fills an important scholarly gap by introducing a phenomenological account of some of the major questions and themes of jurisprudence such as rights and norms. This volume argues that wherever there is a demand for grounding normativity, the phenomenological method can provide a priori—albeit corrigible—access to essential truths, with reference to beings and their social relationships. The present work reflects upon the place and potential impact on the theory of law and normativity stemming from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl—largely overlooked by legal philosophers and legal theorists. Further coverage contains those who have built upon these ideas of Husserl such as Martin Heidegger, Alfred Schutz, Edith Stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Adolf Reinach. This text addresses new issues and questions from the general perspective of the phenomenology of law. It is a response to those critical of phenomenology by presenting sober arguments in support of its potential for achieving a deeper grasp of legal normative concepts such as rights, claims, obligations, promises, and apologies. Boundaries between law and morality as well as legal and social ontologies are approached from a phenomenological perspective. It appeals to students, researchers, and professionals working in phenomenology, ethics, legal philosophy, and human rights theory and practice.

Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right offers an innovative and important account of normativity, yet the theory set forth there rests on philosophical foundations that have remained largely obscure. In Hegel’s Theory of Normativity, Kevin Thompson proposes an interpretation of the foundations that underlie Hegel’s theory: its method of justification, its concept of freedom, and its account of right. Thompson shows how the systematic character of Hegel’s project together with the metaphysical commitments that follow from its method are essential to secure this theory against the challenges of skepticism and to understand its distinctive contribution to questions regarding normative justification, practical agency, social ontology, and the nature of critique.

The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl has decisively influenced much of contemporary philosophy. Yet Husserl's philosophy has come under such criticism that today it is viewed as little more than a historical relic. One of the most important and influential critiques of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology was launched by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time, which radically reinterpreted phenomenology. Timothy Stapleton returns to the origin of phenomenology to provide a clear, concise perspective on where it has been and on where it ought to be heading. This book is a careful reexamination of the internal development of Husserl's thought as well as of the ways in which Heidegger used and transformed the phenomenological method. It begins with an interpretation of the "transcendental" dimension of Husserl's philosophy, stressing the importance of the ontological rather than the epistemological problematic in determining the unfolding of Husserlian thought. The work progresses to an account of Heidegger's early works, viewed as a radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology both in name and substance. Stapleton concludes by contrasting a transcendental origin with a hermeneutic beginning point in terms of their respective ideals of intelligibility, meaning, and being; and then looks at some of the consequences of the idea of a hermeneutic philosophy.

ÔThis book proves to be an excellent guide through the labyrinth of law. Its crucial point is legal order viewed from the perspective of a situated ÒWeÓ. Jurisprudence appears as an implicit sort of thinking, embedded in moral, political, epistemological, and linguistic contexts. Numerous example cases lead us from everyday issues to the abysses of violence. Anyone who practises or studies law will highly profit from reading this book. One sees how law functions by being more than mere law.Õ Ð Bernhard Waldenfels, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany Legal Thought and Philosophy clarifies background questions in legal research projects, such as the relationship between law and justice, law and politics, law and knowledge, facts and norms, normativity and validity, constituent and constitutional power, and rule and context. It provides advanced students in law and philosophy with an account of legal thinking that combines analytical and phenomenological insights. From a conception of justice as principled political self-restraint, the book explains why there are moral reasons to separate law from morality conceptually and in what sense a legal order is positive Ð that is, set by authority and bound up with history. The book explores the conditions under which law may become an object of knowledge and theorizing, before finally discussing how these features come together in law as rule-following by citizens, officials, judges, and legislators alike. Addressing advanced students in law and philosophy, this key book: ¥ bridges separate traditions in legal philosophy (in particular analytical philosophy and phenomenology) ¥ develops a view of law as an institution of authority from a conception of justice in the socio-political relationship between ÔweÕ and Ôthe othersÕ ¥ presents a systematic account of normativity and validity ¥ explains in what sense law is Ôdoing things with rulesÕ.