Explores the ironies, contradictions, and compromises that give "America's oldest border state"its special character. Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title Maryland: A Middle Temperament explores the ironies, contradictions, and compromises that give "America's oldest border state" its special character. Extensively illustrated and accompanied by bibliography, maps, charts, and tables, Robert Brugger's vivid account of the state's political, economic, social, and cultural heritage—from the outfitting of Cecil Calvert's expedition to the opening of Baltimore's Harborplace—is rich in the issues and personalities that make up Maryland's story and explain its "middle temperament."

"Oceanian ceramic cultures making earthenware pottery spread during the past 3500 years through a dozen major island groups spanning 6000 km of the tropical Pacific Ocean from western Micronesia to western Polynesia. Island potters mixed sand as temper into clay bodies during ceramic manufacture. The nature of island sands is governed by the geotectonics of hotspot chains, island arcs, subduction zones, backarc basins, and remnant arcs as well as by sedimentology. Because small islands with bedrock exposures of restricted character are virtual point sources of sand, many tempers are diagnostic of specific islands. Petrographic study of temper sands in thin section allows distinction between indigenous pottery and exotic pottery transported from elsewhere. Study of 2223 prehistoric Oceanian potsherds from 130 islands and island clusters indicates the nature of Oceanian temper types and documents 105 cases of interisland transport of ceramics over distances typically

Drawing on a number of case studies from around the world, this publication considers how the local knowledge and practices of indigenous fishing communities are being used in collaboration with scientists, government managers and non-governmental organisations to establish effective frameworks for sustainable fisheries science and management. It seeks to contribute towards achieving the goal of establishing international responsibility for the ethical collection, preservation, dissemination and application of fishers' knowledge.

Tobacco and Slaves is a major reinterpretation of the economic and political transformation of Chesapeake society from 1680 to 1800. Building upon massive archival research in Maryland and Virginia, Allan Kulikoff provides the most comprehensive study to date of changing social relations--among both blacks and whites--in the eighteenth-century South. He links his arguments about class, gender, and race to the later social history of the South and to larger patterns of American development. Allan Kulikoff is professor of history at Northern Illinois University and author of The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism.

Making, amending, and interpreting constitutions is a political game that can yield widespread suffering or secure a nation's liberty and prosperity. Given these high stakes, Robert Cooter argues that constitutional theory should trouble itself less with literary analysis and arguments over founders' intentions and focus much more on the real-world consequences of various constitutional provisions and choices. Pooling the best available theories from economics and political science, particularly those developed from game theory, Cooter's economic analysis of constitutions fundamentally recasts a field of growing interest and dramatic international importance. By uncovering the constitutional incentives that influence citizens, politicians, administrators, and judges, Cooter exposes fault lines in alternative forms of democracy: unitary versus federal states, deep administration versus many elections, parliamentary versus presidential systems, unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, common versus civil law, and liberty versus equality rights. Cooter applies an efficiency test to these alternatives, asking how far they satisfy the preferences of citizens for laws and public goods. To answer Cooter contrasts two types of democracy, which he defines as competitive government. The center of the political spectrum defeats the extremes in "median democracy," whereas representatives of all the citizens bargain over laws and public goods in "bargain democracy." Bargaining can realize all the gains from political trades, or bargaining can collapse into an unstable contest of redistribution. States plagued by instability and contests over redistribution should move towards median democracy by increasing transaction costs and reducing the power of the extremes. Specifically, promoting median versus bargain democracy involves promoting winner-take-all elections versus proportional representation, two parties versus multiple parties, referenda versus representative democracy, and special governments versus comprehensive governments. This innovative theory will have ramifications felt across national and disciplinary borders, and will be debated by a large audience, including the growing pool of economists interested in how law and politics shape economic policy, political scientists using game theory or specializing in constitutional law, and academic lawyers. The approach will also garner attention from students of political science, law, and economics, as well as policy makers working in and with new democracies where constitutions are being written and refined.