It is important to harness market information to improve bank safety (for example, by increasing the role of large, well-informed, but uninsured claimants) but the approach of a ratings-related capital adequacy system could be counterproductive. Relying on ratings could induce borrowers to increase their exposure to systemic risk even if they reduce exposure to specific risk.

Allowing banks to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency may result in a rating system that neither reveals risk information about borrowers nor protects the deposit insurance fund. Part of the problem is the very idea of basing portfolio risk evaluation on the sum of individual loan risks, but there are also important incentive issues.It has recently been proposed that banks be allowed to hold less capital against loans to borrowers who have received a favorable rating by an approved rating agency. But a plausible model of rating-agency behavior shows that this strategy could have perverse results, actually increasing the risk of deposit insurance outlays.First, there is an issue of signaling, with low-ability borrowers possibly altering their behavior to secure a lower capital requirement for their borrowing.Second, establishing a regulatory cut-off may actually reduce the amount of risk information made available by raters.Besides, the credibility of rating agencies may not be damaged by neglect of the risk of unusual systemic shocks, although deposit insurers greatest outlays come chiefly at times of systemic crisis. And using agencies' individual ratings is unlikely to be an effective early-warning system for the risk of systemic failure, so use of the ratings could lull policymakers into a false sense of security.It is important to harness market information to improve bank safety (for example, by increasing the role of large, well-informed, but uninsured claimants), but this particular approach could be counterproductive. Relying on ratings could induce borrowers to increase their exposure to systemic risk even if they reduce exposure to specific risk.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to examine the effects of financial sector regulation.

The Basel Committee has proposed linking capital asset requirements for banks to the banks' private sector ratings. Doing so would reduce the capital requirements for banks that lend prudently in high-income countries; the same incentives would not apply in developing countries.

The global crisis revealed that credit rating agencies (CRAs) are capable of bringing about potential distortions in the financial sector, thereby resulting in a reduction in market confidence which, in turn, influences negotiations and expectations. CRAs need to be held accountable for lack of transparency and inaccurate ratings, however the existing regulatory framework does not secure adequate investor protection. This book provides a new and important contribution to research in the area, at a crucial time in the debate around financial regulation and investment regimes.

Current and future issues in the global accounting/consulting, business opportunity, and credit rating agency (CRA) industries can have significant multiplier-effects on international trade, sustainable growth, and compliance (as physical phenomena). These three industries are among the most international and human-capital-intensive of all service industries. In these industries, analysis of business models and industry dynamics can provide insights about how human-computer interaction (HCI) and contract theory affect the evolution of financial market ecosystems and cross-border information flows, and how business models, work-allocation mechanisms, and liability allocation can evolve to manage change. An often-overlooked issue is that non-performing loans (NPLs), sustainability, and CRA efficiency can be significantly affected by business processes, corporate strategy, and HCI in industry ecosystems, multinational corporations (MNCs), and economic systems. Complex Systems and Sustainability in the Global Auditing, Consulting, and Credit Rating Agency Industries compares these three industries and introduces theories of public policy and “inter-business” processes. The book links industry structure, complex systems (including networks), behavioral game theory, structural changes, and antitrust problems to sustainability and the efficiency of pollution-remediation systems. The book introduces new “informal algorithms” and business/resource-allocation models that solve social-choice problems, and also contravene “impossibility theorems” that are at the core of modern computer science and mechanism design. This book is essential for professors and masters/PhD-level students and employees (in industry, financial services, research institutes, consulting firms, and government agencies) who are interested in industrial mathematics and theoretical computer science.