At a time when the economic troubles and bailouts of Greece and other European economies are casting significant doubt on the future viability of the Eurozone and the EU, it is crucial to examine the origins of the political will and leadership that is necessary to move the integration process forward. This book makes a significant conceptual and empirical contribution by elucidating the extent to which the integration process hinges not on institutions and norms, but on the relations among leaders. Vogt conducts a comparative diplomatic history of three critical junctures in the process of European integration: the creation of the Common Market (1955–1957), British accession (1969–1973), and the introduction of the Euro (1989–1993). He illustrates how personal diplomacy, leadership constellations, and the dynamics among leaders enable breakthroughs or inhibit accords. He also reveals how the EU’s system of top-level decision-making that privileges institutionalised summitry has operated in the past and suggests – in a separate chapter – why it has come to atrophy and prove more dysfunctional of late.

This volume is a study on summit diplomacy (a meeting of high government officials for the purpose of conducting negotiations between nations) that is performed personally by the President of the United States. The author has outlined the history of presidential diplomacy but takes a closer view of the personal foreign relations efforts of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. In this country, individual Presidents have assumed varying degrees of personal participation in foreign affairs. Some have remained relatively aloof from relations with other countries, and their names rarely appear in the diplomatic records. Others are remembered for one or a few policy statements or international actions. A number of Presidents, and in certain cases, even Vice Presidents, have engaged in personal diplomacy of some consequence. To mention only a few, diplomatic history recounts the contributions of Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, Polk, Cleveland, Truman, and Eisenhower. On the other hand, a few Presidents have played active if not decisive roles in diplomacy, occasionally virtually serving as their own Secretaries of State. Among these, in the present century, generally are included Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Woodrow Wilson riding down the Champs-Élysées in December 1918 to meet with the leaders of the victorious Allies at the Paris Peace Conference marked a break from a long tradition where US presidents directed foreign policy, and direct engagement with foreign counterparts was not considered a central duty. Not until the arrival of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration over a decade later would this change. In The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush Tizoc Chavez reveals the long-overlooked history of the rise of personal diplomacy as one of the core responsibilities of the modern president. The modern presidency as it took shape during the FDR era is characterized by rising expectations, sensitivity to public opinion, activism in the legislative arena, a propensity to act unilaterally, and a vast executive branch bureaucracy, all of which contributed to shaping the necessity and practice of presidential personal diplomacy. Tizoc Chavez takes a comprehensive approach and provides a thorough, archival-based examination of the causes that led presidents to conduct diplomacy on a more personal level. He analyzes personal diplomacy as it was practiced across presidential administrations, which shifts the focus from the unique or contingent characteristics of individual presidents to an investigation of the larger international and domestic factors in which presidents have operated. This approach clarifies similarities and connections during the era of the modern presidency and why all modern presidents have used personal diplomacy regardless of their vastly different political ideologies, policy objectives, leadership styles, partisan affiliations, and personalities, making the practice a central aspect of the presidency and US foreign affairs. This cross-administration exploration of why the presidency, as an institution, resorted to diplomacy at the highest level argues that regardless of who occupied the modern White House, they turned to personal diplomacy for the same reasons: international crises, domestic politics, foreign leaders seeking them out, and a desire for control. The Diplomatic Presidency bridges the gap between history and political science by balancing in-depth case studies with general explanations of broader developments in the presidency and international and domestic politics for a better understanding of presidential behavior and US foreign relations today.

'Kissinger's absorbing book tackles head-on some of the toughest questions of our time . . . Its pages sparkle with insight' Simon Schama in the NEW YORKER Spanning more than three centuries, from Cardinal Richelieu to the fragility of the 'New World Order', DIPLOMACY is the now-classic history of international relations by the former Secretary of State and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Kissinger's intimate portraits of world leaders, many from personal experience, provide the reader with a unique insight into what really goes on -- and why -- behind the closed doors of the corridors of power. 'Budding diplomats and politicians should read it as avidly as their predecessors read Machiavelli' Douglas Hurd in the DAILY TELEGRAPH 'If you want to pay someone a compliment, give them Henry Kissinger's DIPLOMACY ... It is certainly one of the best, and most enjoyable [books] on international relations past and present ... DIPLOMACY should be read for the sheer historical sweep, the characterisations, the story-telling, the ability to look at large parts of the world as a whole' Malcolm Rutherford in the FINANCIAL TIMES

Argues that face-to-face interaction undercuts the security dilemma at the interpersonal level by providing a mechanism for understanding intentions.

At a time when the economic troubles and bailouts of Greece and other European economies are casting significant doubt on the future viability of the Eurozone and the EU, it is crucial to examine the origins of the political will and leadership that is necessary to move the integration process forward. This book makes a significant conceptual and empirical contribution by elucidating the extent to which the integration process hinges not on institutions and norms, but on the relations among leaders. Vogt conducts a comparative diplomatic history of three critical junctures in the process of European integration: the creation of the Common Market (1955–1957), British accession (1969–1973), and the introduction of the Euro (1989–1993). He illustrates how personal diplomacy, leadership constellations, and the dynamics among leaders enable breakthroughs or inhibit accords. He also reveals how the EU’s system of top-level decision-making that privileges institutionalised summitry has operated in the past and suggests – in a separate chapter – why it has come to atrophy and prove more dysfunctional of late.

En dybtgående, veldokumenteret analyse af britisk udenrigspolitik i gennem de første 10 efterkrigsår, herunder bl. a. den engelsk-amerikansk-franske manøvre for at afværge Sovjetunionens bestræbelser for at genforene Tyskland.