This book examines the interconnections between art, phenomenology, and cognitive studies. Contributors question the binary oppositions generally drawn between visuality and agency, sensing and thinking, phenomenal art and politics, phenomenology and structuralism, and subjective involvement and social belonging. Instead, they foreground the many ways that artists ask us to consider how we sense, think, and act in relation to a work of art.

This book grew out of the lectures that I prepared for my students in epis temology at SUNY College at Brockport beginning in 1974. The conception of the problem of perception and the interpretation of the sense-datum theory and its supporting arguments that are developed in Chapters One through Four originated in these lectures. The rest of the manuscript was first written during the 1975-1976 academic year, while I held an NEH Fellowship in Residence for College Teachers at Brown University, and during the ensuing summer, under a SUNY Faculty Research Fellowship. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for their support of my research. I am grateful to many former students, colleagues, and friends for their stimulating, constructive comments and criticisms. Among the former stu dents whose reactions and objections were most helpful are Richard Motroni, Donald Callen, Hilary Porter, and Glenn Shaikun. Among my colleagues at Brockport, I wish to thank Kevin Donaghy and Jack Glickman for their comments and encouragement. I am indebted to Eli Hirsch for reading and commenting most helpfully on the entire manuscript, to Peter M. Brown for a useful correspondence concerning key arguments in Chapters Five and Seven, to Keith Lehrer for a criticism of one of my arguments that led me to make some important revisions, and to Roderick M.

First published in 2002. Written in 1959, this volume looks at the philosophical problems of perception, that arise mainly because our traditional common-sense notions clash with the factual evidence concerning not only the occurrence of illusions and hallucinations but also the essential role played by complex causal and psychological processes in perceiving.

How are causal judgements such as 'The ice on the road caused the traffic accident' connected with counterfactual judgements such as 'If there had not been any ice on the road, the traffic accident would not have happened'? This volume throws new light on this question by uniting, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches to causation and counterfactuals. Traditionally, philosophers have primarily been interested in connections between causal and counterfactual claims on the level of meaning or truth-conditions. More recently, however, they have also increasingly turned their attention to psychological connections between causal and counterfactual understanding or reasoning. At the same time, there has been a surge in interest in empirical work on causal and counterfactual cognition amongst developmental, cognitive, and social psychologists—much of it inspired by work in philosophy. In this volume, twelve original contributions from leading philosophers and psychologists explore in detail what bearing empirical findings might have on philosophical concerns about counterfactuals and causation, and how, in turn, work in philosophy might help clarify the issues at stake in empirical work on the cognitive underpinnings of, and relationships between, causal and counterfactual thought.

"He's waiting for you!" With this enigmatic invitation, the Traveler finds himself swept into a world that is completely alien, yet strangely familiar. He is told that he will be returning home, yet this new world is inhabited by elves, trolls, and centaurs. Everything has changed! Magic, mysticism, and superstition seem to hold more power here than logic and rationality. And a disturbing truth emerges; human history is being deliberately rewritten to disguise an invasion by rebels from another dimension intent upon harnessing humanity to their will. Opposing them is the sovereign government from this same dimension, whose leadership will not become directly involved in the struggle on Earth. Humans must be recruited, then trained to resist this ominous distortion of history. Given the assistance of two extraordinary companions and a magical pendant, the Traveler is told to recover an item lost in the conflict since antiquity, an integral part of a much more powerful mechanism, the First Jewel of Earth. You will find yourself challenged to place this book within conventional categories. Is this fiction, fantasy, or prophecy? Is this story set in the distant past or the emerging future? Is it possible that two alien forces have been struggling for control of human history since the beginning of time? Join the Traveler in pursuing this quest. Like him, your reality will be forever changed!

The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of crucial importance not just in the philosophy of mind, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. The essays in this 1992 volume not only offer fresh answers to some of the traditional problems of perception, but also examine the subject in light of contemporary research on mental content. A substantial introduction locates the essays within the recent history of the subject, and demonstrates the links between them. The Contents of Experience brings together some prominent philosophers in the field, and offers a major statement on a problem central to current philosophical thinking. Notable contributors include Christopher Peacocke, Brian O'Shaughnessy and Michael Tye.