An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various philosophical issues. In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, “bottom-up,” theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.

Numerous spatial biases influence navigation, interactions, and preferences in our environment. This volume considers their influences on perception and memory.

This volume addresses key questions related to how content in thought is derived from perceptual experience. It includes chapters that focus on single issues on perception and cognition, as well as others that relate these issues to an important social construct that involves both perceptual experience and cognitive activities: aesthetics. While the volume includes many diverse views, several prominent themes unite the individual essays: a challenge to the notion of the discreet, and non-temporal, unit of perception, a challenge to the traditional divide between perception and cognition, and a challenge to the traditional divide between unconscious and conscious intentionality. Additionally, the chapters discuss the content of perceptual experience, the value of traditional notions of content, disjunctivism, adverbialism, and phenomenal experience. The final section of essays dealing with perception and cognition in aesthetics features work in experimental aesthetics and unique perspectives from artists and gallerists working outside of philosophy. Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics is a timely volume that offers a range of unique perspectives on debates in philosophy of mind surrounding perception and cognition. It will also appeal to scholars working in aesthetics and art theory who are interested in the ways these debates influence our understanding of art.

How do we see? This question has fascinated and perplexed philosophers and scientists for millennia. In visual perception, mind and world meet, when light reflected from objects enters the eyes and stimulates the nerves leading to activity in the brain near the back of the head. This neural activity yields conscious experiences of a world in three dimensions, clothed in colors, and immediately recognized as (say) ground, sky, grass, trees, and friends. The visual brain also produces nonconscious representations that interact with other brain systems for perception and cognition and that help to regulate our visually guided actions. But how does all of this really work? The answers concern the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of visual perception and cognition. Gary Hatfield's essays address fundamental questions concerning, in Part I, the psychological processes underlying spatial perception and perception of objects; in Part II, psychological theories and metaphysical controversies about color perception and qualia; and, in Part III, the history and philosophy of theories of vision, including methodological controversies surrounding introspection and involving the relations between psychology and the fields of neuroscience and cognitive science. An introductory chapter provides a unified overview; an extensive reference list rounds out the volume.

Deep Learning for Robot Perception and Cognition introduces a broad range of topics and methods in deep learning for robot perception and cognition together with end-to-end methodologies. The book provides the conceptual and mathematical background needed for approaching a large number of robot perception and cognition tasks from an end-to-end learning point-of-view. The book is suitable for students, university and industry researchers and practitioners in Robotic Vision, Intelligent Control, Mechatronics, Deep Learning, Robotic Perception and Cognition tasks. - Presents deep learning principles and methodologies - Explains the principles of applying end-to-end learning in robotics applications - Presents how to design and train deep learning models - Shows how to apply deep learning in robot vision tasks such as object recognition, image classification, video analysis, and more - Uses robotic simulation environments for training deep learning models - Applies deep learning methods for different tasks ranging from planning and navigation to biosignal analysis

Joan Vickers presents evidence on gaze control within visual perception and action in sport as well as the science underlying decision training.

The mental representations of perceptual and cognitive stimuli vary on many dimensions. In addition, because of quantal fluctuations in the stimulus, spontaneous neural activity, and fluctuations in arousal and attentiveness, mental events are characterized by an inherent variability. During the last several years, a number of models and theories have been developed that explicitly assume the appropriate mental representation is both multidimensional and probabilistic. This new approach has the potential to revolutionize the study of perception and cognition in the same way that signal detection theory revolutionized the study of psychophysics. This unique volume is the first to critically survey this important new area of research.