People’s Wars in China, Malaya, and Vietnam explains why some insurgencies collapse after a military defeat while under other circumstances insurgents are able to maintain influence, rebuild strength, and ultimately defeat the government. The author argues that ultimate victory in civil wars rests on the size of the coalition of social groups established by each side during the conflict. When insurgents establish broad social coalitions (relative to the incumbent), their movement will persist even when military defeats lead to loss of control of territory because they enjoy the support of the civilian population and civilians will not defect to the incumbent. By contrast, when insurgents establish narrow coalitions, civilian compliance is solely a product of coercion. Where insurgents implement such governing strategies, battlefield defeats translate into political defeats and bring about a collapse of the insurgency because civilians defect to the incumbent. The empirical chapters of the book consist of six case studies of the most consequential insurgencies of the 20th century including that led by the Chinese Communist Party from 1927 to 1949, the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), and the Vietnam War (1960–1975). People’s Wars breaks new ground in systematically analyzing and comparing these three canonical cases of insurgency. The case studies of China and Malaya make use of Chinese-language archival sources, many of which have never before been used and provide an unprecedented level of detail into the workings of successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. The book adopts an interdisciplinary approach and will be of interest to both political scientists and historians.

"People’s Wars breaks new ground in systematically analyzing and comparing these three canonical cases of insurgency. The case studies of China and Malaya make use of Chinese-language archival sources, many of which have never before been used and provide an unprecedented level of detail into the workings of successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. The book is adopts an interdisciplinary approach and will be of interest of both political scientists and historians.

First published in 1969. The 'consequences' in this book refer to Peking's policy on people's war and to US counter-measures; and the effect of these in South East Asia. The author argues that, on the whole, China under Communism was a better place for the majority of people than it was under the Kuomintang. Contents include: Revolution and Intervention in South East Asia, Communist Revolts: 1948; Sino-Soviet Dispute; US reaction: the Vietnam Commitment; China: Conditions for Success; The Struggle for Vietnam; August Insurrection; China in Maphilindo; Lessons from Malaya and the Philippines; Peace and the Tet Offensive

Timothy Lomperis persuasively argues the ironic point that the lessons of American involvement in Vietnam are not to be found in any analysis of the war by itself. Rather, he proposes a comparison of the Vietnam experience with seven other cases of Western intervention in communist insurgencies during the Cold War era: China, Indochina, Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Cambodia, and Laos. Lomperis maintains that popular insurgencies are manifestations of crises in political legitimacy, which occur as a result of the societal stresses caused by modernization. Therefore, he argues, any intervention in a 'people's war' will succeed or fail depending on how it affects this crisis. The unifying theme in the cases Lomperis discusses is the power of land reform and electoral democracy to cement political legitimacy and therefore deflect revolutionary movements. Applying this theory to the ongoing Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, Lomperis makes a qualified prediction of that conflict's outcome. He concludes that a global trend toward democratization has produced a new era of 'people's rule.'

This book, first published in 1969, casts a critical eye over the problem of insurgency. The author sees insurgency not just as a matter of technique – military tactics or organizational skill – nor as the result of ‘force and fraud’, but as ‘people’s war’: the conditions in which the mass of the people become involved, voluntarily or otherwise, on either side. He quotes Nasution’s statement, ‘The guerrilla movement is only the result, not the cause of the problem’. People’s war brings the peasantry, hitherto ignorant, apathetic or rejected, into the political process. For ‘war is ... the continuation of politics by other means’. In Asia this was essentially a peasant’s war, arising when peasant grievances, interests or demands cannot be met under the existing ‘legitimate’ but urban or landowner-orientated system of rule. It shows little understanding to blame outside intervention when peasant – and nationalist – unrest leads to revolt. The Chinese Communists did not owe success to Soviet aid, the Vietminh to Chinese assistance or the Vietcong to North Vietnamese intervention. The conclusion applies to governments as to insurgents: no amount of outside aid can win the war for them if they themselves are incapable and the people – on whom they depend for support – have no will to fight. This book, based on first-hand experience of the area and on study of original sources, offers (1) an analysis of ‘people’s war’ in China, Indochina and Vietnam, (2) a critique of US policy in Laos and Vietnam and (3) a comparison with counter-measures in Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. It is both original and constructive.