"In the mid-1950s the US faced the first real challenge since World War II to its strategic superiority over any nation on earth. The attempt to collect intelligence on the Soviets began with an initial period of poor collection capabilities and consequent limited analysis. With few well-placed human sources inside the Soviet Union, it was only with the CIA's development of, what can only be called, timely technological wizardry--the U-2 aircraft and Corona Satellite reconnaissance program--that breakthroughs occurred in gaining valuable, game-changing intelligence. Coupled with the innovative use of aerial and satellite photography and other technical collection programs, the efforts began to produce solid, national intelligence."--Https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/index.html.

In the mid-1950s the US faced the first real challenge since World War II to its strategic superiority over other nations on earth. The attempt to collect intelligence on the Soviets began with an initial period of poor collection capabilities and consequent limited analysis.The Missile Gap was in essence a growing perception in the West, especially in the USA, that the Soviet Union was quickly developing an intercontinental range ballistic missile (ICBM) capability earlier, in greater numbers, and with far more capability than that of the United States.Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations struggled to formulate policy in response to what was then believed to be an ever-growing advantage in Soviet strategic missiles. With few well-placed human sources inside the Soviet Union, it was only with the CIA's development of, what can only be called, timely technological wizardry—the U-2 aircraft and Corona Satellite reconnaissance program—that breakthroughs occurred in gaining valuable, game-changing intelligence. Coupled with the innovative use of aerial and satellite photography and other technical collection programs, the efforts began to produce solid, national intelligence. These breakthroughs in technology and photography eventually provided the CIA with a more accurate assessment of actual Soviet missile capacity, allowing policy makers to shift gears. This collection tells the story of this technology catch-up that helped the U.S. penetrate the "iron curtain" and uncover the truth about their capabilities.

In the mid-1950s the US faced the first real challenge since World War II to its strategic superiority over any nation on earth. The attempt to collect intelligence on the Soviets began with an initial period of poor collection capabilities and consequent limited analysis. With few well-placed human sources inside the Soviet Union, it was only with the CIA's development of, what can only be called, timely technological wizardry--the U-2 aircraft and Corona Satellite reconnaissance program--that breakthroughs occurred in gaining valuable, game-changing intelligence. Coupled with the innovative use of aerial and satellite photography and other technical collection programs, the efforts began to produce solid, national intelligence. (from the CIA website at www.cia.gov )

The 2013 Plan serves as a roadmap of the FAA’s ongoing transition to NextGen and provides an overview of the benefits aircraft operators and passengers are receiving from recent NextGen improvements. NextGen is the shift to smarter, satellite-based and digital technologies and new procedures to make air travel more convenient, predictable and environmentally friendly. Highlights of the Plan include the latest on metroplex initiatives, Performance Based Navigation growth, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast deployments, surface collaboration and plans for future benefits. The plan devotes an entire chapter to general aviation and recognizes the growing role of this important stakeholder.

Fortunately, more than ever before, con artists are being apprehended and prosecuted. Federal, state and local law enforcement officials have reported enormous increases in tips and criminal activity since the economic calamity began in 2008. Cash redemptions are dangerous for Ponzi schemes, because when the money runs out, folks start talking. For example, at any one time, enforcement staff at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are investigating anywhere between 750 and 1,000 individuals or entities for various violations of the law. Increases in tips and fraud cases have also occurred at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the states, and various localities around the world. The stories in this book are actual CFTC cases stemming from investigations that began with the economic downturn. These are real cases, real fraudsters, with unfortunately . . . very real victims. While, the fundamental nature of the writing in such files is, as you would imagine, very bureaucratic: this script is anything but bureaucratic. Commissioner Chilton has worked in public service for over a quarter of a century and has found that one of the most important things that can be done is to make government less puzzling and perplexing, less mysterious, and yes, less bureaucratic. While Commissioner Chilton can’t say there has been any monumental change in how folks see their government, over the years, Commissioner Chilton continues to try and do his part by communicating in a way that lets folks “in” on what is going on. This writing is an effort to continue that work. Commissioner Chilton hopes it will be a satisfying read, but more importantly, maybe some folks will avoid the tremendous tragedy that so many of our fellow citizens have endured.

The Silent Guns of Two Octobers uses new as well as previously under-appreciated documentary evidence to link the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Checkpoint Charlie tank standoff to achieve the impossible—craft a new, thoughtful, original analysis of a political showdown everyone thought they knew everything about. Ultimately the book concludes that much of the Cold War rhetoric the leaders employed was mere posturing; in reality neither had any intention of starting a nuclear war. Theodore Voorhees reexamines Khrushchev’s and Kennedy’s leadership, decision, and rhetoric in light of the new documentary evidence available. Voorhees examines the impact of John F. Kennedy's domestic political concerns about his upcoming first midterm elections on his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis through his use of back-channel dealings with Khrushchev during the lead-up to the crisis and in the closing days when the two leaders managed to reach a settlement.