In Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations Joseph Levitt traces the history of these negotiations from the Canadian diplomatic perspective. He analyses the various proposals and documents the reactions of Pearson and his colleagues. Levitt reveals Pearson's own view of the strategic stalemate between the USSR and the United States -- Pearson did not believe that an open and liberal society such as the United States would ever launch an unprovoked offensive on the USSR; he thought instead that the danger of a major military confrontation arose only from the possibility that the Soviet Union might attack. Consequently the main thrust of Canadian diplomatic activity in these negotiations was not prevention of an American arms build-up but support of a strategy which would compel the USSR to accept an agreement that would benefit the Americans militarily or, failing that, to hold the Soviets responsible for the impasse in the talks and thus win the all-important propaganda war.

Lester Pearson was Minister for External Affairs between 1948 and 1957. During this time Canada was a member of two successive United Nations commissions on eliminating or controlling nuclear arms with the United States and the Soviet Union as the main negotiators. The goal of these discussions was to reach an agreement on general principles that reflected the strategic needs of each side, rather than on the technical details necessary for a treaty. While the United States and the Soviet Union played the largest role in the negotiations, two other major powers, Britain and France, allies of the Americans, were also at the bargaining table. Canada was the only middle power to participate in all negotiations.

Since the first atomic weapon was detonated in 1945, Canadians have debated not only the role of nuclear power in their uranium-rich land but also their country’s role in a nuclear world. Should Canada belong to international alliances that depend on the threat of nuclear weapons for their own security? Should Canadian-produced nuclear technologies be exported? What about the impact of atomic research on local communities and the environment? This incisive nuclear history engages with much larger debates about national identity, Canadian foreign policy contradictions during the Cold War, and Canada’s global standing to investigate these critical questions.

The second volume of the official history of the 'Department of External Affairs, Coming of Age' covers a period of remarkable expansion and achievement in the history of Canadian external relations.

Canada's relationship with the United States and its place in the world currently occupy distinct spheres in the minds of policymakers, intellectuals, and citizens. At home, Canada is thought to enjoy a "special" relationship with the United States; abroad, it occupies a place as the world's problem-solver and peacekeeper. Patrick Lennox analyzes six key events in the history of relations between the two countries to reveal the underlying connection between the Canada-US relationship and Canada's place in the world. The war in Afghanistan is but the latest in a series of paradoxical interactions between the two states abroad that has resulted from the hierarchy in Canada-US relations at home.

What do you do when a nuclear weapon detonates nearby? During the early Cold War years of 1945-63, Civil Defence Canada and the Emergency Measures Organization planned for just such a disaster and encouraged citizens to prepare their families and their cities for nuclear war. By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the civil defence program was widely mocked, and the public was vastly unprepared for nuclear war. Canada’s civil defence program was born in the early Cold War, when fears of conflict between the superpowers ran high. Give Me Shelter features previously unreleased documents detailing Canada’s nuclear survival plans. Andrew Burtch reveals how the organization publicly appealed to citizens to prepare for disaster themselves -- from volunteering as air-raid wardens to building fallout shelters. This tactic ultimately failed, however, due to a skeptical populace, chronic underfunding, and repeated bureaucratic fumbling. Give Me Shelter exposes the challenges of educating the public in the face of the looming threat of nuclear annihilation. Give Me Shelter explains how governments and the public prepared for the unexpected. It is essential reading for historians, policymakers, and anybody interested in Canada’s Cold War home front.

The nuclear issue was a minor political matter when John Diefenbaker became prime minister in 1957. By 1963, it served as a catalyst for his defeat, with many attributing his demise to the indecision with which he handled it. Patricia McMahon tells a more nuanced story in Essence of Indecision.