Lastly, we introduced an endogenous multi-nationalization process into a North-South model of scale-invariant long-run Schumpeterian growth with a finite-length patent protection. The latter is perfectly enforceable in the North but imperfectly enforceable in the South. The model was used to examine the effects of intellectual property rights policy and globalization on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the world income distribution. The effectiveness of patent enforcement does not effect the decision of a firm to become MNCs. However, an increase in patent length reduces the flow of FDI and worsens the income distribution between regions. In addition, globalization, measured as a geographic expansion in the size of the South, increases the flow of FDI but worsens the North-South income distribution. Lastly, an improvement in innovation technology leads to a decline in FDI and worsens the North-South wage gap.

We construct a two-country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product-cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long-run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the NorthSouth wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global-growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the NorthSouth wage gap.

We consider the differential incentives of the North and the South to provide patent protection to innovating firms in the North. The two regions are assumed to have a different distribution of preferences over the range of exploitable technologies. Due to the scarcity of R & D resources, the two regions are in potential competition with each other to encourage the development of technologies most suited to their needs. This provides a motive for the South to provide patent protection even when it constitutes a small share of the world market and hence has strong free riding incentives otherwise. A benevolent global planner will set equal rates of patent protection only when it weights the welfare of the two regions equally. We find that the comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium exhibit considerable ambiguity. Numerical simulations in the benchmark case yield the following results: (i) when the technological preferences of the two countries become more similar, the level of patent protection provided by the South is reduced; (ii) when the relative market size of the South is increased, the South enhances its patent protection. In both cases, the level of Northern patents is relatively insensitive.

Economic growth has traditionally been attributed to the increase in national production arising from technological innovation. Using a panel of seventy-nine countries bridging the North-South divide, Patent Intensity and Economic Growth is an important empirical study on the uncertain relationship between patents and economic growth. It considers the impact of one-size-fits-all patent policies on developing countries and their innovation-based economic growth, including those policies originating from the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization, as well as initiatives derived from the TRIPS Agreement and the Washington Consensus. This book argues against patent harmonization across countries and provides an analytical framework for country group coalitioning on policy at UN level. It will appeal to scholars and students of patent law, national and international policy makers, venture capitalist investors, and research and development managers, as well as researchers in intellectual property, innovation and economic growth.

People, Plants and Patents: The impact of intellectual property on biodiversity, conservation, trade and rural society

Alan Deardorff was 65 years old on June 6, 2009. To celebrate this occasion, a Festschrift in his honor was held on October 2OCo3, 2009, in the Rackham Amphitheater at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The Festschrift was entitled OC Comparative Advantage, Economic Growth, and the Gains from Trade and Globalization: A Festschrift in Honor of Alan V Deardorff.OCO It was co-organized by two of Professor Deardorff''s former students, Drusilla Brown of Tufts University and Robert Staiger of Stanford University, together with Robert Stern representing the University of Michigan. The first day of the Festschrift involved a series of panels in which invited participants reflected on Professor Deardorff''s contributions, including his writings on: comparative advantage; trade and growth; the gains from trade and globalization; and computational modeling and trade policy analysis. The panel participants prepared written comments, setting out their evaluation of Professor Deardorff''s contributions combined with their own thoughts on the current state of knowledge and analysis of the particular topic. At the end of the first day, Paul Krugman of Princeton University and The New York Times delivered a Citigroup Foundation Special Lecture entitled OC Reflections on Globalization: Yesteryear and Today.OCO All of these papers and Krugman''s lecture are contained in the volume."