This book explores the potential of participatory research and the capability approach to transform understandings of higher education. The editors and contributors illuminate the importance of epistemic in/justice as a foundation to a reflexive, inclusive and decolonial approach to knowledge, as well as its importance to democratic life and participation in higher education. Drawing together eight global case studies, the authors argue for an ecology of knowledge that expands epistemic capabilities in higher education through teaching, research and policy making. Moreover, the chapters illustrate how these epistemic capabilities can be marginalised by both institutions and structural and historical factors; as well as the potential for possibilities when spaces are opened for genuine participation and designed for a plurality of voices. This book will appeal to scholars of social justice and participatory research as well as ongoing debates around decolonising the academy.

In this book Carmen Martinez-Vargas explores how academic participatory research and the way it is carried out can contribute to more, or less, social justice. Adopting theoretical and empirical approaches, and addressing multiple complex, intersectional issues, this book offers inspiration for scholars and practitioners to open up alternative pathways to social justice, viewed through a Global South lens. Martinez-Vargas examines the colonial roots of research and emphasises the importance of problematising current practices and limitations in order to establish more just and democratic participatory research practices. Although practitioners have been challenging the Western roots of research and participatory research for decades, their goals can be compromised by pluralities and contradictions in the field. This book aims not to replicate past participatory research approaches, but to offer an innovative theoretical foundation—the Capabilities Approach—and an innovative participatory practice called ‘Democratic Capabilities Research’. Democratising Participatory Research is not only timely and relevant in South Africa, but also in the Global North owing to the current crisis of values jeopardising the peaceful existence of diverse societies. The book gives essential recommendations for capabilities and human development scholars to reframe their perspectives and uses of the Capabilities Approach, as well as for participatory practitioners to critically reflect on their practices and their often limited conceptualisation of participation.

This book investigates the power of art to enhance human development and to initiate positive social change for individuals and societies recovering from conflict. Interventions aimed at reinforcing social justice and bringing communities together after conflict are often accused of being top-down, or failing to consider all groups and contexts within a society. The use of participatory arts can help to address these challenges by fostering community engagement, social cohesion, influencing public policy, and ultimately, advancing social justice. Arts-based methods can be particularly effective at reaching youth communities, providing voice and political agency to young people who are often not given a platform. Situated at the intersection of participatory arts, social and epistemic justice, this book brings together case studies from across the world to reflect on best practice for the use of bottom-up, participatory, co-produced, and co-designed arts processes in conflict settings. This book provides an important guide to the role that arts can play in addressing epistemic injustice and contributing to social justice and human development. As such, it will be of interest to international development and arts practitioners, policy makers, and to students and researchers across participatory arts, youth studies, international development, social justice, and peace and conflict studies.

This book describes a method in which researchers commit to research WITH, not ON, members of marginalized communities in order to challenge and transform conditions of social injustice.

In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

This book critically explores Global South perspectives, examining marginalised voices and issues whilst challenging the supremacy of Global North perspectives in literature. The unique value of this book lies in its extensive coverage of various Southern challenges, including disaster management, climate change, communication, resilience, gender, education, and disability. It also underscores the relevance of indigenous philosophies such as animism, Buen Vivir, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Neozapatism, Qi vitality, Taoism, and Ubuntu. Stemming from regions as diverse as Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, these philosophies are brought into public discourse. By demonstrating their practicality in designing intervention programs and influencing policy-making, the book fills a critical gap in global Southern literature while promoting context-specific knowledge for improving well-being in the Global South contexts. This book’s content resonates with a diverse audience, encompassing students, academics, researchers, NGOs, and policymakers from postcolonial states in the Global South and those from Global North countries. Furthermore, it is highly relevant to communities within the Global North that mirror the Global South – those grappling with equity issues for indigenous populations. It has a versatile appeal that transcends disciplinary boundaries, encompassing cultural studies, sociology, international development, philosophy, and postcolonial studies, thus making it accessible to all educational levels. It holds particular interest for those in development studies, indigenous studies, government departments globally, international organisations, and universities worldwide.

I advance a new theory of epistemic injustice, with important implications for pursuing epistemic justice. This project develops a positive account of epistemic justice, broadens the scope of the phenomenon, and motivates new interventions. This dissertations works towards a better understanding of what it means to be an epistemic subject and to be treated as such.I argue that epistemic injustice can be understood through a lens of participation in inquiry, rather than using the received view that focuses on testimony. On my account, victims are marginalized when disrespected and devalued as potential participants in inquiry due to prejudice. This account broadens the domain of epistemic injustice, incorporating different instances of epistemic exclusion that do not involve testimony. This participatory account can better explain the core features of epistemic injustice and identifies mechanisms in subtypes of epistemic injustice. Preventing and remedying epistemic injustice requires creating inclusive communities that respect and foster participation in inquiry. I argue that the virtuous elements of inclusion are embodied in groups rather than individuals, and can successfully address the wrong of epistemic injustice. Successfully fostering inclusion will require an intersectional approach in order to address varied forms of epistemic injustice.My dissertation is a collection of five inter-related articles expanding the notion of epistemic injustice. In the first chapter, the article "What's unjust about testimonial injustice?" explores underlying notions of "justice" within the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. I argue that different philosophers rely upon different notions of justice (specifically David Coady and Miranda Fricker). In contrast to both of their views, I argue that epistemic injustice should be understood as a form of oppression. Next, I argue that there are at least two different ways to disrespect victims of epistemic injustice: by denying them recognition respect (their epistemic standing) or appraisal respect (their credibility). The article "Credibility and Recognition: Two Failures of Respect in Epistemic Injustice" makes up the second chapter. Chapter three, "Knowledge and Participation: Giving a Participatory Account of Epistemic Injustice" argues that epistemic subjects are wronged when de-valued as potential participants (by denying access, recognition, or appraisal).This participatory framework is better able to analyze the category of epistemic injustice compared to other approaches. I propose cultivating the virtue of inclusion (as a virtue of social groups) in the next chapter: "Inclusion: Addressing Epistemic Injustice with a Group Virtue". Inclusion (rather than open-mindedness, testimonial injustice, or trust) is the virtue that is best able to prevent and remedy instances of epistemic injustice. Using a case study of patients with fibromyalgia, I show that different types of epistemic injustice impact and reinforce one another. Those who experience epistemic injustice encounter it while also experiencing other overlapping oppressions. As a result, I argue we must pursue intersectional epistemic justice. The fifth and final chapter addresses this topic, in: "The Pain of Being Overlooked: A Case Study on Fibromyalgia and Intersectional Epistemic Justice".The existing literature on epistemic injustice has been overly narrow in focus, missing significant instances of epistemic wrongs. My project can help both ethicists and epistemologists formulate solutions to epistemic oppression by providing a more fully developed account of epistemic ideals. Methodologically, I draw from varied approaches including virtue ethics, social epistemology, feminist philosophy, and social psychology. This approach has direct implications not only for ethics research but also for teaching pedagogy and provides new avenues for preventing the epistemic marginalization of vulnerable individuals.