Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

Comparative Politics is a series for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. The General Editors are Max Kaase, Professor of Political Science, Vice President and Dean, School of Humanities and Social Science, International University Bremen, Germany; and Kenneth Newton, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Southampton. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. Today, parliamentarism is the most common form of democratic government. Yet knowledge of this regime type has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. This book argues that representative democracies can be understood as chains of delegation and accountability between citizens and politicians. Under parliamentary democracy, this chain of delegation is simple but also long and indirect. Principal-agent theory helps us to understand the perils of democratic delegation, which include the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Citizens in democratic states, therefore, need institutional mechanisms by which they can control their representatives. The most important such control mechanisms are on the one hand political parties and on the other external constraints such as courts, central banks, referendums, and supranational institutions such as those of the European Union. Traditionally, parliamentary democracies have relied heavily on political parties and presidential systems more on external constraints. This new empirical investigation includes all seventeen West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and seventeen country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. They show that political systems with cohesive and competitive parties and strong mechanisms of external constraint solve their democratic agency problems better than countries with weaker control mechanisms. But in many countries political parties are now weakening, and parliamentary systems face new democratic challenges. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.

An examination of executive actors' accountability for EU economic decisions in the aftermath of the euro crisis.

Written by members of the Study of Parliament Group, this book assesses Parliament's response to the reorganisation of much of the civil service into 'executive agencies'. Chief executives have been given freedom to take operational decisions. Yet Ministers insist that they themselves remain constitutionally responsible for the work of the agencies. After reviewing Parliament's mechanisms and considering several case-studies, the authors conclude that Parliament has yet to exploit fully the opportunities for greater accountability which the new arrangements provide.

In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability--the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e. deliberative accountability)--this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.

6 Party Government and Responsiveness: James A. Stimson

In constitutional theory the convention of individual ministerial responsibility ensures the accountability of ministers to Parliament. In practice it is frequently used by government to limit rather than facilitate accountability. In this book Diana Woodhouse examines the divergence betweentheory and practice.She analyses the situations in which ministers resign, the effectivness of resignation as a means of accountability, and the abdication by ministers of responsibility. She also examines the powers and limitations of Select Committees, the effect of the new Next Steps Agencies on individualministerial responsibility, and draws comparisons with mechanisms of accountability adopted by other countries operating under the Westminster system of government.The inclusion of detailed case studies of the resignations, actual and threatened, of Lord Carrington, Leon Brittan, Edwina Currie, David Mellor, James Prior, and Kenneth Baker make this book especially pertinent to our understanding of the current political scene and to recent institutional changeswithin Parliament and government. By highlighting the present deficiencies and possible future failing in public accountability Dr Woodhouse's study provides an essential complement to recent debates about constitutional reform.