The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 were the most significant foreign policy achievement of the Carter administration. Most Latin American nations had regarded the 1903 treaty and its later minor modifications as vestiges of "American colonialism" and obstacles to any long-term, stable relationship with the United States. Hence, at a time when conflicts were mushrooming in Central America, the significance of the new Panama treaties cannot be overestimated. Former Ambassador to Panama William J. Jorden has provided the definitive account of the long and often contentious negotiations that produced those treaties. It is a vividly written reconstruction of the complicated process that began in 1964 and ended with ratification of the new pacts in 1978. Based on his personal involvement behind the scenes in the White House (1972–1974) and in the United States Embassy in Panama (1974–1978), Jorden has produced a unique living history. Access to documents and the personalities of both governments and, equally important, Jorden's personal recollections of participants on both sides make this historical study an incomparable document of U. S. foreign relations. Beyond the singular story of the treaties themselves—and how diplomats negotiate in the modern world—is the rare description of how the United States deals with a major foreign policy problem. How does a superpower cope with a tiny nation that happens to occupy a strategically critical position? And how does the U. S. Senate face up to its constitutionally assigned power to "advise and consent"? Once treaties are approved, does the House of Representatives help or hinder? Panama Odyssey also deals with another crucial element in the shaping of policy—public opinion: how is it informed or led astray? In sum, this is a history, a handbook on diplomacy, a course in government, and a revelation of foreign policy in action, all based on a fascinating and controversial episode in the U. S. experience.

In nine detailed case studies based on interviews with participants and on recently released documents in the Carter presidential library, Robert Strong carefully examines how the thirty-ninth president of the United States addressed and accomplished the work of foreign policy during his term. Working in the World effectively argues for substantial reevaluation of the conventional wisdom about Carter’s weak foreign policy performance and questions how we should formulate our earliest appraisals of presidential success in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Based on recently declassified documents in the Carter Library and interviews, this book is a nuanced depiction of the relationship between policy and character. It is also a poignant history of damaged ideals.

After Panama assumed control of the Panama Canal in 1999, its relations with the United States became those of a friendly neighbor. In this third edition, Michael L. Conniff describes Panama’s experience as owner-operator of one of the world’s premier waterways and the United States’ adjustment to its new, smaller role. He finds that Panama has done extremely well with the canal and economic growth but still struggles to curb corruption, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Historically, Panamanians aspired to have their country become a crossroads of the world, while Americans sought to tame a vast territory and protect their trade and influence around the globe. The building of the Panama Canal (1904–14) locked the two countries in their parallel quests but failed to satisfy either fully. Drawing on a wide array of sources, Conniff considers the full range of factors—political, social, strategic, diplomatic, economic, and intellectual—that have bound the two countries together.

This book continues the narrative begun by the author in Wars of Latin America, 1899-1941. It provides a clear and readable description of military combat occurring in Latin America from 1948 to the start of 1982. (In an unusual peaceful lull, Latin America experienced no wars from 1942 to 1947.) Although the text concentrates on combat narrative, matters of politics, business, and international relations appear as necessary to explain the wars. The author draws on many previously unknown sources to provide information never before published. The book traces the many insurgencies in Latin America as well as conventional wars. Among the highlights are the chapters on the Cuban and Nicaraguan insurrections and on the Bay of Pigs invasion. One goal of the text is to explain why, of the many insurgencies appearing in Latin America, only those in Cuba and Nicaragua were successful in overthrowing governments. The book also helps explain why even unsuccessful insurgencies have survived for decades, as has happened in Colombia and Peru. Instructors considering this book for use in a course may request an examination copy here.

Hemispheric foreign policy has waxed and waned since the Mexican War, and the Cold War presented both extraordinary promises and dangerous threats to U.S.–Latin American cooperation. In Hemispheric Alliances, Andrew J. Kirkendall examines the strengths and weaknesses of new models for U.S.–Latin American relations created by liberal Democrats who came to the fore during the Kennedy administration and retained significant influence until the Reagan era. Rather than exerting ironfisted power in Latin America, liberal Democrats urged Washington to be a moral rather than a militaristic leader in hemispheric affairs. Decolonization, President Eisenhower's missteps in Latin America, and the Cuban Revolution all played key roles in the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress, which liberal Democrats hailed as a new cornerstone for U.S.–Latin American foreign policy. During the Vietnam War era, liberal Democrats began to incorporate human rights more centrally into their agendas, using Latin America as the primary arena for these policies. During the long period of military dictatorship in much of Latin America and the Caribbean, liberal Democrats would see their policies dissolved by the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations who favored militant containment of both communism and absolutism.