Concentrated ownership is considered to be the best protection for shareholders in economies where legal protection is relatively weak. This book investigates and concludes, for Indian business groups, that concentrated-inside ownership provides opportunities for the expropriation of minority shareholders. While more concentrated direct ownership of controlling families results in a higher market value of equity, indirect ownership obtained through cross-holding provides incentives to extract private benefits and results in value loss. This finding requires the prompt attention of regulatory bodies, outside investors and other interested parties. This book examines the effect of ownership structure and disclosure of related-party transactions on firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in India, by using a sample of 317 listed firms comprising 1350 firm-year observations from 2008 to 2017. Well-accepted value-relevance models are employed to examine the effect of ownership rights on market value of equity and valuation effect of RP trading, asset transfer, investment and loan transactions.

Examines the effect of ownership structure and the disclosure of related party transactions on the firm valuation of group-affiliated firms in India.

Advances in Financial Economics Vol. 16 contains a set of empirical papers by a set of global scholars who examine corporate governance and market regulation from a variety of perspectives.

The publication reviews provisions covering related party transactions and the protection of minority shareholder rights in 31 jurisdictions, both OECD and non-OECD. In addition, the regulatory and legal systems that have beeen developed in five jurisdictions are reviewed in detail.

This paper investigates the benefits and associated agency costs of using internal capital markets through affiliating with groups using data of two thousand firms from nine East Asian economies between 1994-96. We find that mature and slow-growing firms with ownership structures more likely to create agency problems gain more from group affiliation, while young and high-growth firms more likely lose. Agency problems are important explanatory factors of firm value in economies outside Japan, but less so in Japan. Consistent with the literature, financially-constrained firms benefit from group affiliation. Our results are robust to different time periods and estimation techniques.

Family-owned businesses account for many of the small and medium-sized enterprises that exist around the world in various industries. Due to their unique make up, these firms are often heavily influenced by family dynamics that must be reconciled by family and non-family workers alike in order to ensure the sustainability of the business. As smaller businesses competing against an increasingly globalized economy and more directly impacted by economic instability, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, these businesses must continue to improve their practices and processes in order to not only survive but thrive. The Research Anthology on Strategies for Maintaining Successful Family Firms discusses the strategies, sustainability, and human aspects of family firms in order to understand what sets them apart from other businesses and how they can survive and compete in a globalized economy. This book discusses the unique dynamic brought by family firms that offers both opportunities and challenges for a growing business. Covering topics such as corporate venturing, the family unit, and business ethics, this text is an essential resource for family firms, entrepreneurs, managers, business students, business professors, researchers, and academicians.

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.