Over the last decade dealing in derivative financial instruments (basically forwards, futures, options and combinations of these), particularly in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has become a central activity for major wholesale banks and financial institutions. Measured in terms of notional principal amount, OTC derivatives outstanding are near, if not greater than, US$10 trillion, even after deduction of double-counting for intra-dealer transactions. Major new regulatory initiatives, including proposed new capital requirements, are under consideration as a means of reducing systemic risk. This paper examines the concept of systemic risk -- that failure of one firm will lead to the failure of a large number of other firms or indeed the collapse of the international financial system. Alternative proposed definitions are considered and integrated and the effects of OTC derivatives on these risks discussed. The key conclusion is that systemic risk has been reduced by the development of the OTC derivatives market due to shifting economic risks to those better able either to bear the risk or, in many cases, cancel it against offsetting risks. The implications of the Basle II capital proposals for systemic risk are analyzed and shown to increase this risk due to encouraging transactions which increase portfolio risks of the dealers and discouraging transactions which decrease their portfolio risk.

To mitigate systemic risk, some regulators have advocated the greater use of centralized counterparties (CCPs) to clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives trades. Regulators should be cognizant that large banks active in the OTC derivatives market do not hold collateral against all the positions in their trading book and the paper proves an estimate of this under-collateralization. Whatever collateral is held by banks is allowed to be rehypothecated (or re-used) to others. Since CCPs would require all positions to have collateral against them, off-loading a significant portion of OTC derivatives transactions to central counterparties (CCPs) would require large increases in posted collateral, possibly requiring large banks to raise more capital. These costs suggest that most large banks will be reluctant to offload their positions to CCPs, and the paper proposes an appropriate capital levy on remaining positions to encourage the transition.

After the credit crisis, supervisors enacted a range of financial reforms. In particular, they radically changed the nature of the OTC derivatives market via a number of measures, notably mandatory central clearing. This book discusses the market before the crisis, explains what central clearing is, and outlines the consequences of the new rules.

Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives played an important role in the build-up of systemic risk in financial markets before 2007 and in spreading volatility throughout global financial markets during the crisis. In recognition of the financial and economic benefits of derivatives products, the Group of Twenty (G20), under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), moved to regulate the use of OTC derivatives.Although a number of scholars have drawn attention to the detrimental effects of the United States and European Union (EU) to coordinate OTC reform, this overlooks an important aspect of the post-crisis process: the exemption of non-financial operators from OTC derivative regulatory requirements, especially Sovereigns. Critically, they remain exempt under existing legislation regardless of the risks they continue to pose through unreported trades and counterparty risks to financial firms; there is still uncertainty around the pricing of derivative (i.e., model risk) for non-financial operators that could pose a risk to the financial system. These, and similar inconsistencies in financial regulation pose risks of conflict and fragmentation that should be soon addressed by the G20.

The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has captured the attention of regulators after the Global Financial Crisis due to the risk it poses to financial stability. Under the post-crisis regulatory reform the concentration of business, and risks, among a few major players is changed by the concentration of a large portion of transactions in the new market infrastructures, the Central Counterparties (CCPs). This book, for the first time, analyses the regulatory response of the United Kingdom and the United States, the two largest centres of OTC derivatives transactions, and highlights their shortcomings. The book uses a normative risk-based approach to regulation as a methodological lens to analyse the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. It specifically focuses on prudential supervision and conduct of business rules governing OTC derivatives transactions and the move towards enhancing the use of central clearing. The resulting analysis, from a normative risk based approach, suggests that the UK regime for CCPs does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent risk based approach was taken. Our comments on the Dodd-Frank Act highlight that the incoherent adoption of risk-based approach to regulation affects the effectiveness of the US regime for CCPs. Such a regime does not follow the pace of events of ‘innovation risk’; in particular, the foreseeable changes FinTech will bring to the OTCDM and central clearing services. The second inadequacy of the US regime concerns the dual regulatory structure of the CFTC and the SEC, and the inadequate adoption of different and not well-coordinated regulatory strategies. We also analyse the cross-border implications of the US regime for non-US CCPs that provide clearing services to US market participants. Finally, we study the negative effects of the absence of a clearly defined resolution regime for CCPs.