This work seeks to clarify why and when interest group leaders in Washigton, USA seek to mobilize the public order to influence policy decisions in Congress. It grants a more important role to the need for interest group leaders to demonstrate popular support on particular issues.

In Outside Lobbying, Ken Kollman explores why and when interest group leaders in Washington seek to mobilize the public in order to influence policy decisions in Congress. In the past, political scientists have argued that lobbying groups make outside appeals primarily because of their own internal dynamics--to recruit new members, for example. Kollman, however, grants a more important role to the need for interest group leaders to demonstrate popular support on particular issues. He interviewed more than ninety interest group leaders and policy makers active on issues ranging from NAFTA to housing for the poor. While he concludes that group leaders most often appeal to the public when they perceive that their stand has widespread popular support, he also shows that there are many important and revealing exceptions to this pattern. Kollman develops his theory of outside lobbying through a combination of rational choice modeling and statistical tests that compare public opinion data with data from his interviews about interest groups' policy positions and activities. The tests reveal that group leaders use outside lobbying to take advantage of pre-existing public preferences, not to recruit members or to try to generate the mere appearance of grass-roots support. Kollman's innovative book will clarify the complex relationship among lobbying, public opinion, and public policy, and will set a new standard for interest group research.

Understanding why individuals participate in politics demands attention to more than just individual attributes and attitudes. Similarly, understanding how interest groups influence policy-making demands attention to more than just the financial donations and direct activities of Washington-based lobbyists. To answer fundamental questions about what determines when and why people participate in politics and how organized interests go about trying to influence legislative decision-making we must understand how and why political leaders recruit which members of the public into the political arena. Looking from the bottom up with survey data and from the top down with data from interest group interviews, Kenneth Goldstein develops and tests a theory of how tactical choices in a grass-roots campaign are made. In doing so, he demonstrates that outside lobbying activities deserve a place in any correctly-specified model of interest group influence, political participation, or legislative decision-making.

Governments worldwide are developing sunshine policies that increase transparency in politics, where a key initiative is regulating lobbyists. Building on the pioneering first edition, this book updates its examination of all jurisdictions with regulations, from the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Australia. Unlike any book, it offers unique insights into how the regulations compare and contrast against each other, offering a revamped theoretical classification of different regulatory environments and situating each political system therein. This edition innovatively considers different measurements to capture the robustness of lobbying laws in terms of promoting transparency and accountability. And, based on the authors’ experience of advising governments globally, it closes with a no-nonsense guide on how to make a lobbying law. This is of value to policymakers seeking to introduce or amend regulations, and lobbyists seeking to influence this process.

The growing need for a concise and comprehensive overview of the world of interest groups, lobbying, and public affairs called for a compendium of existing research, key theories, concepts, and case studies. This project is the first transnational encyclopedia to offer such an interdisciplinary and wide overview of these topics, including perspectives on public relations, crisis management, communication studies, as well as political science, political marketing, and policy studies. It is an interdisciplinary work, which involved an extraordinary pool of contributors made up of leading scholars and practitioners from all around the globe; it is a live and evolving project focused on drawing together grounded international knowledge for our diverse and developing world. The 200+ entries of the Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs (to be found as a live reference work online here, and in two print volumes in 2022) address these research avenues, tackling a growing demand for a comprehensive international reference work regarding key global sectors and policymaking structures, looking beyond the traditional markets of Europe and North America to incorporate practice and research from Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America. This encyclopedia acts as a synthesis of existing research, and aims to aid academics, students, and practitioners navigate their relevant fields around the globe.

This book sheds new light on how lobbying works in the European Union. Drawing on the first-hand professional experience of lobbyists, policymakers, and corporate and institutional stakeholders, combined with a sound academic foundation, it offers insights into successful lobbying strategies, such as how alliances are formed by interest groups in Brussels. The authors present key case studies, e.g. on the shelved EU-US trade deal Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), lobbying scandals, and the role of specific interest groups and EU Think-Tanks. Furthermore, they highlight efforts to improve transparency and ethical standards in EU decision-making, while also underscoring the benefits of lobbying in the context of decision-making. Understanding the tools and techniques of effective lobbying, as well as the dynamics and trends in EU lobbying, will allow professionals involved in the lobbying process, such as policymakers and corporate and institutional stakeholders, to improve their performance and achieve better results when pursuing their respective interests.

What explains differences in the lobbying behaviour of interest groups? And what consequences do these differences have for the access that interest groups can gain to decision-makers and the influence that they can exert on policy outcomes? Building on an unprecedented amount of empirical evidence on lobbying in Europe, this book puts forward a distinction between lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders. Lobbying insiders, most prominently business interests, try to establish direct contacts with decision-makers, enjoy good access to executive institutions, and manage to shape policy outcomes when mobilizing the public on an issue is difficult. Lobbying outsiders, in particular citizen groups such as consumer, environmental or health non-governmental organizations, put greater emphasis on mobilizing the public or changing public attitudes, find it easier to gain access to legislative decision-makers, and have the greatest impact on outcomes on issues that are amenable to an outside lobbying campaign. The book shows that a single argument, building on group type as the main variable, can explain variation across interest groups in their choice of strategy, their access to decision-makers, and the conditions under which they can exert influence. The existence of lobbying insiders and lobbying outsiders has important implications for both our understanding of political decision-making and the normative appraisal of contemporary democracy.