"Major General Orde Wingate (1903-1944) was the most controversial British military commander of the Second World War, and perhaps of the last hundred years. He splits opinion among soldiers, academics and writers seven decades after his death. His exploits in Ethiopia and Burma, in particular his creation of the Chindits, special forces who were trained to use guerrilla tactics behind the Japanese lines, have made him into a key figure in the history of irregular warfare. But, as Simon Anglim reveals in this thought-provoking and insightful study, myths and misunderstandings tend to cloud understanding of Wingates career, and he seeks to put the record straight. He bases his work on a major study of Wingates official and private papers, and those of his contemporaries, and he aims to provide the definitive guide to Wingate as a military commander."--Publisher's information.

Orde Charles Wingate. Winston Churchill thought him a military genius; others considered him greatly over-rated; a few even thought him mad. His overriding passion was for Zionism, a cause which he embraced when posted to British-ruled Palestine in 1936. There he raised the Special Night Squads, an irregular force which decimated Arab rebel bands and taught a future generation of Israeli generals (including Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin) how to fight. In 1941, Wingate led another guerrilla-style force into Italian-occupied Ethiopia and was instrumental in restoring Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne. But his most famous campaign was conducted behind enemy lines in Burma, where his Chindits shattered the myth of Japanese invincibility in jungle fighting. A brilliant maverick, Wingate was a difficult if not impossible subordinate. He was also - as this riveting new study reveals - an inspiring leader.

Orde Wingate rose to fame by creating the Chindits in Burma in 1943. He is an extremely important figure in military history, and deserves just as much attention as Alanbrooke, Montgomery, and Auchinleck. Unlike them, however, he always operated outside the accepted etiquette and the formal chain of command. He was a maverick and misfit, and he held to the belief that the type of mass warfare demonstrated on the Western Front (1914–18) had very little to do with the warfare of the future. He believed that the latter would require an 'indirect approach', in which heavily lumbering armies would be exquisitely vulnerable to small groups of highly motivated, mobile and well-armed guerrillas. This book covers Wingate's experiences in pre-war Palestine, in Ethiopia in 1941 (where he formed an irregular guerrilla unit to harrass the Italian garrisons) and in World War II Burma, where the two Chindit campaigns would be his apotheosis.

Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in the United States' favor, significant capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.

On the world maps common in America, the Western Hemisphere lies front and center, while the Indian Ocean region all but disappears. This convention reveals the geopolitical focus of the now-departed twentieth century, but in the twenty-first century that focus will fundamentally change. In this pivotal examination of the countries known as “Monsoon Asia”—which include India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Burma, Oman, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Tanzania—bestselling author Robert D. Kaplan shows how crucial this dynamic area has become to American power. It is here that the fight for democracy, energy independence, and religious freedom will be lost or won, and it is here that American foreign policy must concentrate if the United States is to remain relevant in an ever-changing world. From the Horn of Africa to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, Kaplan exposes the effects of population growth, climate change, and extremist politics on this unstable region, demonstrating why Americans can no longer afford to ignore this important area of the world.

"World War II was a traumatising experience for those nations that were caught up in it. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Undivided India where over two and a half million Indians volunteered to serve in the armed forces and to fight against the evils of the fascist Axis Powers. Those Indians who served and fought had their own motives but a predominant one was pride and satisfaction in doing a soldier's job and earning a soldier's pay. Service in the Indian Army was respected, particularly in rural communities, and money sent home by a soldier could over time transform his family's social status. As it had done towards the end of World War I the Indian Army in World War II opened its arms wide and recruited from many varied castes and backgrounds, and few were found wanting. The demands made on India to provide servicemen and women were massive. Indian Army formations contributed significantly to the defeat of Italian forces in East and North Africa and then to the much more difficult confrontations with German troops. Dark days followed when Japan invaded Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya and Burma. Indian troops predominated in the defence of those regions and many were killed in action or ordered into captivity by their commanders. After realistic re-assessments of the threats faced in Asia had been made, and the new training and motivation required had been delivered, the Indian Army emerged again in 1944 and 1945 as the most proficient and economical Allied force in Asia. Meanwhile Indian troops, not forgetting the large number of Nepalese serving in the Indian Army, fought Vichy French forces in Syria, nationalists in Persia and Iraq, and above all else Germans in North Africa and Europe – and they won their battles. This book will show you how the Indian Army was tested during World War II, and how it prevailed using courage, professionalism, honour and dignity. "

An overview of modern Western militaries’ response to armed rebellion, from Indochina to Northern Ireland to Iraq. Counterinsurgency—or efforts to defeat and confine a rebellion against a constituted authority—has become a buzzword in recent times, but the term is as old as society itself. This concise history covers the development of modern counterinsurgency over the last two hundred years, from the concept of “small wars” and colonial warfare to the ideas of early insurgents like Clausewitz and the theories of Lawrence of Arabia to the methods of twentieth-century insurgents including Mao and Che Guevara. It also examines a number of post-1945 insurgencies and how Western armies have tried to counter them, in particular the French in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the United States in Vietnam and the reaction to the American experience there. This is compared with the British approach in the years after World War II, particularly in Malaya, but also in Kenya and Northern Ireland. Against this backdrop, there is an investigation of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of COIN literature, and the subsequent backlash against that literature—and finally, a discussion of the future of COIN.