This book includes a collection of articles that present recent developments in the fields of optimization and dynamic game theory, economic dynamics, dynamic theory of the firm, and population dynamics and non standard applications of optimal control theory. The authors of the articles are well respected authorities in their fields and are known for their high quality research in the fields of optimization and economic dynamics.

This book presents a coherent and systematic exposition of the mathematical theory of the problems of optimization and stability. Both of these are topics central to economic analysis since the latter is so much concerned with the optimizing behaviour of economic agents and the stability of the interaction processes to which this gives rise. The topics covered include convexity, mathematical programming, fixed point theorems, comparative static analysis and duality, the stability of dynamic systems, the calculus of variations and optimal control theory. The authors present a more detailed and wide-ranging discussion of these topics than is to be found in the few books which attempt a similar coverage. Although the text deals with fairly advanced material, the mathematical prerequisites are minimised by the inclusion of an integrated mathematical review designed to make the text self-contained and accessible to the reader with only an elementary knowledge of calculus and linear algebra. A novel feature of the book is that it provides the reader with an understanding and feel for the kinds of mathematical techniques most useful for dealing with particular economic problems. This is achieved through an extensive use of a broad range of economic examples (rather than the numerical/algebraic examples so often found). This is suitable for use in advanced undergraduate and postgraduate courses in economic analysis and should in addition prove a useful reference work for practising economists.

Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis presents a modern and thorough exposition of the fundamental mathematical formalism used to study optimal control theory, i.e., continuous time dynamic economic processes, and to interpret dynamic economic behavior. The style of presentation, with its continual emphasis on the economic interpretation of mathematics and models, distinguishes it from several other excellent texts on the subject. This approach is aided dramatically by introducing the dynamic envelope theorem and the method of comparative dynamics early in the exposition. Accordingly, motivated and economically revealing proofs of the transversality conditions come about by use of the dynamic envelope theorem. Furthermore, such sequencing of the material naturally leads to the development of the primal-dual method of comparative dynamics and dynamic duality theory, two modern approaches used to tease out the empirical content of optimal control models. The stylistic approach ultimately draws attention to the empirical richness of optimal control theory, a feature missing in virtually all other textbooks of this type.

Some recent developments in the mathematics of optimization, including the concepts of invexity and quasimax, have not yet been applied to models of economic growth, and to finance and investment. Their applications to these areas are shown in this book.

Since its initial publication, this text has defined courses in dynamic optimization taught to economics and management science students. The two-part treatment covers the calculus of variations and optimal control. 1998 edition.

This work presents the optimization framework for dynamic economics and treats a number of topics in economics, including growth, macroeconomics, microeconomics, finance and dynamic games. The book also teaches by examples, using concepts to solve simple problems, moving on to general propositions.

Various imperfections in existing market systems prevent the free market from serving as a truly efficient allocation mechanism, but optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization claims that socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time exist. To ensure that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, however, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required. This textbook presents a study of subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle the suboptimal behavior that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve.