2. Verdenskrig. Slaget ved Kursk juli 1943. Beskrivelse af et af de mest afgørende panserslag på Østfronten under 2. VK. både den russiske og tyske planlægning samt selve slaget belyses detaljeret.

Few battles attract interest so much as the Battle of Kursk. Operation Zitadelle, the code name given by Hitler to the Wehrmacht's last offensive on the Eastern Front in July 1943, has acquired an almost mythic status as one of the greatest clashes of armour in the history of warfare. Long been depicted as the 'the swan song of the German tank arm' by virtue of the huge tank losses experienced by the Germans; the reality, in light of the emergence of new information proved it to be anything but, with historians previously accepting without question exaggerated Soviet accounts of the battle. For all the resources devoted to this operation by the Germans, Zitadelle was an abysmal failure; and whilst they were not outfought by the Red Army at Kursk, they were out-thought by commanders of outstanding quality. Zitadelle describes the German and Soviet tactics and explores the realities of the battles on sodden ground that culminated in the defeat of the panzers and the Soviet advance on the Reich.

“Comprehensive scholarship and convincing reasoning, enhanced by an excellent translation, place this work on a level with the best of David Glantz” (Dennis Showalter, award-winning author of Patton and Rommel). This groundbreaking book examines the battle of Kursk between the Red Army and Wehrmacht, with a particular emphasis on its beginning on July 12, as the author works to clarify the relative size of the contending forces, the actual area of this battle, and the costs suffered by both sides. Valeriy Zamulin’s study of the crucible of combat during the titanic clash at Kursk—the fighting at Prokhorovka—is now available in English. A former staff member of the Prokhorovka Battlefield State Museum, Zamulin has dedicated years of his life to the study of the battle of Kursk, and especially the fighting on its southern flank involving the famous attack of the II SS Panzer Corps into the teeth of deeply echeloned Red Army defenses. A product of five years of intense research into the once-secret Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, this book lays out in enormous detail the plans and tactics of both sides, culminating in the famous and controversial clash at Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Zamulin skillfully weaves reminiscences of Red Army and Wehrmacht soldiers and officers into the narrative of the fighting, using in part files belonging to the Prokhorovka Battlefield State Museum. Zamulin has the advantage of living in Prokhorovka, so he has walked the ground of the battlefield many times and has an intimate knowledge of the terrain. Examining the battle primarily from the Soviet side, Zamulin reveals the real costs and real achievements of the Red Army at Kursk, and especially Prokhorovka. He examines mistaken deployments and faulty decisions that hampered the Voronezh Front’s efforts to contain the Fourth Panzer Army’s assault, and the valiant, self-sacrificial fighting of the Red Army’s soldiers and junior officers as they sought to slow the German advance and crush the II SS Panzer Corps with a heavy counterattack at Prokhorovka. Illustrated with numerous maps and photographs (including present-day views of the battlefield), and supplemented with extensive tables of data, Zamulin’s book is an outstanding contribution to the growing literature on the battle of Kursk, and further demolishes many of the myths and legends that grew up around it.

In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack.” A generation of nineteenth century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of those armiehe events of 1939, 1940, and 1941 in Poland, France, and Russia respectively again challenged Clausewitz’ claim of the superiority of the defense and prompted armies worldwide to frantically field large armored forces and develop doctrines for their use. While blitzkrieg concepts ruled supreme, it fell to that nation victimized most by those concepts to develop techniques to counter the German juggernaut. The Soviets had to temper a generation of offensive tradition in order to marshal forces and develop techniques to counter blitzkrieg. In essence, the Soviet struggle for survival against blitzkrieg proved also to be a partial test of Clausewitz’ dictum. In July 1943, after arduous months of developing defensive techniques, often at a high cost in terms of men and material, the Soviets met blitzkrieg head-on and proved that defense against it was feasible. The titanic, grinding Kursk operation validated, in part, Clausewitz’ views. But it also demonstrated that careful study of force organization and employment and application of the fruits of that study can produce either offensive or defensive victory. While on the surface the events of Kursk seemed to validate Clausewitz’ view, it is often forgotten that, at Kursk, the Soviets integrated the concept of counteroffensive into their grand defensive designs. Thus the defense itself was meaningless unless viewed against the backdrop of the renewed offensive efforts and vice versa. What Kursk did prove was that strategic, operational, and tactical defenses could counter blitzkrieg.

The Kursk campaign was the major German offensive of 1943 and the last strategic offensive the Germans were to launch on the Eastern Front in World War II. In the summer of 1943, recoiling from defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler conducted a limited objective offensive to eliminate the Soviet Kursk salient. Operating a classic pincer attack of the kind that succeeded during the 1942 Kharkov campaign he hoped that the resulting heavy losses inflicted on the Red Army would give the Wehrmacht time to recover its strength. However, the Soviet anticipation of the attack led to extensive losses on both sides as Soviet anti-tank mines and fierce fighting pushed the Germans back, liberating the German-held Orel in the process. Focusing on the northern front of the battle with Generaloberst, Walter Model's forces pitted against General Rokossovsky's Central Front between 5 July and 18 August, this volume will explore both the German offensive and the Soviet counteroffensive. Using documents from both sides, extensive photographs – both contemporary and modern, maps and bird's-eye-views this title will shed new light on this often ignored part of the battle.

The story of history's largest armored battle Descriptions of Tigers, Panthers, and T-34s in combat Based on declassified Russian documents and captured German records A significant turning point of World War II, the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was the Germans' last major offensive on the Eastern Front. Marked by pitched clashes between German Tiger tanks and Soviet T-34s, the engagement began well enough for the Germans, but the Soviets delayed them long enough to bring their reserves forward, counterattack, and force Hitler to call off the attack. Hundreds of thousands lay dead or wounded on both sides, but the Soviets won the battle and seized the initiative for the rest of the war.

The battle at Kursk in 1943 is often referred to as the greatest tank battle in the history of warfare. This volume makes extensive use of German archival documents as well as various Russian books and articles. As well as an account of the battle, it addresses methodological issues.