A comprehensive theory-based approach to the treatment of text meaning in natural language processing applications.

Lexical Ontological Semantics introduces ontological methods into lexical semantic studies with the aim of giving impetus to various fields of endeavours which envision and model the semantic network of a language. Lexical ontological semantics (LOS) provides a cognition-based computation-oriented framework in which nouns and predicates are described in terms of their semantic knowledge and models the mechanism in which the noun system is coupled with the predicate system. It expands the scope of lexical semantics, updates methodologies to semantic representation, guides the construction of semantic resources for natural language processing, and develops new theories for human-machine interactions and communications.

Lexical Ontological Semantics introduces ontological methods into lexical semantic studies with the aim of giving impetus to various fields of endeavours which envision and model the semantic network of a language. Lexical ontological semantics (LOS) provides a cognition-based computation-oriented framework in which nouns and predicates are described in terms of their semantic knowledge and models the mechanism in which the noun system is coupled with the predicate system. It expands the scope of lexical semantics, updates methodologies to semantic representation, guides the construction of semantic resources for natural language processing, and develops new theories for human-machine interactions and communications.

A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such posits are nonetheless true. The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and ontology. They offer an account of truth that confronts these deep internal problems and is independently plausible: contextual semantics, which asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability. Under contextual semantics, much ordinary and scientific thought and discourse is true because its truth is indirect correspondence to the world. After offering further arguments for austere realism and addressing objections to it, Horgan and Potrc consider various alternative austere ontologies. They advance a specific version they call “blobjectivism”—the view that the right ontology includes only one concrete particular, the entire cosmos (“the blobject”), which, although it has enormous local spatiotemporal variability, does not have any proper parts. The arguments in Austere Realism are powerfully made and concisely and lucidly set out. The authors' contentions and their methodological approach—products of a decade-long collaboration—will generate lively debate among scholars in metaphysics, ontology, and philosophy.

A picture of the world as chiefly one of discrete objects, distributed in space and time, has sometimes seemed compelling. It is however one of two main targets of Henry Laycock's book; for it is seriously incomplete. The picture, he argues, leaves no space for stuff like air and water. With discrete objects, we may always ask 'how many?', but with stuff the question has to be 'how much?' Within philosophy, stuff of certain basic kinds is central to the ancient pre-Socraticworld-view; but it also constitutes the field of modern chemistry and is a major factor in ecology.Philosophers these days, in general, are unlikely to deny that stuff exists. But they are very likely to deny that it is ('ultimately') to be contrasted with things, and it is on this account that logic and semantics figure largely in the framework of the book. Elementary logic is a logic which takes values for its variables; and these values are precisely distinct individuals or things. Existence is then symbolized in just such terms; and this, it is proposed, creates a pressure for 'reducing'stuff to things. Non-singular expressions, which include words for stuff, 'mass' nouns, and also plural nouns, are 'explicated' as semantically singular.Here then is the second target of the book. The posit that both mass and plural nouns name special categories of objects (set-theoretical 'collections' of objects in the one case, mereological 'parcels' or 'portions' of stuff in the other) represents, so Laycock urges, the imposition of an alien logic upon both the many and the much.

"This book provides an overview of current research and development activities in the area of web semantics and ontology, giving an in-depth description of different issues, including modeling, using ontologies in enterprise systems, querying and knowledge discovering of ontologies"--Provided by publisher.

Most widely available approaches to semantic integration provide ad-hoc, non-systematic, subjective manual mappings that lead to procrustean amalgamations to fit the target standard, an outcome that pleases no one. Written by experts in the field, Theories of Geographic Concepts: Ontological Approaches to Semantic Integration emphasizes the