Swing pricing allows a fund manager to transfer to redeeming or subscribing investors the costs associated with their trading activity, thus potentially discouraging large flows. This liquidity management tool, which is already used in major jurisdictions, may also help mitigate systemic risk. Here we develop and apply a methodology to investigate whether swing pricing does in fact help dampen flows out of funds, especially during periods of market stress. Drawing on evidence of first-mover advantage within a group of ‘swinging’ corporate bond funds, we provide policy considerations for enhancing the tool’s effectiveness as a systemic risk mitigant.

How to prevent runs on open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods. The positive impact of alternative pricing rules on fund flows reverses in calm periods when costs associated with higher tracking error dominate the pricing effect.

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the federal government has pursued significant regulatory reforms, including proposals to measure and monitor systemic risk. However, there is much debate about how this might be accomplished quantitatively and objectively—or whether this is even possible. A key issue is determining the appropriate trade-offs between risk and reward from a policy and social welfare perspective given the potential negative impact of crises. One of the first books to address the challenges of measuring statistical risk from a system-wide persepective, Quantifying Systemic Risk looks at the means of measuring systemic risk and explores alternative approaches. Among the topics discussed are the challenges of tying regulations to specific quantitative measures, the effects of learning and adaptation on the evolution of the market, and the distinction between the shocks that start a crisis and the mechanisms that enable it to grow.

"President Donald J. Trump established the policy of his Administration to regulate the U.S. financial system in a manner consistent with a set of Core Principles. These principles were set forth in Executive Order 13772 on February 3, 2017. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), under the direction of Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin, prepared this report in response to that Executive Order. The reports issued pursuant to the Executive Order identify laws, treaties, regulations, guidance, reporting, and record keeping requirements, and other Government policies that promote or inhibit federal regulation of the U.S. financial system in a manner consistent with the Core Principles."--Executive summary

How to prevent runs on open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods. The positive impact of alternative pricing rules on fund flows reverses in calm periods when costs associated with higher tracking error dominate the pricing effect.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This second volume explores three particular domains of shadow banking. The first domain deals with the macro-economic fundamentals of the respective shadow banking segments: Why do they exist, what problems do they solve and why are some of their embedded risks so persistent? The second domain captures the global dimensions of shadow banking markets, reviewing the particularities and specifics of various shadow banking systems around the world. Volume II concludes with an extensive overview of how the sector has changed since the financial crisis, focusing on regulatory arbitrage, contract imperfection and governance. Closing on unresolved issues and open-ended questions that will no doubt remain prominent in the shadow banking sector for years to come, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

The evolution of risk management has resulted from the interplay of financial crises, risk management practices, and regulatory actions. In the 1970s, research lay the intellectual foundations for the risk management practices that were systematically implemented in the 1980s as bond trading revolutionized Wall Street. Quants developed dynamic hedging, Value-at-Risk, and credit risk models based on the insights of financial economics. In parallel, the Basel I framework created a level playing field among banks across countries. Following the 1987 stock market crash, the near failure of Salomon Brothers, and the failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert, in 1996 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the Market Risk Amendment to the Basel I Capital Accord; the amendment went into effect in 1998. It led to a migration of bank risk management practices toward market risk regulations. The framework was further developed in the Basel II Accord, which, however, from the very beginning, was labeled as being procyclical due to the reliance of capital requirements on contemporaneous volatility estimates. Indeed, the failure to measure and manage risk adequately can be viewed as a key contributor to the 2008 global financial crisis. Subsequent innovations in risk management practices have been dominated by regulatory innovations, including capital and liquidity stress testing, macroprudential surcharges, resolution regimes, and countercyclical capital requirements.