This paper considers the performance of average inflation targeting (AIT) policy in a New Keynesian model with adaptive learning agents. Our analysis raises concerns regarding robustness of AIT when agents have imperfect knowledge. In particular, the target steady state can be locally unstable under learning if details about the policy are not publicly available. Near the low steady state with interest rates at the zero lower bound, AIT does not necessarily outperform a standard inflation targeting policy. Policymakers can improve outcomes under AIT by (i) targeting a discounted average of inflation, or (ii) communicating the data window for the target.

Over the past fifteen years, a significant number of industrialized and middle-income countries have adopted inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policymaking. As the name suggests, in such inflation-targeting regimes, the central bank is responsible for achieving a publicly announced target for the inflation rate. While the objective of controlling inflation enjoys wide support among both academic experts and policymakers, and while the countries that have followed this model have generally experienced good macroeconomic outcomes, many important questions about inflation targeting remain. In Inflation Targeting, a distinguished group of contributors explores the many underexamined dimensions of inflation targeting—its potential, its successes, and its limitations—from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, and for both developed and emerging economies. The volume opens with a discussion of the optimal formulation of inflation-targeting policy and continues with a debate about the desirability of such a model for the United States. The concluding chapters discuss the special problems of inflation targeting in emerging markets, including the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.

Inflation Targeting (IT) has become a prevalent monetary policy framework in the past three decades, as more central banks adopted and maintained price stability as their primary monetary policy mandate. Using a dataset of 68 major advanced countries and emerging markets economies, this paper evaluates the effects of inflation targeting countries’ track records on their macroeconomic performance, measured by real GDP growth and CPI inflation. This paper constructs three novel inflation targeting track record measures and establishes new stylized facts on the heterogeneity of inflation targeting countries’ tendency in managing inflation with respect to their stated objectives. This paper finds evidence that most targeters conduct dynamic inflation targeting by frequently updating inflation target bands, and their band sizes are wide-ranging across IT countries. We empirically study the contemporaneous and future effects of inflation targeting track records on countries’ macroeconomic performance. Results from the dynamic panel and local projection regressions suggest that better IT track records do not lead to superior growth and inflation rates in the short term.

This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.

This timely volume presents the latest thinking on the monetary policy rules and seeks to determine just what types of rules and policy guidelines function best. A unique cooperative research effort that allowed contributors to evaluate different policy rules using their own specific approaches, this collection presents their striking findings on the potential response of interest rates to an array of variables, including alterations in the rates of inflation, unemployment, and exchange. Monetary Policy Rules illustrates that simple policy rules are more robust and more efficient than complex rules with multiple variables. A state-of-the-art appraisal of the fundamental issues facing the Federal Reserve Board and other central banks, Monetary Policy Rules is essential reading for economic analysts and policymakers alike.

The paper considers the merits of rules and discretion for monetary policy when the structure of the macroeconomic model and the probability distributions of disturbances are not well defined. It is argued that when it is costly to delay policy reactions to seldom-experienced shocks until formal algorithmic learning has been accomplished, and when time consistency problems are significant, a mixed strategy that combines a simple verifiable rule with discretion is attractive. The paper also discusses mechanisms for mitigating credibility problems and emphasizes that arguments against various types of simple rules lose their force under a mixed strategy.