Randy Ramal argues that philosophy’s main responsibility lies in providing intelligibility to the ordinary language of everyday life while dispelling unwarranted skepticism. Philosophers need to go the hard way to fulfill this responsibility because of the constant and dangerous temptation to turn philosophy into a normative discipline rather than keep it as a descriptively hermeneutical enterprise. In On Philosophy, Intelligibility, and the Ordinary: Going the Bloody Hard Way, the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead is central to Ramal’s endeavor to demonstrate the need to separate the hermeneutical responsibility of philosophy from the normative aspects of responsibility. While showing the futility of labeling Whitehead as a purely disinterested philosopher who abandons the idea that ordinariness is relevant to good philosophical thinking, Ramal frames this discussion within a larger, in-depth engagement with a vast number of thinkers, philosophers, and literary figures whose works touch on the question of the ordinary.

The concept of the ordinary, along with such cognates as everyday life, ordinary language, and ordinary experience, has come into special prominence in late modern philosophy. Thinkers have employed two opposing yet related responses to the notion of the ordinary: scientific and phenomenological approaches on the one hand, and on the other, more informal or even anti-scientific procedures. Eminent philosopher Stanley Rosen here presents the first comprehensive study of the main approaches to theoretical mastery of ordinary experience. He evaluates the responses of a wide range of modern and contemporary thinkers and grapples with the peculiar problem of the ordinary—how to define it in its own terms without transforming it into a technical (and so, extraordinary) artifact. Rosen’s approach is both historical and philosophical. He offers Montesquieu and Husserl as examples of the scientific approach to ordinary experience; contrasts Kant and Heidegger with Aristotle to illustrate the transcendental approach and its main alternatives; discusses attempts by Wittgenstein and Strauss to return to the pre-theoretical domain; and analyzes the differences among such thinkers as Moore, Austin, Grice, and Russell with respect to the analytical response to ordinary language. Rosen concludes with a theoretical exploration of the central problem of how to capture the elusive ordinary intact.

The standard interpretation keeps repeating that Camus is the prototypical “absurdist” thinker. Such a reading freezes Camus at the stage at which he wrote The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus. By taking seriously how (1) Camus was always searching and (2) the rest of his corpus, Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Ordinary corrects the one-sided, and thus faulty, depiction of Camus as committed to a philosophy of absurdism. His guiding project, which he explicitly acknowledged, was an attempt to get beyond nihilism, the general dismissal of value and meaning in ordinary life. Tracing this project via Camus's works, Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Ordinary, offers a new lens for thinking about the well-known author.

Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein's philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.

What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? Joseph Raz examines the philosophical issues underlying these everyday questions. He explores the nature of normativity--the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions about how we should behave--and offers a novel account of responsibility.

“The subject of this slim and lucid volume is the wondrous intelligibility of experience as it comes to light through philosophical attentiveness to the richly articulated whole of the world. Linck models wakefulness as he moves from the tentative hypotheses of Plato’s Socrates, to Aristotle’s elucidation of the determinateness of natural and artificial beings, to Kant’s and Hegel’s astonishing explorations of the ways the world’s intelligibility arises from within the mind itself. A deeply intelligent and subtle book by a master reader and teacher, Wakefulness and World will engage and inform educated amateurs and accomplished scholars alike.”―Jacob Howland, author of The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy and Glaucon's Fate “Wakefulness and World is an introduction to philosophy in the way that having a discussion with the finest teachers of philosophy is rumored to have been: Wittgenstein puzzling out utterances; Aristotle on peripatetic garden walks; and Socrates, whose every illustration proved both familiar and unsettling. Like Socrates, Linck speaks directly to beginners as well as practiced scholars about our endeavors to understand, from the images that lure us into reflection, to the confrontation between intelligible generalization and everyday experience. Linck’s book brings us into conversation with Plato’s Socrates, with Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and with Newton. Through these encounters, he guides the reader to a profound reckoning with the conditions that allow careful, critical inquiry to flourish.”―Katie Terezakis, Professor of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology “An invitation to philosophy in the strongest sense. Through a patient and elegant discussion of some key moments in classic texts from Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Linck invites his readers to wake up to the strangeness and miraculousness which is the making intelligible of the world in thought.”―Louis Colombo, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bethune-Cookman University

The path taken by German philosophy in the twentieth century is one of the most exciting and controversial in the history of human thought, by turns radical and conservative and secular and religious. In this outstanding introduction, German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Dilthey to Honneth—the third and final volume in his trilogy—Julian Young examines the work of eight German philosophers and theologians of the period. He discusses their engagement with the deepest existential questions, their critique of the rationalization and mechanization of modernity, and their commitment to varying forms of liberalism, socialism, and democracy. Young introduces and assesses the thought of the following figures: Wilhelm Dilthey: the need for ‘worldviews’, and the distinction between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ as a bulwark against the reduction of human beings to scientific quanta Karl Jaspers: existentialism, the challenge of nihilism, and the turn to theology Edith Stein: the phenomenology of empathy, community versus society, and the turn to Catholicism Paul Tillich: philosophical theology and the ‘theonomous’ life Martin Buber: recovering the ‘thou’ in the face of modernity’s reduction of everything to an ‘it’; the kibbutz as the paradigm of a socialist community Hans Jonas: the mortal threat posed by the unknown consequences of modern technology and the ethics of responsibility for the planet Erich Fromm: the ‘art of loving’ as a bulwark against hard and soft totalitarianism; the replacement of capitalism by communitarian socialism Axel Honneth: contemporary Hegelianism and the ethics and politics of recognition; the nature of real freedom. Lucidly and engagingly written, German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Dilthey to Honneth is essential reading for students of German philosophy, phenomenology, and theology and will also be of interest to students in related fields such as literature, political theory, and sociology. German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Weber to Heidegger (2018) and German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Lukács to Strauss (2020) are also available from Routledge.