Essay from the year 2004 in the subject Business economics - Economic and Social History, grade: 2,0, Turku School of Economics (Department of economics), course: Economic History and Development, language: English, abstract: Nowadays oil is still the world’s most important single source of energy. The world’s industry is influenced by the cost of energy which, in turn, is influenced by the price of crude oil, taxation and other factors. If the cost of energy goes up, then prices of goods and services will increase, subsequently it will cause lower availability of products, higher transportation’s costs and in turn lower economic growth. The latter will influence negatively the efficiency and productivity of the whole world’s industry. This means that if oil prices go too high or too low there will be unlikely consequences for both oil producers and oil consumers. This paper analyzes the oil crisis of 1970ies. The first section concerns the history of the October War (6 – 23 October 1973) that led to the oil embargo, one of the most dramatic events for the world economy. The embargo lasted six months, beginning on 17 October 1973 and ending on 18 March 1974. The second section deals with the impact of the energy crisis on different countries. It caused terrible consequences for the economies of all industrialized countries such as recession, inflation, unemployment, lost economic growth and stagflation. But the essential question is whether the energy crisis was a real shortage or mainly a matter of politics.

"A detailed historical narrative of the U.S. energy crisis in the 1970s and how policymakers responded to the turmoil"--

This book contains a collection of papers on various aspects of Indonesia's economic and its industrial development. It discusses the early independence period in the 1950s; the Soeharto era (1966-1998); and the ensuing two economic crises, namely the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.

In the decades that followed World War II, cheap and plentiful oil helped to fuel rapid economic growth, ensure political stability, and reinforce the legitimacy of liberal democracies. Yet waves of price increases and the use of the so-called “oil weapon” by a group of Arab oil-producing countries in the early 1970s demonstrated the West’s dependence on this vital resource and its vulnerability to economic volatility and political conflicts. Oil and Sovereignty analyzes the national and international strategies that American and European governments formulated to restructure the world of oil and deal with the era’s disruptions. It shows how a variety of different actors combined diplomacy, knowledge creation, economic restructuring, and public relations in their attempts to impose stability and reassert national sovereignty.

In a decade of constant crises, perhaps the most formidable challenge that Americans faced in the 1970s was the energy shortage. An era of inexpensive and seemingly unlimited supplies of oil came to an end with the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and strained the nation's economy for the remainder of the decade. In his "Crisis of Confidence" speech, one of the most remarkable political addresses in American history, President Jimmy Carter drew connections between America's increasing dependence on foreign oil and what he considered larger, more spiritual problems that plagued the nation. Through carefully selected documents that bring together the high-level White House decision-making process and the national conversation about energy, Daniel Horowitz helps students understand both the crises of the 1970s and the continuing relationship between American economic and foreign policy. An introduction by the editor, headnotes to documents, a chronology, questions for consideration, and a selected bibliography provide further pedagogical support.

Through innovative and expansive research, Oil Revolution analyzes the tensions faced and networks created by anti-colonial oil elites during the age of decolonization following World War II. This new community of elites stretched across Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Algeria, and Libya. First through their western educations and then in the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, these elites transformed the global oil industry. Their transnational work began in the early 1950s and culminated in the 1973–4 energy crisis and in the 1974 declaration of a New International Economic Order in the United Nations. Christopher R. W. Dietrich examines how these elites brokered and balanced their ambitions via access to oil, the most important natural resource of the modern era.

Relying on a rich cache of previously classified notes, transcripts, cables, policy briefs, and memoranda, Andrew Cooper explains how oil drove, even corrupted, American foreign policy during a time when Cold War imperatives still applied, and tells why in the 1970s the U.S. switched its Middle East allegiance from the Shah of Iran to the Saudi royal family. Amid the oil shocks of the early 1970s, there was one man the U.S. could rely on: the Shah of Iran. The Shah sold us oil; we sold him weapons. But the U.S. and other industrialized economies could not tolerate repeated annual double digit increases in oil prices. During the 1976 election campaign, President Gerald Ford decided that he had to find a country that would break the OPEC monopoly and sell the U.S. oil more cheaply. On the advice of Treasury Secretary William Simon -- and against the advice of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger -- Ford made a deal to sell advanced weaponry to the Saudis in exchange for a more moderate price hike in oil. The Shah's economy was destabilized, and disaffected elements mobilized to overthrow him. The U.S. had embarked on a long relationship with the autocratic Saudi kingdom that continues to this day.