The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics. Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies—hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program. As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.

This book proposes a new framework for achieving global nuclear security in the 21st century. Building on recent developments, such as the remarkable new capabilities of nuclear forensics, and legal and institutional evolution that can be made a turning point for counterproliferation capacity, it sets forth the critical basis to achieve profound improvement of nuclear security worldwide.

"Living Lies" is an enthralling story about espionage, human frailty, and loyalty. The plot focuses on a covert Iranian nuclear weapons program, as written by a senior CIA operations officer whose career was devoted to battling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He also led the CIA team which disrupted the deadliest nuclear weapons network in history. This is the first installment of a series of espionage thrillers. The story begins as the U.S. is eagerly pursuing negotiations with Iran regarding their nuclear weapons program. A well-placed source in the Iranian delegation provides seemingly critical intelligence on their positions after he volunteers to a gullible CIA officer. The Iranian source, however, is a double agent controlled by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. A more talented CIA officer, Lane Andrews, recruits a legitimate source. His source discovers the stark truth in Iran and reports back at great risk to himself. Lane struggles in vain to convince the CIA that there is a double agent influencing the negotiations, but the U.S. and Iran strike a deal. The CIA Director, a narcissistic billionaire, is delighted that Iran has caved into the U.S. demands. Except it secretly hasn't. "Living Lies" will keep readers on the edge as they embark on a thrilling adventure filled with unexpected twists and turns. Lane must find a way to do the right thing and prevent largescale death and destruction in a world where trustworthiness is nonexistent. This is an unforgettable espionage thriller that will keep you coming back for more with each page. Get ready for an adventure filled with thrills, danger, and excitement in "Living Lies"!

At the same time, they are able to make a complex subject understandable to non-technical experts, making this book a useful teaching tool, especially for those who have little or no knowledge or experience in US national security decision making."--BOOK JACKET.

Selected by Choice Magazine as an Outstanding Academic Title The intelligence community's flawed assessment of Iraq's weapons systems—and the Bush administration's decision to go to war in part based on those assessments—illustrates the political and policy challenges of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this comprehensive assessment, defense policy specialists Jason Ellis and Geoffrey Kiefer find disturbing trends in both the collection and analysis of intelligence and in its use in the development and implementation of security policy. Analyzing a broad range of recent case studies—Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons, North Korea's defiance of U.N. watchdogs, Russia's transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Iran and China's to Pakistan, the Soviet biological warfare program, weapons inspections in Iraq, and others—the authors find that intelligence collection and analysis relating to WMD proliferation are becoming more difficult, that policy toward rogue states and regional allies requires difficult tradeoffs, and that using military action to fight nuclear proliferation presents intractable operational challenges. Ellis and Kiefer reveal that decisions to use—or overlook—intelligence are often made for starkly political reasons. They document the Bush administration's policy shift from nonproliferation, which emphasizes diplomatic tools such as sanctions and demarches, to counterproliferation, which at times employs interventionist and preemptive actions. They conclude with cogent recommendations for intelligence services and policy makers.

This official history was originally printed in very small numbers in 2002. "Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997" traces the development of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and its descendant government organizations, from its original founding in 1947 to 1997. After the disestablishment of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) in 1947, AFSWP was formed to provide military training in nuclear weapons' operations. Over the years, its sequential descendant organizations have been the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) from 1959 to 1971, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) from 1971 to 1996, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and selected elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense were combined to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

"Brings together scholars and policymakers to examine the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on the bioscientific community, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the IAEA, trade and customs, and counterproliferation initiatives. Provides an overview of a wide range of new policy-related questions arising from UNSCR 1540's future implementation and enforcement"--Provided by publisher.