Capitalizing on the availability of physicists and chemists who had fled Hitler's Germany, U.S. and British scientists were able to repeat within a few weeks the test of nuclear fission first performed by two German chemists and strive toward cooperative development of the bomb during World War II. But the death of Roosevelt and Truman's succession in 1945, coupled with Churchill's loss of the prime ministership to Clement Attlee, marked a definite change in Anglo-American atomic policy.".

Nuclear weapons are the elusive ‘toys’ of modern warfare and are hankered after by every Middle Eastern government. Although no Middle eastern government has formally admitted that the purpose of its investment in nuclear research is to develop weapons, it is certain that two countries, Israel and Pakistan, have mastered the technology for making nuclear bombs and that others are attempting to manipulate their nuclear hardware to this end. The combination of these nuclear ambitions, the large amounts of money that can be made available for research and the area’s political instability make the region a powerful example of both the drive towards, and the dangers of, nuclear proliferation. This book, first published in 1988, examines the evolution of nuclear research and development in the region. It shows that it is the product of a complex web of internal and external factors, fuelled by considerations of international prestige and local rivalries. Whilst concluding that it is probably no longer possible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to the Middle East, it suggests ways in which the rate of proliferation can be slowed down.

Shortlisted for the Andrew Carnegie Medal for Excellence in Nonfiction Finalist for The California Book Award in Nonfiction The San Francisco Chronicle's Best of the Year List Foreign Affairs Best Books of the Year In These Times “Best Books of the Year" Huffington Post's Ten Excellent December Books List LitHub's “Five Books Making News This Week” From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, an eyewitness exposé of the dangers of America's Top Secret, seventy-year-long nuclear policy that continues to this day. Here, for the first time, former high-level defense analyst Daniel Ellsberg reveals his shocking firsthand account of America's nuclear program in the 1960s. From the remotest air bases in the Pacific Command, where he discovered that the authority to initiate use of nuclear weapons was widely delegated, to the secret plans for general nuclear war under Eisenhower, which, if executed, would cause the near-extinction of humanity, Ellsberg shows that the legacy of this most dangerous arms buildup in the history of civilization--and its proposed renewal under the Trump administration--threatens our very survival. No other insider with high-level access has written so candidly of the nuclear strategy of the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy years, and nothing has fundamentally changed since that era. Framed as a memoir--a chronicle of madness in which Ellsberg acknowledges participating--this gripping exposé reads like a thriller and offers feasible steps we can take to dismantle the existing "doomsday machine" and avoid nuclear catastrophe, returning Ellsberg to his role as whistle-blower. The Doomsday Machine is thus a real-life Dr. Strangelove story and an ultimately hopeful--and powerfully important--book about not just our country, but the future of the world.

A theoretical analysis and historical investigation of the Cold War nuclear arms race that challenges the nuclear revolution.

Exploring how the United States manages its still-powerful nuclear arsenal Arms control agreements and the end of the Cold War have made the prospect of nuclear war a distant fear for the general public. But the United States and its principal rivals—China and Russia—still maintain sizable arsenals of nuclear weapons, along with the systems for managing them and using them if that terrible day ever comes. Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century focuses on how theories and policies are put into practice in managing nuclear forces in the United States. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the Cold War? What nuclear attack options would the president have during a war? How are these war plans developed and reviewed by civilian and military leaders? How would presidential orders be conveyed to the uniformed men and women who are entrusted with U.S. nuclear weapons systems? And are these communications systems and supporting capabilities vulnerable to disruption or attack? The answers to such questions depend on the process by which national strategy for nuclear deterrence, developed by civilian leaders, is converted into nuclear war plans and the entire range of procedures for implementing those plans if necessary. The chapter authors have extensive experience in government, the armed forces, and the analytic community. Drawing on their firsthand knowledge, as well as the public record, they provide unique, authoritative accounts of how the United States manages it nuclear forces today. This book will be of interest to the national security community, particularly younger experts who did not grow up in the nuclear-centric milieu of the Cold War. Any national security analyst, professional, or government staffer seeking to learn more about nuclear modernization policy and the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be interested in this book. It should also be of interest to professors and students who want a deep understanding of U.S. nuclear policy.

This book investigates what is driving Iran's nuclear weapons programme in a less-hostile regional environment, using a theory of protracted conflicts to explicate proliferation. Iran’s nuclear weapons program has alarmed the international community since the 1990s, but has come to the forefront of international security concerns since 2000. This book argues that Iran’s hostility with the United States remains the major causal factor for its proliferation activities. With the US administration pursuing aggressive foreign policies towards Iran since 2000, the latter’s security threat intensified. A society that is split on many important domestic issues remained united on the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition after the US war in Iraq. Consequently, Iran became determined in its drive to acquire nuclear weapons and boldly announced its decision to enrich uranium, leaving the US in no doubt about its nuclear status. This book underscores the importance of protracted conflicts in proliferation decisions, and underpinning this is the assumption that non-proliferation may be achieved through the termination of intractable conflicts. The aims of this work are to demonstrate that a state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons depends largely on its engagement in protracted conflicts, which shows not only that the presence of nuclear rivals intensifies the nuclear ambition, but also that non-nuclear status of rival states can promote non-proliferation incentives in conflicting states inclined to proliferate. This study will be of great interest to students of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations theory. Saira Khan is a Research Associate in the McGill-University of Montreal Joint Research Group in International Security (REGIS).

Robert Jervis argues here that the possibility of nuclear war has created a revolution in military strategy and international relations. He examines how the potential for nuclear Armageddon has changed the meaning of war, the psychology of statesmanship, and the formulation of military policy by the superpowers.