Concepts associated with nuclear strategy often go beyond any 'objective' logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have special roles in different national belief-systems, myths surround them, they have catalysed tensions already existing in societies, become symbols of power or of past sins. This book delves into the conscious and subconscious beliefs in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (all voiced in debates about nuclear strategy) about society, the State and power structures, each country's place in the world, the international system, allies and enemies.

Examines the cast of mind that created and maintains the nuclear threat and suggests an alternative direction.

Are NATO’s mutual security commitments strong enough today to deter all adversaries? Is the nuclear umbrella as credible as it was during the Cold War? Backed by the full range of US and allied military capabilities, NATO’s mutual defense treaty has been enormously successful, but today’s commitments are strained by military budget cuts and antinuclear sentiment. The United States has also shifted its focus away from European security during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and more recently with the Asia rebalance. Will a resurgent Russia change this? The Future of Extended Deterrence brings together experts and scholars from the policy and academic worlds to provide a theoretically rich and detailed analysis of post–Cold War nuclear weapons policy, nuclear deterrence, alliance commitments, nonproliferation, and missile defense in NATO but with implications far beyond. The contributors analyze not only American policy and ideas but also the ways NATO members interpret their own continued political and strategic role in the alliance. In-depth and multifaceted, The Future of Extended Deterrence is an essential resource for policy practitioners and scholars of nuclear deterrence, arms control, missile defense, and the NATO alliance.

The first comprehensive history of NATO in the 1960s, based on the systematic use of multinational archival evidence. This new book is the result of a gathering of leading Cold War historians from both sides of the Atlantic, including Jeremi Suri, Erin Mahan, and Leopoldo Nuti. It shows in great detail how the transformation of NATO since 1991 has opened up new perspectives on the alliance’s evolution during the Cold War. Viewed in retrospect, the 1960s were instrumental to the strengthening of NATO's political clout, which proved to be decisive in winning the Cold War – even more so than NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities. In addition, it shows that NATO increasingly served as a hub for state, institutional, transnational, and individual actors in that decade. Contributions to the book highlight the importance of NATO's ability to generate "soft power", the scope and limits of alliance consultation, the important role of common transatlantic values, and the growing influence of small allies. NATO's survival in the crucial 1960s provides valuable lessons for the current bargaining on the purpose and cohesion of the alliance. This book will be of much interest to students of international history, Cold War studies and strategic studies.

In this book, Michael Gardiner suggests that the conception of the ‘war-ending’ weapon was tied up with a longer commitment to unified space and singular progress. The mission for total weapons can be seen rising with the highly-technical defensive war of the later nineteenth century, and passing through twentieth century atomic research, then the targeting of the outsides of commercial empire, and the post-war consensus with deterrence as its foundation. The end of the Cold War brought an opportunity to fully naturalise deterrence, but also brought a tacit acceptance of nuclear violence while forms of violence against the individual were rigorously sought out. If the world-unifying role of deterrence has always been undermined by the rise of rival empires, it has also been questioned by critical communities including the consensus-sceptics of the 1950s–60s, 1980s–90s Nuclear Criticism and readers of ‘nuclear ism’, millennial campaigns for Scottish independence, and twenty-first century descriptions of nuclear colonialism. Recently it has become more obvious that an Anglosphere concept of ‘worldly’ deterrence was bound to a singular and ultimately nihilistic idea of progress.[bio]Michael Gardiner is Professor in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Warwick.

From the destruction of Hiroshima to the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the international community struggled to halt the nuclear arms race and to prevent the annihilation of humanity. This study offers an accessible and authoritative account of European policy in this critical dimension of world politics. How much influence did Europeans exert in Washington? Why were European objectives often at variance with U.S. expectations? To what extent did differing national agendas on non-proliferation cause friction within the Western Alliance? Schrafstetter and Twigge examine five initiatives designed to prevent or restrain the nuclear arms race: the international option, the commercial option, the moral option, the multilateral option, and the legal option. Their conclusions show the extent to which non-proliferation policy dominated European politics and the transatlantic relationship. The international option focuses on early UN plans for international control of atomic energy (1946-48). The commercial option assesses the influence of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal of 1953 and the impact of civil nuclear power. The moral option charts international attempts to outlaw the testing of nuclear weapons, resulting in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. The multilateral option discusses the role of collective nuclear forces in addressing West German demands for nuclear equality within NATO. The legal option explores British, French, and West German attitudes to nuclear disarmament and charts the international drive to stop the spread of nuclear weapons culminating in the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Throughout the analysis, attention is focused on the role of the European powers and their influence on both Washington and Moscow.