This book offers a new analytical framework for studying nuclear command and control (C2), based on a comparative study of four nuclear weapons states (NWS). The subject of nuclear operations management has long been shrouded in secrecy, and whilst the importance of nuclear C2 cannot be disputed, there are few academic studies into how and why states develop these systems. This volume includes a comparative study of the development of nuclear C2 by four different NWS (Britain, China, India, and Pakistan) and demonstrates that, despite several differences, there is a central set of factors that remain constant. The analytical framework used in this study identifies key factors that can potentially shape the evolution and stability of nuclear C2. These factors include geostrategic (threat) environment, international norms, leadership, and control of nuclear operations (civil-military control). The book also analyses the interaction among different stakeholders within the nuclear C2 enterprise. It recognises that politicians, the military and scientists all have key but different roles to play, and the way these stakeholders have learned to co-exist with each other is explored. This volume offers a set of dynamics that could form a global norm for nuclear C2, serving as a standard for new entrants into the nuclear club. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, and International Relations in general.

Currently, there are no international standards or norms that are specific to NC3 operations—the sole exception being the clause in US-Soviet/Russian nuclear arms treaties that proscribes interference with national technical means, which is an integral part of NC3. Of course, all international humanitarian laws and related treaties that apply in general to the use of nuclear weapons apply to NC3 personnel, military and civilian. Whether NC3 operations in the nine nuclear weapons states are sufficiently rigorous, robust, and secure to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used except in extremis— defined by the International Court of Justice’s 1996 ruling on the legality of nuclear weapons was when the existence of the state itself is threatened—is doubtful. There is some evidence that at least lip service is paid to how international law shapes nuclear use options in the various elements that constitute NC3 including all instructions, orders, guidance, training, domestic laws, and the overall design of the NC3 architecture to ensure negative controls and avoid mistaken nuclear strikes. The standard for operating NC3 that is consistent with international law may be so high as impossible to achieve, in which case systematic tests against the legal criteria, similar to those conducted to ascertain the reliability with which nuclear weapons can be delivered, would rule out deployment.

Here is the official U.S. Air Force (USAF) doctrine for nuclear war, addressing the issue of command and control, and clearly stating that only the President can make explicit orders to employ nuclear weapons at any level. This doctrine document was updated in 2015. Air Force nuclear forces consist of delivery systems; nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities; personnel; and the physical infrastructure for sustainment. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and dual-capable bombers and fighters are the Air Force's delivery platforms. Combined with the Navy's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and other assets, these forces form the nuclear triad. Each nuclear-capable system offers distinct advantages. SLBMs offer survivability whereas ICBMs are the most responsive, offering prompt, on-alert capability combined with dispersed fielding; also, attacks on ICBMs are unambiguous attacks against the United States. Dual-capable bomber and fighter aircraft offer mission flexibility and a capability to provide distinct signaling in a crisis through posturing to alert and through shows of force. Deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, dissuasion, and defeat stem from the credibility of our nuclear capabilities in the minds of those we seek to deter, assure, or dissuade. The objectives of deterring adversaries and assuring allies require visible and credible nuclear capabilities. This credibility is attained through focused day-today training, periodic exercises, and regular inspections which underpin the credibility of US nuclear capability. As a bonus, this reproduction also includes the historic vintage 1961 civil defense document about radioactive fallout and shelters. Written during the most dangerous days of the Cold War, this guide was designed to advise Americans on what to do after a thermonuclear attack. The text reads: "There is no escaping the fact that nuclear conflict would leave a tragic world. The areas of blast and fire would be scenes of havoc, devastation, and death. For the part of the country outside the immediate range of the explosions, it would be a time of extraordinary hardship-both for the Nation and for the individual. The effects of fallout radiation would be present in areas not decontaminated. Transportation and communication would be disrupted. The Nation would be prey to strange rumors and fears. But if effective precautions have been taken in advance, it need not be a time of despair. These are somber subjects, and they presuppose a catastrophe which can be made very unlikely by wise and positive policies, pursued with imagination and faith. Still, realistic preparation for what might happen is far more useful than blindness, whether from fear or ignorance. A sane and sober person can assume that, whatever comes to pass, he would draw on his reserve of courage and intelligence-and the unquenchable will to live-and begin to build again."

After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions.

"Thou0gh often overlooked in policy debates surrounding the modernization of U.S. nuclear forces, the nuclear command, control and communication (NC3) systems and personnel which support those forces represent one of the most important investments Congress and the military will make regarding the future security of the United States. The United States faces an increasingly multipolar world where the proliferation of advanced technologies and weapon systems have enabled comparatively weaker nations and even non-state actors to exert an inordinate amount of pressure on U.S. national interests and security. U.S. NC3 nodes make a tempting target for potential aggressors, as disrupting or destroying them could severely blunt U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities. This method of attack could theoretically be accomplished with a relatively small-scale "bolt from the blue" strike. Even without a conspicuous rival facing the United States today, the capabilities being developed by potential adversaries have serious ramifications for the future of U.S. national security."--Abstract.