North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are currently deployed in three Balkan states: Bosnia-Herzegovina; Yugoslavia, in the province of Kosovo; and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). These three deployments represent NATO's attempts to date to conduct crisis management operations, a mission the Alliance adopted in the early 1990s and now a fundamental security task alongside collective defense. In view of the increasing importance of crisis management in NATO activities, this thesis analyzes the Balkan operations to identify lessons that can be applied to future doctrines. NATO's 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts are reviewed to illustrate the development of NATO's crisis management doctrine. Each Balkan intervention is examined to clarify NATO's crisis management failures and successes, and to assess apparent lessons. The thesis compares the lessons learned with the crisis management doctrine contained in the 2001 NATO Handbook, and offers recommendations for revisions to take fuller account of the lessons learned in the Balkans.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, observers and players of American foreign policy have been wrestling with what US policy is and, more importantly, what it should be in the post-Cold War era. The breakdown of communism in the East has coincided with the outbreak of warfare in the former Yugoslavia to add a new sense of urgency for those seeking a direction for US foreign policy. This work seeks to demonstrate how reactive rather than proactive measures by the US, in both democracy promotion and in crisis management have been short-sighted, resulting in the present failure.

"Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism in the Western Balkans, Ljubljana, Slvoenia, 20-21 April 2007."--T.p. verso.

This book offers a critical analysis of the EU's first police and military crisis management missions in the Balkans--in Bosnia and Macedonia. The authors have conducted extensive research both in the field and at EU headquarters in Brussels. Their findings yield some important lessons for ongoing and future missions, from establishing mission goals to operational planning and specialized training of troops to battlefield tactics and weaponry to adapting to shifting political situations and controlling the local populace. Contributors include Isabelle Ioannides (Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK), Anna Juncos (Department of Politics, Loughborough University, UK), and Ursula Schroeder (European University Institute, Florence, Italy).

Since the end of the Cold War, crises from the Balkans to Central Asia and Africa have forced international organizations to adapt, expand, and cooperate to end civil wars, manage humanitarian challenges, and contain terrorist threats. The Power of Dependence explores the complex relationship between two of these organizations: NATO and the United Nations. It advances an innovative resource dependence approach to explain the stark variation in interorganizational cooperation, combining insights from international relations theory and organizational science in a comprehensive theoretical framework. Comparing NATO and the UN's engagement in three major post-Cold War conflicts- Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan- the study finds that the level and balance of the organizations' resource dependence plays a crucial role in shaping the degree of cooperation. The Power of Dependence demonstrates the logic, dynamics, and impact of organizational interactions in addressing regional instability and violent conflict. It will be of interest to anyone concerned with understanding and building more effective interorganizational partnerships in crisis management.

Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.