Why Noncompliance traces the history of noncompliance within the European Union (EU), focusing on which states continuously do or do not follow EU Law, why, and how that affects the governance in the EU and beyond. In exploring the EU's long and varied history of noncompliance, Tanja A. Börzel takes a close look at the diverse groups of noncompliant states throughout the EU's existence. Why do states that are vocally critical of the EU have a better record of compliance than those that support the EU? Why has noncompliance been declining since the 1990s, even though the EU was adding member-states and numerous laws? Börzel debunks conventional wisdoms in EU compliance research, showing that noncompliance in the EU is not caused by the new Central and Eastern European member states, nor by the Eurosceptic member states. So why do these states take the brunt of Europe's misplaced ire? Why Noncompliance introduces politicization as an explanatory factor that has been long overlooked in the literature and scholarship surrounding the European Union. Börzel argues that political controversy combined with voting power and administrative capacity, explains why noncompliance with EU law has been declining since the completion of the Single Market, cannot be blamed on the EU's Central and Easter European member states, and is concentrated in areas where EU seeks to protect citizen rights. Thanks to generous funding from Freie Universitat Berlin, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

A first-hand account of the oversight of the big banks in the wake of the financial crisis, from the Federal Reserve examiner who refused to be silenced In 2011, Carmen Segarra took a job as at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York supervising for Goldman Sachs. It was an opportunity, she believed, to monitor the big bank's behavior in order to avoid another financial crisis. Segarra was shocked to discover, however, the full extent of the relationship between Goldman and the Fed. She began making secret recordings that later became the basis of a This American Life episode that exposed the Fed's ineffectiveness in holding banks accountable. In Noncompliant, Segarra chronicles her experience blowing open the doors on the relationship between the big banks and the government bodies set up to regulate them. As we mark the tenth anniversary of the 2008 financial crisis, Noncompliant shows us how little has changed, and offers an urgent call for real reforms.

Non-Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements Editors Tullio Treves, Laura Pineschi, Attila Tanzi, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni, Francesca Romanin Jacur A project of the Universities of Milan, Bologna and Parma co-? nanced by the Italian Ministry of University and Research T. M. C. ASSER PRESS The Hague Foreword iv Published by T. M. C. ASSER PRESS P. O. Box 16163, 2500 BD The Hague, The Netherlands T. M. C. ASSER PRESS’ English language books are distributed exclusively by Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK, or, for customers in the USA, Canada and Mexico: Cambridge University Press, 100 Brook Hill Drive, West Nyack, NY 10994-2133, USA The publication of this book was supported by the ? nancial contribution of the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR) and of the Universities of Milano, Bologna and Parma, within the framework of a research project of national interest (PRIN 2005, n. 2005124407). ISBN 978-90-6704-273-4 All rights reserved. © 2009, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, The Netherlands, and the Authors This publication is protected by international copyright law. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior wr- ten permission of the copyright owners.

In today’s business climate, accountability, transparency, and a high regard for laws, regulations, and ethical conduct is as much a part of how an organization manages its affairs as its primary mission and operations. Compliance Management for Public, Private, or Nonprofit Organizations is a complete, hands-on guide to implementing strategies and techniques for developing, managing, and improving the compliance function of any organization. Author Michael G. Silverman is a corporate expert in strategic planning, program management, compliance, risk assessment, and policy development. In Compliance Management for Public, Private, or Nonprofit Organizations, he presents a comprehensive treatment of the subject by examining the traditional compliance issues associated with laws and regulations, as well as matters surrounding ethical behavior, organizational structure, technology, administration, and risk management. From establishing compliance goals and managing education and training programs to operating a whistle-blowing program and addressing staffing and budgeting requirements, this practical resource covers everything compliance officers and risk and organizational managers need to know, including: Where and how to establish a compliance program within an organization The critical skills and expertise for maintaining an effective compliance program Pros and cons of making a compliance program a part-time function of an organization How to deliver bad news to senior management—and survive Compliance Management for Public, Private, or Nonprofit Organizations includes a wealth of examples that illustrate the real-world applications of critical strategies and techniques for using the board of directors and senior management to promote compliance, reduce employee and management barriers to compliance, conduct in-depth risk assessment and compliance audits, and more.

The studies in this book concern the nature of international law, how it is and is not constituted, and whether commitments that are legally binding can change the behaviour of states as well as or better than non-binding legal norms do.

This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain’s Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain’s regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.