Both the literature and new empirical evidence show that exchange rate regimes differ primarily by the noisiness of the exchange rate, not be measurable macroeconomic fundamentals. This motivates a theoretical analysis of exchange rate regimes with noise traders. The presence of noise traders can lead to multiple equilibria in the foreign exchange market. The entry of noise traders both create and share the risk associated with exchange rate volatility. In such circumstances, monetary policy can be used to lower exchange rate volatility without altering macroeconomic fundamentals.

Both the literature and new empirical evidence show that exchange rate regimes differ primarily by the noisiness of the exchange rate, not by measurable macroeconomic fundamentals. This motivates a theoretical analysis of exchange rate regimes with noise traders. The presence of noise traders can lead to multiple equilibria in the foreign exchange market. The entry of noise traders alters the composition of the market and generates excess exchange rate volatility, since noise traders both create and share the risk associated with exchange rate volatility. In such circumstances, monetary policy can be used to lower exchange rate volatility without altering macroeconomic fundamentals.

A flexible instrument to insure against adverse exchange rate movements are options on foreign currency. Often a relatively simple foreign currency option valuation model is used to address issues related to the pricing and hedging of such options. The results of many empirical studies document that real-world foreign currency option premia deviate from those predicted by the baseline model. In the first part of the book, it is shown that a noise trader model can help to explain the observed mispricing of the baseline foreign currency option pricing model. In the second part of the book, it is studied how policymakers can exploit the pricing errors of the baseline model. In particular, it is examined how option pricing theory can be applied to assess the effectiveness of central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. To this end, a model is constructed to analyze the effectiveness of the interventions conducted by the Deutsche Bundesbank during the Louvre period.

The paper extends and empirically tests the noise trader exchange rate model of Jeanne and Rose (2002). We introduce technical trading in the exchange market as a source of noise and explicitly incorporate monetary and exchange rate policy. With these modifications it is possible to directly test the model's prediction of an U shaped relation between exchange trend and volatility. We find strong empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. As a corollary we develop a measure of excess exchange rate volatility and categorize exchange rate regimes based on the de facto behavior of the exchange rates.The paper extends and empirically tests the noise trader exchange rate model of Jeanne and Rose (2002). We introduce technical trading in the exchange market as a source of noise and explicitly incorporate monetary and exchange rate policy. With these modifications it is possible to directly test the model's prediction of an U shaped relation between exchange trend and volatility. We find strong empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. As a corollary we develop a measure of excess exchange rate volatility and categorize exchange rate regimes based on the de facto behavior of the exchange rates.

The appropriate exchange rate regime, in the context of integration of currency markets with financial markets and of large international capital flows, continues to be a policy dilemma. We find that the majority of countries are moving towards somewhat higher exchange and lower interest rate volatility. Features of foreign exchange (forex) markets could be partly motivating these choices. A model with noise trading, non-traded goods and price rigidities shows that bounds on the volatility of the exchange rate can lower noise trading in forex markets; decrease fundamental variance and improve real fundamentals in an emerging market economy (EME); and give more monetary policy autonomy. Central banks prefer secret interventions where they have an information advantage or fear destabilizing speculation. But in our model, short-term pre-announced interventions can control exchange rate volatility, pre-empt deviations in prices and real exchange rates, and allow markets to help central banks achieve their targets. The long-term crawl need not be announced. In conclusion, the regime's applicability to an EME is explored.

An empirical study of exchange rate regimes based on data compiled from 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Few topics in international economics are as controversial as the choice of an exchange rate regime. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to currency boards and dollarization at the other. While a vast theoretical literature explores the choice and consequences of exchange rate regimes, the abundance of possible effects makes it difficult to establish clear relationships between regimes and common macroeconomic policy targets such as inflation and growth. This book takes a systematic look at the evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, drawing on the experience of some 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Among other questions, it asks whether pegging the exchange rate leads to lower inflation, whether floating exchange rates are associated with faster output growth, and whether pegged regimes are particularly prone to currency and other crises. The book draws on history and theory to delineate the debate and on standard statistical methods to assess the empirical evidence, and includes a CD-ROM containing the data set used.