On July 12, 2006, Israel went to war with Hezbollah in response to the killing and capture of Israeli soldiers along the southern Lebanese border. Believed at the time by many in the West to be an overreaction to a relatively minor border incident resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths in Lebanon, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians on both sides of the border, and the deaths of dozens of Israeli soldiers and civilians. More important to Israeli nation security, the war exposed basic flaws in Israel’s national security assumptions, and defense strategy. This study reveals that Israel went to war without having clearly defined its critical political, diplomatic, or military goals and objectives. In the years immediately prior to the beginning of the war the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) rejected the long proven principles of war in favor of a novel, incoherent, and confusing doctrine. The war revealed the debilitating impact of a long counterinsurgency campaign on training, and traditional combined arms capabilities. Finally, despite the superb performance of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), airpower and technology proved to be inconclusive and a poor substitute for well-trained resolute maneuver forces directly engaging enemy forces.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.

The Holocaust and the Nakba are foundational traumas in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian societies and form key parts of each respective collective identity. This book offers a parallel analysis of the transmission of these foundational pasts in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian societies by exploring how the Holocaust and the Nakba have been narrated since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords. The work exposes the existence and perpetuation of ethnocentric victimhood narratives that serve as the theoretical foundations for an ensuing minimization – or even denial – of the other's past. Three established realms of societal memory transmission provide the analytical framework for this study: official state education, commemorative acts, and mass mediation. Through this analysis, the work demonstrates the interrelated nature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the contextualization of the primary historical events, while also highlighting the universal malleability of mnemonic practices.

From Simon & Schuster, Israel's Lebanon War is the first and only complete inside account of a disastrous military adventure and its ongoing consequences. A detailed narrative by two Israeli journalists on the origins, conduct, and political repercussions of the Lebanon war, based on previously unreleased documents and interviews with high officials.

"Explores various dimensions to the confrontation initiated by Israel on July 12, 2006 in response to Hizbollah provocation. The sixteen analytical essays and three appendices compiled here provide a strategic overview of the war and discuss the rationales underlying this violent clash. They delve into different dimensions of the war: its background, its nature and implications, and the strategic conclusions that can be drawn from it" -- p. [4] of Cover.

Contents: Introduction; Chapter 1. Hard Lessons Learned: ¿Training, Training and Training as Well as Innovative Thinking¿: The IDF Response to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War; Hezbollah; The Gaza Conflict; Conclusion; Chapter 2. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics: Introduction; Application of the PMESII+PT Variables; Hamas and Hezbollah; Political; Military; Economic; Social; Infrastructure; Information; Physical Environment; Time; The 2006 Second Lebanon War; Hezbollah TTPs; 2008-2009 Hamas/Israeli Conflict; Hamas TTPs; Conclusion. Charts and tables.