Distinguished historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, are the contributors to No End to Alliance . The book focuses on some crucial issues in transatlantic relations in the past, present, and future, with emphasis on America's relations with West Germany, Britain, France, and Scandinavia. While the contributors hold somewhat different views, the emphasis is on the remarkable strength and duration of the Atlantic alliance.

This compelling history brings to life the watershed year of 1948, when the United States reversed its long-standing position of political and military isolation from Europe and agreed to an "entangling alliance" with ten European nations. Not since 1800, when the United States ended its alliance with France, had the nation made such a commitment. The historic North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, but the often-contentious negotiations stretched throughout the preceding year. Lawrence S. Kaplan, the leading historian of NATO, traces the tortuous and dramatic process, which struggled to reconcile the conflicting concerns on the part of the future partners. Although the allies could agree on the need to cope with the threat of Soviet-led Communism and on the vital importance of an American association with a unified Europe, they differed over the means of achieving these ends. The United States had to contend with domestic isolationist suspicions of Old World intentions, the military's worries about over extension of the nation's resources, and the apparent incompatibility of the projected treaty with the UN charter. For their part, Europeans had to be convinced that American demands to abandon their traditions would provide the sense of security that economic and political recovery from World War II required. Kaplan brings to life the colorful diplomats and politicians arrayed on both sides of the debate. The end result was a remarkably durable treaty and alliance that has linked the fortunes of America and Europe for over fifty years. Despite differences that have persisted and occasionally flared over the past fifty years, NATO continues to bind America and Europe in the twenty-first century. Kaplan's detailed and lively account draws on a wealth of primary sources--newspapers, memoirs, and diplomatic documents--to illuminate how the United States came to assume international obligations it had scrupulously avoided for the previous 150 years.

The Alliance has endeavoured to identify a new raison d'être since 1991, but no unifying set of priorities has surfaced. In the absence of a menace to their vital interests, and with fundamental policy differences dividing North America and Europe, NATO is succumbing to the pressure of the times.

This study brings to light key overlooked documents, such as the Yalta diary of Roosevelt's daughter Anna; the intimate letters of Roosevelt's de facto chief of staff, Missy LeHand; and the wiretap transcripts of estranged advisor Harry Hopkins. The book lays out a new approach to foreign relations history.

After Panama assumed control of the Panama Canal in 1999, its relations with the United States became those of a friendly neighbor. In this third edition, Michael L. Conniff describes Panama’s experience as owner-operator of one of the world’s premier waterways and the United States’ adjustment to its new, smaller role. He finds that Panama has done extremely well with the canal and economic growth but still struggles to curb corruption, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Historically, Panamanians aspired to have their country become a crossroads of the world, while Americans sought to tame a vast territory and protect their trade and influence around the globe. The building of the Panama Canal (1904–14) locked the two countries in their parallel quests but failed to satisfy either fully. Drawing on a wide array of sources, Conniff considers the full range of factors—political, social, strategic, diplomatic, economic, and intellectual—that have bound the two countries together.

After Panama assumed control of the Panama Canal in 1999, its relations with the United States became those of a friendly neighbor. In this third edition, Michael L. Conniff describes Panama’s experience as owner-operator of one of the world’s premier waterways and the United States’ adjustment to its new, smaller role. He finds that Panama has done extremely well with the canal and economic growth but still struggles to curb corruption, drug trafficking, and money laundering. Historically, Panamanians aspired to have their country become a crossroads of the world, while Americans sought to tame a vast territory and protect their trade and influence around the globe. The building of the Panama Canal (1904–14) locked the two countries in their parallel quests but failed to satisfy either fully. Drawing on a wide array of sources, Conniff considers the full range of factors—political, social, strategic, diplomatic, economic, and intellectual—that have bound the two countries together.

Some of the most brutal and long-lasting civil wars of our time involve the rapid formation and disintegration of alliances among warring groups, as well as fractionalization within them. It would be natural to suppose that warring groups form alliances based on shared identity considerations - such as Christian groups allying with Christian groups - but this is not what we see. Two groups that identify themselves as bitter foes one day, on the basis of some identity narrative, might be allies the next day and vice versa. Nor is any group, however homogeneous, safe from internal fractionalization. Rather, looking closely at the civil wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia and testing against the broader universe of fifty-three cases of multiparty civil wars, Fotini Christia finds that the relative power distribution between and within various warring groups is the primary driving force behind alliance formation, alliance changes, group splits and internal group takeovers.